Midland Credit Management, Inc. v. Arnold Navarro et al.

In opposition: The record establishes that the Defendant was personally served at his residence address in the proof of service filed 1-31-22. The process server personally delivered the summons and complaint to the Defendant after he identified himself by stating his name, and accepted service by direct delivery. A minor discrepancy in the process server’s estimation of height or weight. His contention that his name is Arnulfo rather than Arnold is similarly does not overcome the presumption of correctness pursuant to Evidence code section 647. Moreover, the Defendant did not seek relief until 5-18-26, more than 4 years after the entry of default judgment, and as a matter of law the motion is untimely under both statutes. The Defendant was personally served, and so CCP§473 (d) s not availing and the judgment should stand.

Legal Authorities and analysis. CCP§473.5 has strict time limits. A motion pursuant to this code section must be filed within a reasonable time, in no event exceeding the earlier of either two years after the entry of default judgment, or 180 days after the service of written notice of entry of judgement. (CCP§473.5 sub (a).). CCP §473(b) is also governed by strict time limits. While it permits a party to seek relief from a judgment taken against them through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, the motion must be made within a reasonable time, not exceeding six months after the entry of the judgment.

Here, the default judgment was entered March 25, 2022. (See Plaintiff’s MPA ex F.) The Defendant did not seek relief until May 18, 2026, more than four years later. Under either of these statutes the motion is untimely. The Defendant’s assertion that he lacked notice of the action neither extends nor tolls the statutory time limits, nor under CCP§473(b) does it constitute excusable neglect where the record establishes valid service of process as set forth in the case file.

The request for relief pursuant to CCP§473(d), claiming the judgment is void for lack of service challenges the facially valid proof of personal service executed by the registered process server (Aileen Garay) filed with the court January 31, 2022. (Plaintiff’s MPA Ex D.) The Defendant was served January 21, 2022, at the address that Defendant admits has been his residence since 2009. (Defendant’s Declaration in support; Ex D.) The registered process server’s proof of service is entitled to a statutory presumption of correctness which the Defendant has not rebutted.

Pursuant to Evidence Code section 647. The process server’s proof of service constitutes a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence as to the facts stated therein. The proof further states that the process server personally encountered the Defendant who confirmed his identity when the defendant stated his name and there was direct personal delivery of the Summons and Complaint. Nothing has been provided which rebuts this presumption.

It is not relevant that the Defendant resided outside the United States from December 2023 until May 2025, as service occurred January 21, 22, almost two years before his stated departure. The challenges to his estimated height description is not dispositive, as they are approximations when identity is confirmed through direct verbal acknowledgement and

*Please contact Judicial Courtroom Assistant, Adriana Ramirez, at (831) 636-4057 x124 or aramirez@sanbenitocourt.org with any objections or concerns personal delivery at the Defendant’s residence. Moreover, the claim that his legal name is Arnulfo as opposed to Arnold doesn’t establish a misidentification, the proof of service reflects that the Defendant personally identified himself to the process server at the time of service and personally accepted the delivery of the Summons and Complaint. (Plaintiff’s MPA Ex D.) No evidence that another individual was server or that service was directed to the wrong person has been provided. The declaration is self-serving and unsupported by any corroborating evidence. A bare denial alone is insufficient to overcome the presumption created by the Proof of Service by a registered process server pursuant to Evidence Code section 647.

Proposed Ruling: Defendant’s motion is denied.

CL-24-00687 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Victoria Voight 6-26-2026

On calendar for Defendant’s motion to set aside judgment entered pursuant to stipulation and order based on CCP§473.5

Petitioner: Jon Blanda, Edgar Lopez (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.)

Defendant: Self Represented (Voight, Victoria)

The underlying case is for the collection of consumer debt. The case initially resolved pursuant to a stipulation signed by the parties in 2024, with dismissal pursuant to CCP§664.6, allowing the Plaintiff to vacate the dismissal if there was a failure to comply with the terms of the stipulation in the matter.

Argument: Defendant asserts she was never served properly in this matter, and she knew nothing of the matter until she received the notice in April regarding setting aside dismissal. She assumed the court would notify her if the Plaintiff’s motion was granted. She didn’t know of the judgment until mid-May. She reports that there are slight differences in height, weight, and estimated age of the person served and her own statistical information.

Opposition: Plaintiff notes that on 11-10-24 Defendant signed a stipulation for entry of judgment and installment payments with dismissal of action with consent to the court retaining jurisdiction pursuant to CCP§664.6. The Defendant then failed to make any payments under the stipulation on 1-15-25 Plaintiff sent Defendant written notice she was in default under the Stipulation and provided an additional 7 days to cure the default. The default was not cured. True and correct copy of that written notice is provided as EX 1 to Lopez Declaration. On 4-27-26 the court entered judgment pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation after considering Plaintiff’s noticed motion pursuant to 664.6. The Defendant has