Motion to Stay Proceedings
"(1) An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process. "(2) An order staying further proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed. "(3) An order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party. "(4) An order rendering a judgment by default against that party. "(e) The Court may impose a contempt sanction by an order treating the misuse of the discovery process as a contempt of Court. "(f)(1) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), or any other section of this title, absent exceptional circumstances, the Court shall not impose sanctions on a party or any attorney of a party for failure to provide electronically stored information that has been lost, damaged, altered, or overwritten as the result of the routine, good faith operation of an electronic information system. "(2) This subdivision shall not be construed to alter any obligation to preserve discoverable information." (Code Civ.
Proc., Sec. 2023.030.) The discovery statutes evince an incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 991.) A terminating sanction should generally not be imposed until the Court has attempted less severe alternatives and found them to be unsuccessful, and the record clearly shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective. (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604-605.) "A Court has broad discretion in selecting the appropriate penalty" for a party's refusal to obey a discovery order. (Lopez v.
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604.) Here, Plaintiff has admittedly failed to comply with the Court order to respond to discovery no later than February 18, 2026. As an excuse, Plaintiff's counsel declares: "This case was originally assigned within my office to an associate attorney who was responsible for handling discovery obligations, calendaring deadlines, and supervising the assigned paralegal on the matter. The associate attorney and the paralegal assigned to assist him are no longer employed with my firm." (Farzam decl., P. 3.) "Unbeknownst to me at the time, the assigned associate and his support staff failed to properly manage and prosecute this matter, including failing to timely comply with certain discovery obligations and Court-ordered deadlines.
Their mishandling of this file was not an isolated incident and was part of broader performance and case management issues which ultimately resulted in their separation from the firm." (Farzam decl., P. 4.) "Upon discovering the extent of the deficiencies and neglect in this case, my office immediately undertook efforts to correct the issues, review the outstanding discovery, communicate with opposing counsel, and bring the Plaintiff into compliance. (Farzam decl., P. 5.) "Since that time, Plaintiff has served verified discovery responses and supplemental responses and has produced responsive documents presently available and within Plaintiff's possession, custody, or control.
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Additional supplementation has also been provided in good faith in an effort to address concerns raised by Defendants." (Farzam decl., P. 6 & Exh. 1.) It is axiomatic that Farzam, as Plaintiff's attorney of record, is ultimately the attorney responsible for the handling of this case and for the supervision of subordinates who perform work on the case. While Defendants argue that Plaintiff's responses are still deficient in some respects, the amended responses give the parties the opportunity to further meet and confer, and, if necessary, to bring a further motion regarding the responses.
The providing of responses largely moots the present motion. However, the Court will order that Plaintiff fully comply with the order that he produce all responsive documents to the request for production of documents. If he fails to do so, evidence sanctions will be imposed that will prevent Plaintiff from introducing any non-produced documents into evidence at trial. Monetary Sanctions Defendants seek sanctions in the amount of $2,625.00 for the necessity of bringing the present motion.
Defendants' counsel declares: "I spent a total of 4.8 hours researching, reviewing and preparing for Defendant's motion for order compelling responses. I anticipate having to spend an additional 1 hour reviewing Plaintiff Julian Broadbery's opposition, 3 hours preparing Defendant's reply, 1 hour attending the hearing on Defendant's motion and an estimated 6 hours round trip travel to the hearing on Defendant's motion, and $60.00 fees associated with filing this motion. My regular billable rate on similar cases such as this is $175.00 per hour.
Therefore, Defendants request that the Court award sanctions in the amount of $2,625.00." "The Court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. The Court may also impose this sanction on one unsuccessfully asserting that another has engaged in the misuse of the discovery process, or on any attorney who advised that assertion, or on both.
If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the Court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2023.030, subd. (a).) "Plaintiff does not oppose reasonable monetary sanctions to address any inconvenience or additional work caused by the delays." (Opp., p. 4, ll. 19-21.) Monetary sanctions will be imposed.
Specifically, because he admits the failure to respond was the fault of his office, Plaintiff's counsel will be responsible for the payment of the monetary sanctions. However, the amount will be reduced. Six hours of travel time is unreasonable. There is no need for Defendants' counsel to drive from San Diego, where his office is located, to Santa Barbara for a routine discovery hearing. Defendants' counsel has the option of appearing remotely. Therefore, the total sanctions imposed, for the present motion, shall be $1,715.00.
