FCL BUILDERS CALIFORNIA LLC v. PATRIOT PARTNERS; RC WHITTRAM LLC

$285,652.65 remains unpaid. (Compl., ¶¶ 26-29; Exh. A.)

Now before the Court is Defendants’ motion to remove the mechanic’s lien. Plaintiff

opposes and Defendants reply.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standard

A property owner may bring a motion to remove an unjustified mechanic’s lien without

waiting for trial on the lien foreclosure claim. (Lambert v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d

383, 387-389 (Lambert).)1 The lien claimant bears the burden of establishing the probable validity

of the claim underlying the lien. (Cal Sierra Construction, Inc. v. Comerica Bank (2012) 206

Cal.App.4th 841, 845 (Cal Sierra).) If the claimant fails to meet that burden, the lien may be

released in whole or in part. (Ibid.)

To establish the validity of a mechanic’s lien, the claimant must show that the labor,

services, and/or materials were actually used in the construction, the reasonable value of the work

and/or materials, and the date of completion or cessation of work. (Basic Modular Facilities, Inc.

v. Ehsanipour (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1485 (Basic Modular).)

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice

1 A motion seeking pretrial removal of a mechanic’s lien under Lambert is commonly referred to as a “Lambert motion.” (See Cal Sierra Construction, Inc. v. Comerica Bank (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 841, 845.) 6

Defendants request judicial notice of FCL’s mechanic’s recorded in the Official Records

of San Bernardino County on March 18, 2025, as Document No. 2025-0056817. (RJN, Exh. F.)

There is no opposition to the request.

The Court GRANTS judicial notice of Exhibit F, FCL’s mechanic’s lien recorded in the

Official Records of San Bernardino County as Document No. 2025-0056817. (Evid. Code, §452,

subd. (c).)

Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections

1. Declaration of Nanthalom Darina Sokanthong

Objection No. 1 to paragraph 3 of Sokanthong’s declaration: The Court SUSTAINS. The

June 2025 site observation occurred after FCL recorded the mechanic’s lien and does not establish

whether work ceased during the relevant pre-recording period.

Objection No. 2 to paragraph 4 of Sokanthong’s declaration: The Court SUSTAINS IN

PART and OVERRULE IN PART. The objection is overruled to the extent Ms. Sokanthong states

she personally observed piles of concrete and debris. The objection is sustained to the extent she

opines that those conditions were “consistent with materials commonly found at a project site

undergoing work of improvement or maintenance”, as that conclusion lacks adequate foundation

and is speculative.

Objection No. 3 to paragraph 5 of Sokanthong’s declaration: The Court SUSTAINS. The

photographs taken after the lien was recorded do not establish whether work occurred during the

relevant pre-recording period and are not material to the timeliness issue.

2. Declaration of Natasha A. Kader

Objection No. 1, to paragraph 32 of Kader’s declaration: The Court SUSTAINS. The

September 2025 Google Maps images post-date the mechanic’s lien and do not establish whether

work occurred during the relevant pre-recording period.

Objection No. 2, to paragraph 4 of Kader’s declaration: The Court SUSTAINS IN PART

and OVERRULES IN PART. The objection is overruled to the extent counsel states FCL seeks

recovery in this action based on Invoice No. 22512-3 and attaches the invoice as Exhibit C. The

objection is sustained to the extent the declaration is offered to prove the truth of the invoice

contents, that the invoiced work was performed, or that the amounts are owed, because counsel

has not established personal knowledge or foundation for those facts.

Objection No. 3, to paragraph 5 of Kader’s declaration: The Court SUSTAINS. Ms. Kader

has not established personal knowledge or foundation for the asserted $8,185.83 Mobile Modular

reimbursement, and no Exhibit D is attached to the declaration.

Analysis

Defendants move to remove the lien on four grounds: (1) the lien was untimely; (2) the lien

is willfully overstated; (3) the lien does not identify qualifying contracted work; and (4) the lien

lacks an adequate general description of the work performed. Defendants also seek $6,560 in

attorney’s fees.

1. The Lien Was Untimely Recorded

Civil Code section 8412 provides that a direct contractor may not enforce a mechanic’s

lien unless the contractor records the claim of lien after completing the direct contract and before

the earlier of: (1) 90 days after completion of the work of improvement; or (2) 60 days after the

2 Misnumbered as paragraph 2. 8

owner records a notice of completion or notice of cessation. Civil Code section 8180 provides that

completion of a work of improvement occurs upon, among other events, cessation of labor for a

continuous period of 60 days. (Civ. Code, § 8180, subd. (a)(3).)

Here, no notice of completion or notice of cessation was recorded. Therefore, the

applicable deadline was 90 days after completion of the work of improvement. Defendants

submitted evidence that FCL was contracted only to perform preliminary work under the LAP,

consisting of demolition, temporary fencing, security, and supervision, for a total of $97,976.

(Rice Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, Exh. A.) Rice declares that Patriot Partners did not execute a final contract and

did not authorize FCL to perform additional work beyond the preliminary work. (Rice Decl. ¶ 5.)

