Malki vs. Karanouh

The court finds that the requirements for pro hac vice admission have been met here. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40.)

Moving Attorney to give notice.

6 Malki vs. Karanouh Motion for Attorney’s Fees

The court GRANTS Defendant ABDULMAJID KARANOUH’s motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (re anti-SLAPP).

Defendant is awarded attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $12,112.50.

Defendant prevailed on an anti-SLAPP motion and Section 425.16(c) therefore authorizes attorneys’ fees here.

Plaintiff does not apparently dispute that the Defendant is entitled to attorneys’ fees. Rather, Plaintiff disputes the amount requested.

Lodestar Calculation

The lodestar method for calculating attorneys’ fees applies to any statutory attorneys’ fees award, unless the statute authorizing the award provides for another method of calculation. (Galbiso v. Orosi Pub. Util. Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1089; see also K.I. v. Wagner (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425.)

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084,1095.) “Under this method, the court ‘begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the “careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.’ ” [Citation.] The lodestar ‘should ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent’ on the case [citation], but the court must ‘carefully review attorney documentation of

hours expended; “padding” in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.’ [Citation.] The lodestar may then be adjusted ‘to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action.’ ” (Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 348.)

Hourly Rates

When determining a reasonable attorneys’ fees award using the lodestar method, the court begins by deciding the reasonable hours the prevailing party’s attorney spent on the case and multiplies that number by the reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 998).

The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095.).

Here, the court finds that Defendant’s counsel’s hourly rate of $425 is reasonable. (Moher Decl., ¶ 2.)

Time Spent

Defendant seeks $11,857.50 in his motion. Mr. Moher declares that 27.90 hours were expended in these proceedings, not including the approximately 2.5 hours of work on reviewing documents and the settlement discussions that he voluntarily waived. (Moher Decl., ¶ 5 and ¶ 6, Exh. B [billings].) In his Reply Brief, Defendant seeks an additional $935, attaching a declaration wherein Mr. Moher declares that he spent an additional 2.2 hours in reviewing the Opposition and preparing a Reply. The total amount sought by Defendant is therefore $12,792.50.

In challenges to the reasonableness of the number of hours billed, “it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.” (Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) “General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Id.) Additionally, moving party’s counsel’s verified time records

should be “entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) However, the court “may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.)

Plaintiff argues that the following entries were disproportionate to the scope of issues presented:

5.5 hours for initial case assessment and pre-motion work 6.5 hours opposing Plaintiff’s motion for limited discovery; and 6.4 hours preparing the reply brief for the anti-SLAPP motion and related declaration work.

The court however does not find that this time is unreasonable or disproportionate.

Next, Plaintiff disputes the attorney client communications and case coordination reflected throughout the billing.

There are multiple billable entries for “emails w/ client” that do not provide further detail (in contrast to other, more descriptive entries of his communication with the client). Counsel also did not state in his declaration whether these emails were connected to the anti-SLAPP motion. These entries include the following:

11/25/25 entry for “emails w/ client (6 emails)”, .2, $85.00 11/28/25 entry for “emails w/ client”, .1, $42.50 12/16/25 entry for “emails w/ client”, .3, $127.50 1/26/26 entry for “emails w/ client”, .4, $170.00 2/24/26 entry for “emails w/ client”, .2, $85 3/6/26 entry for “text messages w/ client”, .4, $170.00

The court deducts the amount from these entries, for a total deduction of $680.

Plaintiff also argues that time spent educating counsel regarding collateral family law issues and coordinating with third parties should not be allowable. However, Plaintiff did not set forth any specific entry, and a general review of

the billable entries only shows communications with family law attorneys and review of documents, which do not appear to be irrelevant. As Defendant notes in his reply, Defendant’s review of the underlying family law proceeding and communication with family law attorneys is relevant as the premise of the Anti-SLAPP motion rested on the position that the Complaint’s allegations derived from protected activity.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that because the anti-SLAPP ruling is on appeal, “the existence of the appeal counsels in favor of a conservative and carefully limited award.” (Opp’n Br., at p. 3, line 8). Plaintiff cites to no authority in support of this argument. And as Plaintiff acknowledges, “the Court retains jurisdiction to consider attorney’s fees as a collateral matter.” (Opp’n Br. at p. 3, line 8. See also, Bankes v. Lucas (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 365, 369 [“an award of attorney fees as costs is a collateral matter which is embraced in the action but is not affected by the order from which an appeal is taken. ... Consequently, filing of a notice of appeal does not stay any proceedings to determine the matter of costs and does not prevent the trial court from determining a proper award of attorney fees claimed as costs”].)

Defendant’s other entries, including the 2.2 hours for the review of Opposition papers and the preparation of the Reply papers are reasonable.

Accordingly, the total fee award, minus the $680 deduction, is $12,112.50.

Defendant to give notice.

Upcoming 8/3/26 OSC re Dismissal

On 4/3/26, after the court granted Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion (on 3/20/26) but before Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal (on 4/6/26), this court set an Order to Show Cause re Dismissal pursuant to Section 581(f)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, for hearing on 8/3/26.

In light of the Appeal, the court DISCHARGES the Order to Show Cause set for 8/3/26, for possible resetting after the conclusion of the appeal.

Defendant to give notice.

7 California Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint Affordable Housing Association vs. Volk The court DENIES Defendant VOLK INVESTMENTS, LLC’s Investments, LLC Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint.

The proposed Cross-Complaint seeks indemnity claims against an individual who is not currently a party to this action, ALEX AKSELROD. Section 428.50 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the filing of a cross-complaint against a non-party “at any time before the court has set a date for trial.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50(b), emphasis supplied.)

Here, as explained below, trial was set long ago and Defendant’s explanation is lacking for Defendant’s extensive delay in seeking leave now to file a cross- complaint.

This action was filed on 10/11/23 (i.e., years ago) and trial is currently set for 8/3/26 (i.e., about a month away). The action has been at-issue for years and trial has been continued numerous times at Defendant’s requests. Defendant filed an answer on 7/26/24. On 10/28/24, the court set the original trial for 12/15/25. After Defendant failed to comply with discovery obligations and pursuant to Plaintiff’s motions for sanctions, the court issued evidentiary sanctions on 5/2/25 against Defendant (while denying Plaintiff’s request for evidentiary sanctions). The court also heard, but denied, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment/adjudication of issues on 10/10/25.

Thereafter, on 11/25/25, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties and ex parte application filed by Defendant, the court granted Plaintiff leave to file a Third Amended Complaint by 12/1/25, ordered Defendant to file an Answer to the new pleading within 30 days, continued the trial date from 12/15/25 to 3/9/26, and extended trial-

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