Tentative Ruling: Diana Sandoval v. Robert Seidler, et al. Tentative Ruling: Diana Sandoval v. Robert Seidler, et al. Case Number
Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Wed, 05/13/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motion of Defendants Robert Seidler and PoloDonkey, LLC to Stay Proceedings in Case after Jury Trial in Related Case No. 24CV05259 Tentative Ruling For Plaintiff Diana Sandoval, trustee of the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust: Stephen M. Sanders, Jeff G. Coyner, Sanders Coyner Cade PC For Defendants PoloDonkey, LLC and Robert Seidler: Todd A. Amspoker, Jeff F. Tchakarov, Price Postel & Parma LLP RULING For all reasons discussed herein, the hearing on this matter is continued until June 24, 2026, at 10 a.m., to be heard concurrently with the hearing on the motion to stay enforcement of the judgment in Case No. 24CV05259.
Background/Analysis This action commenced on August 5, 2024, by the filing of the original petition and complaint by plaintiff Diana Sandoval, trustee of the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust (Sandoval) against defendants County of Santa Barbara Department of Planning and Development (CSBDPD) for: (1) Writ of Administrative Mandamus, (2) Nuisance, and (3) Negligence. In the original complaint, PoloDonkey was identified as the real party in interest.
On February 6, 2025, Sandoval filed her operative second amended petition for writ of mandate and complaint for damages (SAC), asserting causes of action for: (1) Writ of Administrative Mandamus, (2) Writ of Mandate, (3) Violation of California Coastal Act, (4) Nuisance, (5) Negligence, (6) Inverse Condemnation, (7) Fraud/Deceit, (8) Negligent Misrepresentation, (9) Waste & Trespass, (10) Ejectment, (11) Quiet Title on Easement & Action for Possession Based on Unlawful Use, and (12) Declaratory Relief, against defendants CSBDPD, County of Santa Barbara Board of Building Appeals (collectively the "County Defendants"), California Coastal Commission (the "Coastal Commission"), PoloDonkey, and Robert Seidler (Seidler).
Following the sustaining of demurrers, without leave to amend, Sandoval's complaint was dismissed as to the County Defendants and the Coastal Commission. As alleged in the SAC: Sandoval is the owner of real property located at 3196 Serena Avene, Carpinteria (the Serena Property). (SAC, P. 1.) PoloDonkey owns real property located at 3215 Foothill Road, in Carpinteria, California (the Foothill Property). (SAC, P. 5.) Seidler is the principal, beneficiary, and interested owner of PoloDonkey. (SAC, P. 6.)
On or before October 30, 2006, PoloDonkey's predecessor in interest, through its manager and principal Michael Rothbard (Rothbard), confirmed in writing that they would abandon one existing residential driveway and the use therefore of the Serena Property easement, road access, and previous bridge. (SAC, P. 34 & Exh. 12.) Rothbard expressly stated to the County that they would create two new driveways, one for residential access and one for commercial equestrian facility use, both of which driveways were located with access onto Foothill Road. (Ibid.)
Rothbard, and PoloDonkey's predecessor company, maintained this abandonment of the Serena Property easement and did not use the tertiary road and previous bridge associated with the easement until Rothbard sold the Foothill Property to PoloDonkey. (SAC, P. 35.) PoloDonkey, through Seidler, purchased the Foothill Property on July 31, 2014, and thereafter used it unlawfully, without permitted use or entitlement thereto, or right of legal access to the Serena Property. (SAC, P. 36.) In 2016, Siedler misrepresented and submitted on behalf of PoloDonkey an application stating, "Access will continue to be provided off of Foothill Road" without reference to or disclosure of PoloDonkey's and Siedler's unlawful use of the expressly abandoned bridge and the Serena Property easement. (SAC, P. 37.)
On June 30, 2025, Seidler and PoloDonkey answered the SAC admitting some allegations and denying others. Related Case: On December 18, 2024, Sandoval filed a notice of related case regarding Case No. 24CV04379, PoloDonkey v. Quiel, et al. In that matter: On September 23, 2024, plaintiff PoloDonkey, LLC, (PoloDonkey) filed a verified complaint against defendants Tyler N. Quiel (Quiel) and Diana Sandoval (Sandoval) (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging six causes of action: (1) interference with easement; (2) private nuisance; (3) quiet title; (4) declaratory relief; (5) temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions; and (6) quiet title to prescriptive easement.