Rice further declares that FCL completed the demolition work on or about April 22, 2024; the

longest-duration item under the LAP was three months of temporary fencing, which expired on or

about July 22, 2024; and no other contractors performed work on the property after that date. (Rice

Decl. ¶ 6.) Rice also declares that no further work was performed on the property after FCL

completed its demolition work, and the project was never fully completed. (Rice Decl. ¶ 7.)

Based on this evidence, there was a continuous cessation of labor beginning July 22, 2024.

The work of improvement was therefore deemed complete 60 days later, on or about September

20, 2024. (Civ. Code, § 8180, subd. (a)(3).) FCL then had 90 days, or until December 19, 2024,

to record its lien. (Civ. Code, § 8412.) FCL did not record its lien until March 18, 2025. The lien

is therefore untimely.

Even if the Court uses the most generous possible date for FCL, the result does not change.

Defendants note that FCL produced an invoice dated September 19, 2024. Even if the Court

treated that invoice date as the last possible date on which FCL performed any work, the 60-day

cessation period would have expired on November 18, 2024, and FCL’s 90-day deadline to record

the lien would have expired on February 16, 2025. The March 18, 2025 lien is still untimely.

2. FCL’s Opposition Does Not Establish Probable Validity as to Timeliness

FCL’s opposition does not create a factual dispute as to timeliness. FCL relies primarily

on photographs and observations from June 2025 and Google Maps images from September 2025

to argue that the property showed signs of ongoing activity. (Sokanthong Decl. ¶¶ 3-5; Kader

Decl. ¶ 3.) As discussed above, Defendants’ objections to that evidence are sustained. In any

event, even if considered, those observations and images post-date the March 18, 2025 lien. They

do not show that any labor occurred during the 60-day no-work period following July 22, 2024,

which Defendants contend triggered completion under Civil Code section 8180, subdivision (a)(3),

or at any time before the lien was recorded.

Even accepting the photographs for the limited purpose of showing the condition of the

property in June or September 2025, they do not rebut Rice’s declaration that no work occurred

for a 60-day period after July 22, 2024. Nor does FCL submit a declaration from any witness with

personal knowledge that labor was performed at the property during the relevant 60-day cessation

period.

FCL’s reliance on cases addressing commencement of a work of improvement is

misplaced. The issue here is not whether limited physical activity can constitute commencement

of a work of improvement. The issue is whether FCL has shown that labor did not cease for a

continuous 60-day period before its lien-recording deadline. It has not. Evidence of alleged post-

lien site conditions does not establish the probable validity of the lien’s timeliness.

3. Equitable Estoppel Does Not Save the Untimely Lien

FCL alternatively argues Defendants should be equitably estopped from asserting

untimeliness because Defendants did not record or serve a notice of cessation and did not otherwise

inform FCL that work had stopped. The argument is unpersuasive.

Civil Code section 8180 expressly recognizes that completion may occur by 60 days of

cessation of labor, even without a recorded notice of cessation. (Civ. Code, § 8180, subd. (a)(3).)

Defendants therefore had no statutory obligation to record a notice of cessation for the 90-day

deadline under Civil Code section 8412 to begin running.

FCL also has not established the elements of equitable estoppel. The requirements for

application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel are: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised

of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party

asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant

of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury. (Fontana Paving,

Inc. v. Hedley Bros., Inc. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 146, 156-157 (Fontana Paving), quoting Driscoll

v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 305.) Here, FCL identifies no affirmative

representation by Defendants that work remained ongoing, no conduct intended to induce FCL to

delay recording its lien, and no reasonable reliance. Defendants’ failure to record a notice of

cessation, standing alone, is insufficient because the statute does not require such a notice before

completion may occur by 60 days of cessation of labor.

FCL’s reliance on Doherty v. Carruthers (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 214 (Doherty) is also

unpersuasive. In Doherty, the owner recorded a notice of completion with an erroneous date, and

the lien claimants relied on that affirmative act in recording their liens. (Doherty, supra, 171

Cal.App.2d at pp. 216-218; see also Fontana Paving, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 155-156

[discussing Doherty].) Here, by contrast, Defendants did not record a misleading notice or

otherwise affirmatively represent that the lien deadline had not begun. Further, FCL could not

have relied on the June 2025 site observations in deciding when to record its lien because those

observations occurred after FCL recorded the lien in March 2025.

Accordingly, FCL has not established a basis to equitably estop Defendants from asserting

the lien was untimely.

4. FCL Has Not Established the Probable Validity of the Lien Amount

The lien amount is also unsupported on the present record. Civil Code section 8430

provides that the amount of a mechanic’s lien is limited to the lesser of the reasonable value of the

work provided by the claimant or the price agreed to by the claimant and the person who contracted

for the work. Civil Code section 8430, subdivision (c), allows a claimant to include work

performed based on a written modification of the contract, or as a result of rescission,

abandonment, or breach; however, if the lien is based on rescission, abandonment, or breach, the

amount may not exceed the reasonable value of the work provided by the claimant. (Civ. Code, §

8430, subds. (a), (c).) On a Lambert motion, the claimant still bears the burden to establish the

probable validity of the claim underlying the lien, including the lien amount. (Cal Sierra, supra,

206 Cal.App.4th at p. 845; Basic Modular, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485.)

Defendants submitted the LAP, which states that if the parties agreed to a stipulated lump

sum, no further work would be performed in excess of that amount unless both parties mutually

agreed in writing to a change order increasing the scope of work and stipulated sum. (Rice Decl.

