LY v. SANTA CRUZ SEASIDE COMPANY

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 26, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

plaintiff had any contract with the hotel, and no particularized facts supporting fraudulent concealment of the bed bugs. On April 21, 2025, this Court ruled that plaintiff’s first amended complaint was still deficient and failed to support any of those claims, sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and striking plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations.

Following plaintiff’s motion to compel pest control records from defendant, the Court ordered the unredacted records produced. Plaintiff now contends that those records support renewing her claims for IIED, fraudulent concealment, and punitive damages.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Leave of court is required to amend any pleading except as provided by Code of Civil Procedure sections 472 and 474. A judge may, in furtherance of justice and on proper terms, allow the amendment of any pleading at any time, even after commencement of trial. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 473, subd. (a), 576; Hong Sang Market, Inc. v. Peng (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 474, 488 [leave to amend any pleading is entrusted to judge’s sound discretion].) Judges should generally be liberal in permitting amendments to pleadings. (Ibid.)

Judges must consider factors of party conduct, potential prejudice to parties, timeliness of amendment, or unwarranted delay in determining if an amendment is permitted. (See Duchrow v. Forrest (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1377; Emerald Bay Community Assn. v. Golden Eagle Ins. Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1097-98 [even if proposed amendment in proper form, unwarranted delay in bringing it may be a valid reason for denial].)

III. DISCUSSION

A. IIED

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), a plaintiff must allege: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050- 51.) “A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” (Ibid.)

The complaint must plead specific facts that establish severe emotional distress resulting from the defendant’s conduct. (Michaelian v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1114.)

The distress must be so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. (Bogard v. Employers Casualty Co. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 602, 617.) Plaintiffs must state facts

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 26, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

which describe or indicate the nature and extent of their mental suffering. (Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397.)

Based on the pest control records, plaintiff now alleges beginning no later than March 15, 2022, defendant had actual knowledge, through its pest control contractor, that bed bugs were present in multiple rooms at the hotel. The pest control records reflect that on or about February 28, 2023, defendant was billed for bed bug inspection services for rooms 202, 204 and 205, and was billed for bed bug treatments performed in rooms 201, 202, 203, 204, and 205 from February 28, 2023 through March 1, 2023.

The pest control records show that room 103 – plaintiff’s room on October 13, 2023 -- was the subject of a bed bug treatment on July 7, 2023, and a bed bug inspection on July 10, 2023. Plaintiff alleges this establishes defendant’s actual notice of a hotel-wide infestation as well as bed bugs in room 103. Notwithstanding this actual knowledge, defendant allegedly continued to hold out the hotel as fit for guest occupancy and continued renting rooms to paying guests without disclosing the known bed bug history, prior treatments, prior inspections, or the ongoing bed bug problem at the hotel. (Demirdjian Declaration, Exhibit A, proposed Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 73-76.)

On or about October 13, 2023, the hotel rented room 103 to plaintiff without warning her that it was treated for bed bugs in July 2023. Plaintiff thereafter alleges typical and conclusory allegations related to punitive damages (ratification, failure to inform, intentional concealment, choosing profit over guest safety, ignored complaints by plaintiff, failure to abate the condition and protect plaintiff from harm). Plaintiff alleges that had defendant disclosed that room 103 had been treated for bed bugs on July 7, 2023 and inspected on July 10, 2023, she would not have rented the room.

Plaintiff also alleges that multiple additional rooms “had recently required bed bug inspections and treatments” but fails to allege those dates or rooms. (Demirdjian Decl., Ex. A, ¶¶ 77-89.) Based on her proposed second amended complaint, the last inspections and treatments were in July 2023, three months prior to plaintiff’s visit.

Defendant argues that the pest control records actually establish that defendant was conducting proactive inspections and treatment for bed bugs, and that there is no evidence of bed bugs at the time of plaintiff’s stay.

On reply, plaintiff contends her IIED allegations are sufficient and cures the previous identified defects. However, the Court agrees that the new allegations based on the pest control records do not support a claim for IIED. As the Court indicated in its previous order sustaining defendant’s demurrer to the prior IIED claim without leave to amend, these facts could support negligent infliction of emotional distress but they fail to describe behavior that exceeds all bounds of that usually tolerated in society, as is the standard for IIED. Even where alarming or upsetting facts justify liability on other tort theories, intentional infliction of emotional distress will not necessarily lie. (See Mack v. Soung (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 966, 975-976 [elder abuse];

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 26, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051 [attempt to extort sexual favors for trust fund payments]; Delfino v. Agilent Echnologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 809 [anonymous emails graphically threatening physical harm].) The presence of bed bugs when renting hotel rooms - even when the infestation is severe - is not beyond what a reasonable person could expect to endure in a civilized society. And here, there is no evidence that defendant was aware of any bed bug infestation at the relevant time.

