Plaintiff Nizar Shehadeh’s Motion for Attorney Fees
JUNE 26, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar
HONORABLE MICHAEL L. MAU, Department 20 ________________________________________________________________________
09:00 AM 25-CIV-02045 NIZAR SHEHADEH VS. LUCID GROUP USA, INC. LINE 5
NIZAR SHEHADEH ASHLEY J. YADDGO LUCID GROUP USA, INC. AMY MACLEAR
PLAINTIFF NIZAR SHEHADEH’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiff Nizar Shehadeh’s Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs, and Expenses, is GRANTED-in-part, as follows:
Reasonableness of Fees
A buyer who prevails in an action under the Song-Beverly Warranty Act is entitled to recover costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, reasonably incurred in connection with the commencement and prosecution of the action. (Civ. Code section 1794; Reynolds v. Ford Motor Co. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1105.)
Plaintiff requests a lodestar fee award of $21,912.50 and an additional $4,658.86 for time spent reviewing the Opposition, preparing the Reply, and anticipated time to appear at the hearing. (Cline Decl., ¶3; Johnson Decl. ISO Reply, ¶7.) This represents 36.8 hours of attorney and staff time expended at hourly rates varying from $275 to $800. (Cline Decl., ¶7, Exh. 2.) Plaintiff presents evidence that the rates charged by each billing attorney are comparable those of similar experience levels in other Song-Beverly cases in the region and that similar rates have been approved in the past. (Id., at ¶¶12-30.) Plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to show that the rates charged are the prevailing rate in the community for similar work by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.
Defendant argues that fee rates should be reduced to a blended rate of $350. (Opp. at p. 2:26 – 4:2.) However, most of the cases Defendants point to are from 2021 or older, are federal cases, and are not specific to this community. Defendants therefore have not rebutted Plaintiff’s evidence that the rates charged are comparable those of similar experience levels in other Song-Beverly cases in the region.
Defendant next argues that Plaintiff’s request contains inflated hours, based on improperly billing for clerical work disguised by block billing. For example, Plaintiff’s paralegal billed.3 hours on March 24, 2025 to: “Receive and review court returned documents. Update file and notify attorney re: same. Review register of actions and update calendar. Notes to file re: same.” (Cline Decl., ¶7, Exh. 2.) Defendant objects to this entry as clerical work billed as “0.3 hours for, in part, calendaring dates.” The clerical element of updating the calendar that is noted within this work is minimal relative to the substantive work of reviewing documents and adding notes to the file, and therefore likely falls within a minimum increment of.1 billable hours. This does not warrant a reduction in the time billed. The same is true of the other objections for clerical work.
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Defendant also objects to 8.3 hours billed throughout the case for, at least in part, legal research, arguing that it is unclear how it was necessary or useful here. (Opp. at p. 6:13-18.) This is a speculative
JUNE 26, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 24 HONORABLE MICHAEL L. MAU, Department 20 ________________________________________________________________________ objection that second guesses the method by which counsel achieved a successful prosecution of Plaintiff’s action without evidence that the time billed was unnecessary. A key issue in the case was the legal adequacy of Defendant’s initial 998 offer to compromise, which was ultimately adjusted in Plaintiff’s favor, and several legal research entries pertain to that issue. (Cline Decl., ¶7, Exh. 2.)
Finally, Defendant objects to fee on fee billing, arguing that litigation over fees is not in the public interest. However, Plaintiff is not solely responsible for litigation over fees. Agreement could have been reached in lieu of litigation, and Defendant has opposed each element of Plaintiff’s fees without making a strong showing for a reduction in the amount. There is no basis to restrict recovery for time necessarily billed in the recovery of fees.
Plaintiff’s lodestar fee request is therefore reasonable in amount.
Multiplier
The amount of attorney fees awarded pursuant to the lodestar adjustment method may be either increased or decreased. (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5 240, 247.) Factors to be considered include novelty of the issues involved, skill displayed in presenting the case and quality of representation, extent to which the case precluded other work, contingent nature of the award, and quality of results obtained. (See Cates v. Chiang (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 791; Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223; Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819.)
Here, Plaintiff achieved a fairly strong result in the form of a $77,877.72 judgment, demonstrating skill and quality in the representation he received. However, there is limited evidence of novel issues being presented with respect to the adequacy of Defendant’s initial and updated 998 offers. The case required only limited, intermittent billing, and there is no evidence that other case work was precluded. The action was taken on a contingency basis, but it received a relatively quick buy-back offer, and most of the work necessitated was in seeking a somewhat limited adjustment to that offer, demonstrating that the likelihood of recovery was apparent from an early stage. On these facts, no adjustment to the lodestar amount is warranted.
Costs
The usual method to recover costs as a prevailing party is by filing a Memorandum of Costs pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Costs filed October 30, 2025 requests $611.13 in costs, consisting of $559.50 in filing fees and $51.63 for service of process costs. Plaintiff’s Reply brief is supported by evidence that additional costs in the amount of $388.86 were incurred in filing the present Motion. (Johnson Decl. ISO Reply, at ¶4.) These fees appear reasonable in amount and to have been necessarily incurred in the prosecution of the action, and amount to $388.86 +$611.13 = $999.99 in total costs. However, Plaintiff’s requested award seeks a total of $634.76 in “Statutory Costs and Expenses.” (Reply, at p. 8:10.) Costs are therefore awarded in that lesser amount.
The Motion is accordingly GRANTED-in-part in the amount of $21,912.50 in lodestar attorney fees, $634.76 in costs, and $4,658.86 in fees for the Reply briefing and estimated time at the hearing for a total awarded of $27,206.12.
Any party who contests a tentative ruling must email Dept20@sanmateocourt.org with a copy to all other parties by 4:00 p.m. stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests.
JUNE 26, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 25 HONORABLE MICHAEL L. MAU, Department 20 ________________________________________________________________________ If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, Counsel for the prevailing party shall prepare for the Court’s signature a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and by the CRC. Please note that Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv) states in part “prevailing party on a tentative ruling is required to prepare a proposed order REPEATING VERBATIM the tentative ruling” (emphasis added). The order should be filed or e-filed only, do not email or mail a hard copy to the Court.