Exh. A.) Rice declares that no final contract was executed, FCL was not authorized to conduct

additional work beyond the preliminary work, Defendants paid FCL in full for the preliminary

work on October 14, 2024, and he is unaware of any additional agreements expanding the scope

of work. (Rice Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8, 10.)

FCL does not submit evidence from a project manager, employee, or other witness with

personal knowledge establishing that Defendants authorized additional work, that any written

change order was executed, or that the claimed additional work was actually performed for the

property. Instead, FCL relies primarily on counsel’s declaration attaching invoices and asserting

what FCL seeks to recover. That is insufficient to establish probable validity of the lien amount,

particularly in light of the LAP’s written-change-order requirement and Rice’s declaration denying

any authorization for additional work. (Rice Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5, 10; Exh. A.)

5. The Overstatement Issue Provides Additional Support for Removal

FCL also appears to concede that the lien amount includes charges attributable to a separate

project. FCL states the lien inadvertently included $26,683.82 in charges for another Patriot

Partners project and asks the Court to reduce the lien to $258,968.83. (Opp. at p. 11:7-26.)

That admission does not necessarily establish willful overstatement by itself. Erroneous

information does not invalidate a lien unless the requirements of Civil Code section 8422 3 are met,

and Basic Modular recognizes that an excessive lien may be reduced to the proper amount in

appropriate circumstances. (Basic Modular, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485.)

Although an excessive lien may be reduced to the proper amount, FCL has not provided a

competent evidentiary basis for doing so here. FCL concedes the lien includes amounts

attributable to another project, but does not provide admissible evidence from a witness with

personal knowledge identifying the authorized scope of any additional work, which charges were

3 Civil Code section 8422 provides that erroneous information in a claim of lien relating to the claimant’s demand, credits and offsets, work provided, or description of the site does not invalidate the lien unless the court determines either that the claim was made with intent to defraud or that an innocent third party, without notice, became a bona fide owner after recordation and the lien was so deficient it did not put the party on inquiry. A claimant forfeits the lien if it willfully includes labor, services, equipment, or materials not furnished for the property described in the lien. (Civ. Code, § 8422, subds. (a)-(c).) 13

actually furnished to this property, or how the proposed reduced lien amount was calculated.

Because FCL bears the burden on this motion to establish the probable validity of the lien,

including the amount claimed, there is no basis on this record to reform the lien to a lesser amount.

6. The Lien Description Provides Additional Support for Removal

Civil Code section 8416, subdivision (a)(3), requires a claim of lien to include a general

statement of the kind of labor, services, equipment, or materials furnished by the claimant.

FCL’s recorded lien describes the work as “Building materials and labor for demolition

work.” That description may satisfy the statute if the lien were limited to demolition-related work.

However, the invoice FCL relies on to support the lien includes line items for security/watchmen,

utility/site-maintenance work, a site trailer, temporary fencing, portable restrooms, dumpsters,

SWPPP installation, material purchases, and supervision, not merely demolition. (Patel Decl., ¶

3, Exh. E; Kader Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. C.) The lien itself describes the work only as “Building materials

and labor for demolition work.” (RJN, Exh. F.). This discrepancy further supports the conclusion

that FCL has not established the probable validity of the lien as recorded.

7. Attorney’s Fees

Defendants request $6,560 in attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 8488.

Civil Code section 8488, subdivision (c), provides that the prevailing party is entitled to

reasonable attorney’s fees in connection with the statutory release-order procedure set forth in

Civil Code sections 8480 through 8488. That procedure applies where the lien claimant has not

commenced an action to enforce the lien within the time provided by Civil Code section 8460.

(Civ. Code, § 8480, subd. (a).)

Here, Defendants’ motion is brought as a Lambert motion challenging the probable validity

of the lien on the grounds that the lien was untimely recorded, overstated, unsupported by

qualifying work, and inadequately described. FCL commenced this action to foreclose the lien

within 90 days after the lien was recorded. Defendants therefore have not shown that section 8488

applies to this motion, and they have not identified any other basis for a fee award.

Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ attorney’s fee request.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court:

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to remove FCL’s mechanic’s lien recorded on March 18,

2025, as Document No. 2025-0056817, in the Official Records of San Bernardino County.

DENIES Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees.

GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice of Exhibit F, FCL’s mechanic’s lien

recorded in the Official Records of San Bernardino County on March 18, 2025, as Document No.

2025-0056817.

SUSTAINS Defendants’ Objection Nos. 1 and 3 to the Declaration of Nanthalom Darina

Sokanthong; SUSTAIN IN PART and OVERRULE IN PART Objection No.

2.

SUSTAINS Defendants’ Objection Nos. 1 and 3 to the Declaration of Natasha A. Kader;

SUSTAIN IN PART and OVERRULE IN PART Objection No.

2.

Counsel for Defendants is ordered to Provide Notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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