Carrie Moles v. City of Santa Clara et al.

Plaintiff’s FAC, another form complaint, was filed on September 2, 2025, stating the same single cause of action for “premises liability” and the same two “counts.” The FAC added the Forty Niners Stadium Management Company LLC and ABM Industry Groups LLC as named defendants to the negligence “count.” The FAC does not expressly allege that either of the new defendants are substituted for specific Does, and it does not allege that either of the new defendants are agents or employees of the two original defendants. (The court acknowledges the FAC refers to Doe defendants “3 to 50” in certain places, suggesting Plaintiff may have intended to substitute the new defendants for Doe defendants 1 and 2.) Doe defendants 3-50 are all alleged to be agents or employees of other alleged defendants. (See FAC at ¶ 6 and Prem.L-5.a.) There are no exhibits attached to the FAC.

There are no allegations in the FAC describing the discovery of the newly added defendants’ identity. The only narrative portion of the FAC alleges: “Plaintiff was a guest attending a football game at Levi’s Stadium located at 4900 Marie P DeBartolo Way, Santa Clara, CA, 95054. Plaintiff slipped and fell due to [a] dangerous and unsafe condition of the subject property. Plaintiff slipped and fell on liquid or some other foreign substance which had been allowed to accumulate on the floor and thereby legally caused the injuries and damages to Plaintiff. Defendants owned, leased, occupied, operated, controlled, possessed, supervised, managed, inspected, maintained, repaired, and/or was legally responsible for the subject property. Defendants so negligently owned, leased, occupied, operated, controlled, possessed, 5

supervised, managed, inspected, maintained, and/or repaired the area where Plaintiff was injured such that unsafe and dangerous conditions existed, causing Plaintiff’s injuries.”

Plaintiff’s injuries are not described in the FAC. The FAC itself cannot be construed as a Doe amendment under Code of Civil Procedure section 474, and no Doe amendment has been filed.

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Both sides have submitted requests for judicial notice. “Judicial notice may not be taken of any matter unless authorized or required by law.” (Evid. Code, § 450.) A precondition to judicial notice in either its permissive or mandatory form is that the matter to be noticed be relevant to the material issue before the court. (Silverado Modjeska Recreation and Park Dist. v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 282, 307.) Evidence Code section 453, subdivision (b), requires a party seeking notice to “[furnish] the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter.”

Forty Niners SMC’s Request

Forty Niners SMC requests judicial notice of two documents, the original complaint and the FAC. (Request at pp.1:25-2:7.) The court denies this request as unnecessary; the court already considers both pleadings in evaluating this demurrer. (Paul v. Patton (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1091, fn.1 [denying as unnecessary a request for judicial notice of pleading under review on demurrer].)

Forty Niners SMC also requests judicial notice of the fact that “the San Francisco Forty Niners is the football team that plays at Levi’s Stadium located at 4900 Marie P DeBartolo Way, Santa Clara, CA,” pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (g). (Request at p. 2:8-13.) That request is granted.

Plaintiff’s Request

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of three court filings: the original complaint, the stipulation and order permitting the filing of the FAC, and the FAC itself. (See request at p. 1:3-19.) This request is denied as unnecessary. The court already considers both the complaint and FAC in ruling on the demurrer, and the court has already taken judicial notice of the stipulation and order.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DEMURRER

In ruling on a demurrer, the court accepts as true all properly pleaded material factual allegations but does not accept as true contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Valero v. Spread Your Wings, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 243, 253.) Code of Civil Procedure section 430.60 states that “[a] demurrer shall distinctly specify the grounds upon which any of the objections to the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer are taken. Unless it does so, it may be disregarded.” The California Rules of Court also require that the demurrer itself (distinct from a supporting memorandum) specify the target of any objection and the grounds. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1103(c), 3.1112(a), 3.1320(a) [“Each ground of demurrer must be in a

separate paragraph and must state whether it applies to the entire complaint, cross-complaint, or answer, or to specified causes of action or defenses.”].)

Where a demurrer is to an amended complaint or cross-complaint, the court “may consider the factual allegations of prior complaints, which a plaintiff may not discard or avoid by making contradictory averments, in a superseding, amended pleading.” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1034, internal quotations omitted (Berg & Berg); see also Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assoc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1122.)