For these reasons, the Court denies plaintiff’s motion as to any newly alleged IIED claim.

B. Fraudulent concealment

“[T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Marketing West, Inc. v. Sanyo Fisher (USA) Corp. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 603, 612-613.)

Concealment is a species of fraud and must be pleaded with specificity. (Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 878; Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248.) General and conclusory allegations do not suffice. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645). The requirement of specificity, however, is relaxed when the allegations indicate the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy. (Tarmann v. State Farm (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 158.) When asserting fraud against a corporate entity, plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. (Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1614.)

Plaintiff’s proposed amendment alleges “[a]t all times relevant hereto, defendants, through their employees, agents, business manager(s), front-desk personnel, and managing agents, were aware of the existence of bed bugs in the Subject Property and the Hotel Room, and possessed superior and exclusive knowledge of the facts concerning prior bed bug activity, inspections, and treatments at the hotel.” (Demirdjian Decl., Ex. A, ¶ 91.)

She describes the facts regarding the 2022 through July 2023 pest control records (as detailed above). She alleges when she checked in on October 13, 2023, and was assigned room 103, defendant, “through the front-desk employee(s) and/or manager(s) then on duty, acted with Defendant’s authority to assign rooms, accept payment, and communicate room status to guests,

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 26, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

and failed to disclose the foregoing material facts” to her. She alleges that by assigning room 103, taking her payment, and permitting her to occupy the room without disclosing the hotel’s prior bed bug treatment and inspection history, defendant conveyed that room 103 was fit and safe for occupancy, while suppressing material facts that materially affected the transaction. She claims defendant had a duty to disclose these facts because it had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known or reasonably accessible to her and that it actively concealed those facts, and made representations of room 103’s habitability by renting it as a suitable guest room while omitting its known bed bug history.

She goes on to allege relatively conclusory facts as to her placing her trust in defendant to rent a habitable room, that she could not have known or discovered the infestation that was known to defendant, that defendant’s unnamed managing agents intentionally concealed the infestation and prior history of bed bugs with the intent to induce her to rent the infested room, and general facts related to defendant’s causing her harm, which included severe physical and presently ongoing emotional injuries, including painful bites, infection, scarring, anxiety, sleeplessness, humiliation, and other damages according to proof.

She asserts unnamed officers or managing agents ratified the conduct with a conscious disregard for the Plaintiff’s rights and with the intent, design and malicious purpose of injuring the Plaintiff. (Demirdjian Decl., Ex. A, ¶¶ 92-101.)

These allegations remain problematic. The proposed amendment continues to allege general conclusions that the hotel and essentially all its employees were aware of the bed bug infestation in plaintiff’s room and hid this fact. All that the new pest control evidence establishes is that someone at the hotel, unidentified by plaintiff, knew an infestation had occurred in room 103 three months prior. The evidence does not meet the pleading standard for fraud – plaintiff fails to specify the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. This evidence also does not support that any hotel employee actively concealed the prior infestation with the intent to harm plaintiff.

For these reasons, the Court denies plaintiff’s motion as to any newly alleged fraudulent concealment claim.

C. Punitive damages

“Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at 725.) “As amended to include [despicable], the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (Ibid.) The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 26, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

punitive damage awards.” (Ibid.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)

“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)

Plaintiff’s proposed amendment does not cure the defects of her previous complaints. Despite including the pest control services for her room three months before, and other rooms before that, she fails to offer specific factual details describing how she discovered the alleged infestation, what hotel staff said when she complained, what the circumstances were surrounding her departure, or what any identified corporate actor knew at the time of check-in. As noted above, plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient as to IIED or fraud, which are the only claims that could support any punitive damages. She also has not pled that any officer, director, or managing agent had knowledge that the hotel remained infested on October 13, 2023.

Therefore, the Court does not find that plaintiff can state any new allegations to support punitive damages.

No. 24CV02263 -- UPDATED FROM PRIOR POSTING OF MAY 29, 2026

WOODS v. PACIFIC BELL, et al.

MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL

The motion is denied, as discussed below.

I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Woods (“Woods” or “plaintiff”) contends that a bridge on his property was significantly damaged by an AT&T van that came to perform an installation on his property. Woods hired attorney Saunders to prosecute his claim against defendants, including AT&T. (Decl. of Woods at ¶ 13.) Defendants successfully demurred to the complaint, but plaintiff was granted leave to amend. Saunders allegedly never told Woods about the demurrer or that he needed to file an amended complaint. (Decl. of Woods at ¶ 16.) Woods did not file a timely amended pleading. (Decl. of Woods at ¶ 16.) The case was then dismissed by the Court after