Plaintiffs Paula Sanburg Ruby and Barry Ruby’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production
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denying motion to compel where the motions failed to comply with the applicable rules regarding separate statements].)
While Plaintiffs are permitted to submit a concise outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(3); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(b)(2); see In Marriage of Moore (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1275, 1296-1297 [moving party not required to obtain prior court permission to submit a concise outline in support of motion]), Exhibit B to the Ruby Declaration can hardly be described as complying with either the separate statement requirement, or as a “concise outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute.”
As the moving party, it was Plaintiffs’ duty to provide the Court with a compliant separate statement so that the Court could understand each discovery request, all the responses that are at issue, and the factual and legal reasons that warrant further responses. Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with rule 3.1345 warrants denial of their Motion.
Second, motions to compel further responses require that Plaintiffs make a good faith effort at informal resolution prior to filing the motion. Pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure, a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).)
In turn, section 2016.040 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that a “meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt, either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference, to informally resolve each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040
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Plaintiffs only attempted to meet-and-confer with Defendant via written correspondence. (Exhibits C, D to Ruby Declaration.) Even when Defendant advised Plaintiffs that the meet-and-confer requirement required a telephonic or in-person discussion, Plaintiffs insisted Defendant was wrong, and they took the position that their written meet-and-confer correspondence was sufficient. (Exhibit D to Ruby Declaration.)
Further, Plaintiffs’ meet-and-confer efforts do not evince “ ‘a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution.’ ” (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1293.) “ ‘[T]he law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1294.) “[A]ttempting informal resolution means more than the mere attempt by the discovery proponent ‘to persuade the objector of the error of his ways’ ... [A] reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel .... Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; In re Marriage of Moore (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1275, 1293-1294; Ellis v. Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 853, 880.)
This is because Plaintiffs’ sole meet-and-confer letter demanded further responses within 10 days, and they made no further effort to discuss why they were entitled to further responses as to their requests for production.
Further, in determining whether Plaintiffs made an adequate effort at informal resolution, the Court may also consider “[t]he time available before the motion filing deadline” to determine “whether, from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the discovering party, additional effort appeared likely to bear fruit ....” (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 432.)
The discovery responses were mail-served on January 5, 2026, meaning Plaintiffs’ deadline to file the subject Motion was February 24, 2026, or 45 days after service, plus five additional days to account for mail service.
Rather than make a serious effort at informal resolution, Plaintiffs sent two letters, dated January 13 and 15, which merely demanded further responses within 10 days (Exhibits A and C to Ruby Declaration). They then filed the subject Motion on January 23, 2026, even though they had about a month to engage in a good faith effort at resolving this dispute.
The foregoing shows that, had Plaintiffs complied with their meet-andconfer obligations, there would at least have been a chance for the parties to avoid this Motion.
Third, a motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).)
“To establish good cause, a discovery proponent must identify a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and explain how the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.” (Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 224, disapproved of, on other grounds, by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531 [disapproving prior cases that held a party seeking discovery of private information was always required to establish a compelling interest of compelling need, without regard to the other considerations articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1].)
While Plaintiffs raise a number of arguments as to why Defendant’s responses are not code-compliant, or why they are not credible (Ruby Declaration, ¶¶ 7-11, 15-17; Exhibits B, D to Ruby Declaration), they have not explained why the contested requests “will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.” (Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 224.)
Since Plaintiffs failed to set forth specific facts showing good cause to justify the discovery sought by their requests for production of documents, their Motion is denied.
Finally, the Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs are self-represented, such that they do not have the benefit of legal counsel. However, the law is clear that self-represented litigants are entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys. They are not afforded exceptionally lenient treatment, and they are held to the same restrictive rules as an attorney. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Association v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 262.)
For the reasons discussed, supra, Plaintiffs’ Motion is denied.
Defendant to give notice.
4 Hulsey v. Nguyen Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Rickie Hulsey moves to vacate 1) the Court’s January 22, 2026 order declaring Plaintiff a vexatious litigant and 2) vacating the default entered on June 1, 2022 and the default judgment entered on February 3, 2023. For the following reasons, the motions are DENIED.