The court cannot consider extrinsic evidence when ruling on a demurrer. This includes declarations. The court has considered the declaration from Maria Lampasona filed in support of the demurrer only to the extent it discusses the meet and confer efforts required by statute. The court has not considered the attached exhibits or arguments based on these exhibits. The court has not considered any portion of the declaration from Plaintiff’s counsel Darren Darwish filed with the opposition, any attached exhibits, or arguments based on the exhibits.

While the demurring party is required by statute to submit a declaration addressing meet and confer efforts, there is no authority permitting the party opposing a demurrer to submit declarations. Finally, “points raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to present them before.” (Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1273.)

DISCUSSION

Forty Niners SMC demurs to the entire FAC and the sole cause of action for premises liability on the ground that it fails to state sufficient facts because it is time-barred as alleged against Forty Niner SMC. Forty Niner SMC contends “Plaintiff failed to file her FAC naming Defendant as a party within the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1.” (See Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer.)

An “injury to ... an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another” is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1; Johnson v. Open Door Community Health Centers (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 153, 160 [premises liability claims subject to two-year statute of limitations].)

“A complaint showing on its face the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations is subject to general demurrer.” (Iverson, Yoakum, Papiano & Hatch v. Berwald (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 990, 995.) The running of the statute must appear clearly and affirmatively from the dates alleged—it is not enough that the complaint might be barred. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.) “Generally, the limitations period starts running when the last element of a cause of action is complete.” (NBCUniversal Media, LLC v.

Super. Ct. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1231.) Both the complaint and the FAC allege that Plaintiff was injured on January 14, 2023. The premises liability cause of action was complete at the time of injury. “The fact that a plaintiff does not know the identity of each and every defendant who has caused the harm, does not toll the running of the statute of limitations. The identity of the defendant is not an element of the cause of action. Once a plaintiff is aware of the injury, the limitations period is presumed to afford sufficient opportunity to discover the identity of all the defendants.”

(Burdette v. Carrier Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1668, 1693, internal citations omitted (Burdette).)

Plaintiff’s cause of action for premises liability based on the January 14, 2023 injury became time-barred against anyone not already a named defendant on January 15, 2025. The premises liability claim became time-barred as to Forty Niners SMC well before the FAC was filed on September 2, 2025, and well before the original parties to the lawsuit (Plaintiff, the City of Santa Clara, and the Santa Clara Stadium Authority) entered into the stipulation regarding the filing of a FAC on July 31, 2025.

Plaintiff argues that the original parties’ stipulation bars Forty Niners SMC from raising this issue because the stipulation became an order of the court. But the existing parties to a lawsuit have no power to bind nonparties through a stipulation. Nor can they preclude them from raising whatever rights and defenses those nonparties have under the law if they are later named as parties. The stipulation here also expressly states that the proposed FAC “shall not prejudice any defense that the newly added defendants may assert.” (Stipulation at p. 1:24-25.) That the same law firm that represented the original defendants also represents Forty Niners SMC is irrelevant. The only parties to the stipulation are Plaintiff, the City of Santa Clara, and the Santa Clara Stadium Authority.

The existing parties to a lawsuit do not have any power to revive already expired causes of action by stipulation, particularly claims against individuals or organizations that are not already parties to the lawsuit. By the time the stipulation was signed on July 31, 2025 the statute of limitations had run for a premises liability claim against Forty Niners SMC based on Plaintiff’s January 14, 2023 injury.

Plaintiff made no attempt to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 474’s procedural requirements before her premises liability claim was time-barred against Forty Niners SMC. No Doe amendment substituting Forty Niners SMC for any specific Doe defendant named in the original complaint was filed before January 15, 2025. The FAC also does not contain any allegations that either of the newly added defendants are substituted for specific Does pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 474. In any event, the premises liability cause of action was already time-barred as brought against Forty Niners SMC when the FAC was filed.

Simply naming Forty Niners SMC as a defendant in the FAC does not make the amendment relate back to the filing of the original complaint. “The general rule is that an amended complaint that adds a new defendant does not relate back to the date of filing the original complaint and the statute of limitations is applied as of the date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed.” (Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176 (Woo).) “A recognized exception to the general rule is the substitution under section 474 of a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint as to whom a cause of action was stated in the original complaint.

