Horn vs. Ford Motor Company

Defendant Ford Motor Company’s demurrer to Plaintiffs Jeffrey Horn and Rachel Horn’s Complaint is SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc. §430.10, subd. (e).) Plaintiffs shall have 30 days to file a First Amended Complaint to address the defects identified below. Particularity

“[T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on a concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248.)

The “‘particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.’ ” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) This standard, however, “is harder to apply [] to a case of simple nondisclosure.” (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.) “One of the purposes of the specificity requirement is ‘notice to the defendant, to furnish the defendant with certain definite charges which can be intelligently met.’” (Id.) “Less specificity should be required of fraud claims ‘when “it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy,” [citation]; “[e]ven under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party . . . .” ’ ” (Id.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged concealment and have not alleged any duty to disclose on the part of Defendant such that a cause of action for concealment cannot stand. Plaintiffs alleges that they entered into a warranty contract with Defendant. (Complaint, ¶7.) This is sufficient to trigger a duty to disclose on the part of Defendant. (See Dhital, supra., 84 Cal.App.5th at 844 [rejecting Nissan’s similar arguments because plaintiffs alleged the manufacturer backed the car with an express warranty]; see Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 334, 337, 343 [manufacturer stepped into the role of the distributor and retail seller by issuing an express warranty]; see Fortune v. Nissan North America, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 2023, No. 22-CV-05247- KAW) 2023 WL 2065043, at *5 [transactional relationship where manufacturer issued a warranty].)

In any event, “it is clear in California that an action for deceit does not require contractual privity.” (Shapiro v. Sutherland (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1549.) This is true because “a defendant cannot escape liability if he or she makes a representation to one person while intending or having reason to expect that it will be repeated to and acted upon by the plaintiff.” (Id. at 1548.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant was aware of a serious, and potentially hazardous, underlying defect with its 10R80 automatic transmission used in the 2022 F-150 or its related components. (See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 24-32). However, the Complaint does not allege with particularity that Defendant concealed any of this information, relying instead on bare conclusions. Nor does the Complaint allege that Defendant influenced anyone who did have direct communications with Plaintiff regarding the vehicle to withhold any of this information. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained for failure to plead the element of concealment with particularity.