In this action, at the trial on May 31, 2022, Plaintiff did not appear and did not file trial documents, so the Court dismissed the Complaint without prejudice. (ROA 258.) At the trial on the Cross-Complaint on June 1, 2022, Cross-Defendant Hulsey did not appear for trial and the Court ordered Cross-Defendant’s default entered. (ROA 267.) At the default prove up on February 3, 2023, the Court entered judgment against Plaintiff in the amount of $27,737.77. (ROA 339.)
Plaintiff’s “motion to vacate void default judgment” filed on January 29, 2026 seeks set aside the default and the default judgment. Plaintiff contends that the default is void because it was entered after Defendant had appeared in the case, that there was no proof of service establishing Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant was served with the Cross-Complaint, and that Plaintiff’s failure to attend trial was excusable neglect.
However, Plaintiff, in propria person, has repeatedly relitigated or attempted to relitigate the validity of the judgment entered against her. On June 10, 2022, Plaintiff moved to set aside the default, but that motion was denied on November 18, 2022. (ROA 318.) On February 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the default judgment, but the Court denied that motion on July 10, 2023. (ROA 376.) On July 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed another motion to vacate the default judgment, but the Court denied that motion on February 1, 2024. (ROA 431.)
Plaintiff filed an appeal of the Court’s February 1, 2024 ruling, but the Court of Appeal issued an Order on February 3, 2025 affirming the trial court’s February 1, 2024 ruling. (ROA 455.) Plaintiff filed another motion to vacate the default judgment on May 19, 2025, which was denied on July 3, 2025. (ROAs 468, 473.) Plaintiff filed another motion to vacate the default judgment on July 9, 2025, but that motion was denied on October 23, 2025. (ROAs 475, 491.) Plaintiff filed two more motions to vacate the default judgment on October 30, 2025 and January 29, 2026. (ROAs 493, 558.)
Plaintiff has filed at least 7 motions in attempts to relitigate the validity of the February 3, 2023 judgment.
A court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Civ. Proc. Code § 473(b).) Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. (Id.)
As stated previously, this motion was filed on January 29, 2026, almost 4 years after Plaintiff’s default was entered on June 1, 2022 and almost 3 years after the default judgment was entered on February 3, 2023. (ROAs 267, 339.) Thus, the motion is not timely.
Further, this Court has addressed Plaintiff’s contention that she was never served with the Summons re: Cross-Complaint or Cross- Complaint on multiple occasions. (See ROA 16, 142, 238, 318, 376, 431, and 455.) The matter is well settled in this action and Plaintiff’s request to set aside the default judgment on this ground is denied. As previously stated, Plaintiff already moved to strike the cross-complaint without objecting to service, therefore, Plaintiff has already appeared in this action and consented to the Court’s jurisdiction. (ROA No. 22.) Filing a motion to strike is a general appearance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1014.)
Plaintiff also moves to vacate the January 22, 2026 order declaring Plaintiff a vexatious litigant. Plaintiff advances three primary arguments in support of that motion.
First, Plaintiff contends that the order is void for lack of personal jurisdiction. This contention relies entirely on the argument that Plaintiff was not properly served with the Cross-Complaint. As discussed previously, this argument lacks merit.
Second, Plaintiff contends that the vexatious litigant motion was not properly noticed under Code Civ. Proc. § 1005(b). The Court already addressed this contention earlier. (ROA 540.) The motion was served by mail on December 22, 2025. Sixteen court days before January 22, 2026 is December 29, 2025. Accounting for the extra 5 days required for mail service, service on December 22, 2025 was sufficient.
Third, Plaintiff contends the notice of motion stated an incorrect case number and an incorrect hearing year. Again, the Court already addressed this contention in the January 22, 2026 ruling. (ROA 540.) These typographical errors were immaterial, as Plaintiff herself knew that the hearing was set for January 22, 2026. (ROA 516, 540.) She filed an opposition and she appeared at the hearing. (Ibid.)
The motions are denied.
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