Motion of Defendant DCOR, LLC, to Compel Arbitration
petition asserts that the Court must exercise its independent judgment in reviewing the administrative record, the exhibits to that memorandum, and the index to those exhibits, do not appear to include a complete copy of the record of any proceedings ostensibly at issue here.
The Court has also reviewed the declarations and supplemental declarations filed by Petitioner in support of the petition, including the supplemental declarations filed on June 1 and 15, 2026. Those declarations also do not include an administrative record.
In addition, the petition and the memorandum filed in support of the petition present no information, evidence, or reasoned argument showing why an administrative record does not exist, why the Court is not required to review any administrative record, or why an exception to the general rule further discussed above applies under the circumstances present here. Petitioner also presents no information or evidence showing why the complete administrative record of which Petitioner seeks review was filed with the Court.
The response of Respondents to the petition, which is supported by a declaration of Fredericks, also does not include an administrative record, and includes no information or evidence showing why an administrative record does not exist. Instead, that response asserts that on February 1, 2023, Vadas' Section 8 Housing Choice voucher was transferred to Petitioner's address; that Petitioner lived rent free pursuant to the terms of the 2023 Agreement; that Petitioner's actions entitled Petitioner to earn an income through the IHSS program; that Petitioner was never classified as a "family member" or "household member" of Vadas; and that the Housing Authority responded to Petitioner's November 12, 2025, letter on November 18, 2025. (Response at pp. 2-3, 5 [arguing that Petitioner lacks standing].)
In an administrative mandamus action, "[c]ourt review 'is limited to issues in the record at the administrative level.' [Citation.]" (Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. County of San Luis Obispo (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 705, 715.)
"The general rule is that a hearing on a writ of administrative mandamus is conducted solely on the record of the proceeding before the administrative agency." (Toyota of Visalia, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 872, 881
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"Generally, '[i]n a section 1094.5 proceeding, it is the responsibility of the Petitioner to produce a sufficient record of the administrative proceedings; "... otherwise the presumption of regularity will prevail.... [Citations.]" ' [Citation.]" (Weinberg v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1107.)
For the reasons discussed above, the status of production of the administrative record in this matter is presently unclear. Therefore, the Court will continue the hearing on the petition to allow sufficient time for the production and filing of the administrative record by Petitioner.
To the extent either Petitioner or Respondents contend that the production of an administrative record has been made or is not required in these proceedings, that party shall file and serve, in advance of the continued hearing, a supplemental brief explaining, with reasoned argument, why the production of an administrative record has been made or is not required. The parties shall not, apart from the administrative record or the supplemental briefing described herein and absent further Court order, file any further papers in support of or in opposition to the petition.
Tentative Ruling: Jesus Ernesto Flores v. DCOR, LLC Tentative Ruling: Jesus Ernesto Flores v. DCOR, LLC Case Number
Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Wed, 06/24/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motion of Defendant DCOR, LLC, to Compel Arbitration Tentative Ruling For Plaintiff Jesus Ernesto Flores: Kevin A. Lipeles, Thomas H. Schelly, Jasmine J. Badawi, Lipeles Law
Group, APC For Defendant DCOR, LLC: Bryan L. Hawkins, Robert Sarkisian, Kyndall Banales, Stoel Rives LLP RULING For all reasons stated herein, the motion of Defendant DCOR, LLC, to compel arbitration is granted. The individual claims alleged by Plaintiff Jesus Ernesto Flores are ordered to arbitration pursuant to the parties' arbitration agreement. This action is stayed pending the completion of the arbitration proceedings.
Background: On February 19, 2026, Jesus Ernesto Flores initiated this action by filing a class action complaint against Defendant DCOR, LLC (DCOR), setting forth eight causes of action for violations of the Labor Code as to overtime, minimum wages, meal breaks, rest breaks, wage statements, reimbursement of business expenses, failure to pay wages at termination, and failure to permit records inspection, as well as unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. As alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff and similarly situated employees of DCOR who worked at oil platform operations in Carpinteria and in other locations in Santa Barbara County were subjected to these wage and hour violations.
On April 10, 2026, DCOR filed a motion to compel arbitration. The motion seeks an order compelling the individual claims in this action to arbitration pursuant to the parties' arbitration agreement and dismissing or staying this pending action in Court.
On June 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition stating that, "Plaintiff JESUS ERNESTO FLORES does not oppose Defendant DCOR, LLC's Motion to Compel Arbitration currently set for hearing on June 24, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. in Department 3 of the above-entitled Court." (Non-Opp., p. 1, ll. 23-25.)
Analysis "Private arbitration is a matter of agreement between the parties ...." (Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 307, 313.)
"There is no public policy favoring arbitration of disputes which the parties have not agreed to arbitrate.... Whether the parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate is determined under general California contract law. [Citation.] Hence, when ruling on a petition to compel arbitration, the superior Court may consider evidence on factual issues such as contract formation bearing on the threshold issue of arbitrability." (City of Vista v. Sutro & Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 401, 407.)
"Under 'both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.' " (Fleming v. Oliphant Financial, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 13, 19.)
"The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence an agreement to arbitrate a dispute exists." (Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1120.)
"It is essential to the existence of a contract that there should be: [P.]
1. Parties capable of contracting; [P.]
2. Their consent; [P.]
3. A lawful object; and, [P.]
4. A sufficient cause or consideration." (Civ. Code, Sec. 1550.)
"The consent of the parties to a contract must be: [P.]
1. Free; [P.]
2. Mutual; and, [P.]
3. Communicated by each to the other." (Civ. Code, Sec. 1565.)
"Consent is not mutual, unless the parties all agree upon the same thing in the same sense...." (Civ. Code, Sec. 1580.)
"The existence of mutual consent is determined by objective rather than subjective criteria, the test being what the outward manifestations of consent would lead a reasonable person to believe. [Citation.] Accordingly, the primary focus in determining the existence of mutual consent is upon the acts of the parties involved." (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 789 (Monster).)
If consent to arbitrate is established, subject to certain exceptions, "the Court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy ...." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1281.2.)
The arbitration agreement (Agreement) provides in part as follows: "The Company and the undersigned Employee hereby agree that any dispute ... arising out of or in any way related to Employee's application for employment and employment with the Company shall be resolved by mandatory, binding arbitration before a retired judge or other arbitrator selected by mutual agreement of the Company and the Employee." (Eastman Decl., Ex. A. at p. 1.)
DCOR submits evidence that the Agreement was signed by Plaintiff and a representative of DCOR. (Eastman Decl., P.P. 2-6, Ex. A at p. 3.)
Moreover, the Agreement provides as follows pertaining to waiver of representative actions: "Except as