MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS OR STAY OR DISMISS
SF Superior Court - Law & Motion / Discovery Dept 301 - CGC25631969 - June 29, 2026 Hearing date: June 29, 2026 Case number: CGC25631969 Case title: SAMANTHA D. RAJAPAKSE VS. FREELANCER.COM ALSO AS FREELANCER, A FOREIGN Case Number: | | CGC25631969 | Case Title: | | SAMANTHA D. RAJAPAKSE VS. FREELANCER.COM ALSO AS FREELANCER, A FOREIGN | Court Date: | | 2026-06-29 09:00 AM | Calendar Matter: | | MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS OR STAY OR DISMISS | Rulings: | | On the Law & Motion/Discovery calendar for Monday, June 29, 2026, Line 6, DEFENDANTS FREELANCER.COM ALSO AS FREELANCER, A FOREIGN COMPANY DBA ESCROW.COM MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS OR STAY OR DISMISS.
Defendant Freelancer USA, Inc.'s motion to quash service of summons and complaint is granted.
Plaintiff Samantha D. Rajapakse has filed a complaint against "Freelancer.com, also [known] as Freelancer, a foreign company, d/b/a Escrow.Com." Freelancer USA Inc. specially appears. It presents a declaration by Alma Caus, who attests that she is an employee of Internet Escrow Services, Inc., and that on March 11, 2026, she received a piece of certified mail at the company mailbox with a copy of the summons and complaint inside. (Caus Decl., para. 4 & Ex. B.)
The court takes judicial notice of a proof of service filed in the register of actions on April 8, 2026, with a declaration by Arthur L. McClinton Jr. that he served Owen Smith, Escrow.com Compliance Officer, by U.S. mail at 180 Montgomery Street, Suite 630, San Francisco. The McClinton Declaration attaches a certified mail receipt.
On this motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving proper service. (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413 ["When a defendant challenges the court's personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service."].)
Proper methods of service are set out by statute. When considering service on an entity, two questions are important: who was served and how they were served.
With respect to who was served: an entity can only be served by service on a person who is authorized to accept service, either by the entity itself or by statute. The relevant entity-service statute states that a corporation may be served by service on its agent for service of process (Code Civ. Proc., section 416.10, subd. (a)), or on its "president, chief executive officer, or other head of the corporation, a vice president, a secretary or assistant secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, a controller or chief financial officer, a general manager, or a person authorized by the corporation to receive service of process" (id., subd. (b)). There is no evidence before the court that Caus is any of these; she states that she is an employee of Internet Escrow Services, Inc., which is not one of the names listed on the complaint.
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In addition, the court must consider how service was purportedly made. Here, McClinton states that he mailed the summons and complaint by certified mail, which is consistent with Caus's declaration. This method does not satisfy the service statutes. In the absence of personal service on one of the authorized agents of the corporation, a corporation can be served by "leaving a copy of the summons and complaint during usual office hours in the person's office or, if no physical address is known, at the person's usual mailing address . . . with the person who is apparently in charge thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.
When service is effected by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at a mailing address, it shall be left with a person at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof. . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., section 415.20, subd. (a).)
Rajapakse does not present evidence that she (through a process server or other person) left a copy of the summons with a person apparently in charge and informed the person of its contents. (Part 1 of 2, tentative ruling continues in Part 2 of 2) | |