If the requirements of section 474 are satisfied, the amended complaint substituting a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant filed after the statute of limitations has expired is deemed filed as of the date the original complaint was filed. Among the requirements for application of the section 474 relation back doctrine is that the new defendant in an amended complaint be substituted for an existing fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint.” (Ibid., internal citations omitted.)

The FAC does not satisfy the procedural requirements of section 8

474 as it does not allege that Forty Niners SMC was substituted for a specific Doe defendant under section 474.

The FAC also does not satisfy the “further and nonprocedural requirement for application of the section 474 relation-back doctrine” in that it does not include any allegations that Plaintiff was genuinely ignorant of the Forty Niners SMC’s identity when the original complaint was filed. “The omission of the defendant’s identity in the original complaint must be real and not merely a subterfuge for avoiding the requirements of section 474. Furthermore, if the identity ignorance requirement of section 474 is not met, a new defendant may not be added after the statute of limitations has expired even if the new defendant cannot establish prejudice resulting from the delay.” (Woo, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at 177, internal citations omitted.)

Plaintiff’s argument that this issue cannot be resolved on demurrer because Plaintiff’s ignorance presents a question of fact is unpersuasive. The FAC does not cite Code of Civil Procedure section 474. And by the time it was filed, the two-year limitations period for a premises liability claim against Forty Niners SMC had already run. The premises liability causes of action as brought against Forty Niners SMC in the FAC is time-barred on its face. There are no allegations in the FAC describing how Plaintiff learned the identity of either of the two newly added defendants.

“[T]here is a general, rebuttable presumption that a plaintiff has knowledge of the wrongful causes of an injury.” (Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 788, 795, citing Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 638 (Grisham).) “In order to rebut that presumption, ‘a plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.’” (Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 638.) “In assessing the sufficiency of the allegations of delayed discovery, the court places the burden on the plaintiff to ‘show diligence’; ‘conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer.’” (Fox v.

Ethicon Endo- Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808, internal citations omitted.) “In order to adequately allege facts supporting a theory of delayed discovery, the plaintiff must plead that, despite diligent investigation of the circumstances of the injury, he or she could not have reasonably discovered facts supporting the cause of action within the applicable statute of limitations period.” (Id. at p. 809.)

A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that a defect identified on demurrer could be cured through amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; Shaeffer v. Califia Farms, LLC (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1145 [“The onus is on the plaintiff to articulate the ‘specifi[c] ways’ to cure the identified defect, and absent such an articulation, a trial or appellate court may grant leave to amend ‘only if a potentially effective amendment [is] both apparent and consistent with the plaintiff’s theory of the case.’”].) The opposition argues Plaintiff can amend to allege that she was genuinely ignorant of Forty Niners SMC’s “status as a distinct legal entity and of the facts giving rise to [Forty Niners SMC’s] independent liability at the time the original complaint was filed.” (Opposition at p. 7:24-26.)

The court has some doubt that any amendment will alter the conclusions that: (1) no Doe amendments were filed in this case, and (2) the limitations period for a premises liability claim based on a January 13, 2023 injury ran well before both the stipulation in this case and 9

the filing of the FAC. The court also notes that the alleged circumstances of Plaintiff’s injury would appear to put her on inquiry notice that any entities related to the Forty Niners were potential defendants as of the date of her injury. The “limitations period is presumed to afford sufficient opportunity to discover the identity of all the defendants.” (Burdette, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1693.) However, as this is the first pleading challenge in this case, the court will grant leave to amend. The court does not grant leave to add new parties or new causes of action. The court will consider the contents of the original complaint and the FAC if a pleading challenge is brought to any further amended complaint Plaintiff chooses to file. (See Berg & Berg, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 1034.)

CONCLUSION

Defendant Forty Niners SMC’s request for judicial notice is granted in part and denied in part.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is denied.

Defendant Forty Niners SMC’s demurrer to the FAC and the sole cause of action for premises liability is sustained with leave to amend. Any amended pleading must be filed and served no later than July 27, 2026.

The court will prepare the order.

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