As alleged in the complaint: PoloDonkey owns real property located at 3215 Foothill Road/3200 Serena Avenue, in Carpinteria, California. (Compl., P. 8.) Defendants are the owners of property located at 3196 Serena Avenue, in Carpinteria, California. (Compl., P. 9.) The PoloDonkey Property is benefitted by an express easement located on a portion of the Serena Property. (Compl., P.P. 11-13.) Contrary to the express language of the easement, Defendants have maintained a fence on and across the easement, blocking PoloDonkey's access and denying PoloDonkey a safe and unobstructed easement area. (Compl., P.P. 15-16.)
On November 26, 2024, Defendants filed a verified answer to the complaint, responding to its allegations and asserting forty-three affirmative defenses. The matter was tried simultaneously before a jury and the court on January 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 22, and 23, 2026. Following the presentation of each side's respective cases, judgment was entered in favor of PoloDonkey.
striking of Diana's testimony, questions surrounding the Court's reference to a property view, and jury’selection concerns, these constitute irregularities requiring a new trial under CCP Sec. 657. The Judgment also exceeds both the pleadings and the verdict by imposing mandatory and prohibitory injunctions on unpled and untried theories and forms of relief, including compelling Defendants to sign an Owner/Applicant Consent Form and "any other documents" requested by the County, requiring perpetual and immediate maintenance of the alleged easement area, forcing relinquishment of a lawful mailbox, and granting an unpled equitable easement after denying that relief during trial and despite Plaintiff's inability to satisfy the "innocence" element--particularly in light of Plaintiff's own survey acknowledging that the bridge extends outside the disputed easement area.
These vague and untried injunction terms, never pleaded, tried, or proven, warrant vacatur under CCP Sec. 663. This action was pled, served, and tried solely against Tyler N. Quiel and Diana Sandoval in individual capacities, not against any trustee capacity or the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust. The Complaint nowhere identifies the Trust or trustees. The public docket showed only individuals; no amended complaint, new summons, or proof of service issued naming trustees. Trustee issues are being litigated separately in Case No. 24CV04379, ("Lead Case") in which the caption names Diana Sandoval, as trustee of the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust.
When the Trust and Sandoval in the Lead Case sought consolidation, Plaintiff, appearing as Defendant in the Lead Case, opposed consolidation, thereby excluding the trustee from this action. On October 29, 2025, the Court denied consolidation. This pretrial ruling confirmed that trust’capacity issues and trust property remained in the Lead Case, and the present case ("24CV05259") would proceed against individuals only. The trial record further confirms that the Plaintiff expressly proceeded against the individuals not the Trust or Trustee capacity.
On the morning of January 5, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel admitted to the Court that "[t]he property is owned by their family trust." Counsel hesitated on dismissing the Doe defendants, the Court explicitly warned that adding a new party would require starting all over again. Faced with the choice of starting over to properly serve the Trust and trustees, Plaintiff's counsel stated: "It's okay, your Honor. Let's dismiss the Does." By dismissing the Does, the parties and Court proceeded on the understanding that the Trust and trustees were not parties to this action.
Throughout trial, including in the jury verdict forms, the case was tried solely against the individuals, and even post’trial the Proposed Statement of Decision continued to identify only the individuals. Defense Was Limited to Individuals, Not Any Trust or Trustee Capacity. Plaintiff's own trial insurance exhibit confirms that, while the Policy's Conditions automatically extend coverage to a later trust owner, the actual defense engagement was framed as "individuals only." The First American Homeowners Policy No. 5026100?6273661 lists only Quiel and Sandoval as the named insureds, and while Condition 2(b)(3) extends coverage to a later trust owner, the reservation’of’rights letter that actually defines the defense in 24CV05259 identifies only the individuals as the insureds being defended in this lawsuit, never the Trust or any trustee capacity "First American will retain counsel to represent you in the defense of the PoloDonkey, LLC v.
Quiel and Sandoval lawsuit." and "First American is in the process of retaining counsel to represent you." Carrier’appointed counsel's statement of no objection therefore ran solely to the individual insureds; he had no separate retainer from the Trust or trustees and no engagement as trust counsel in the present case, so any purported consent to bind a trustee capacity exceeded the scope of that authority and cannot supply the missing personal jurisdiction. Further, Defendants were never informed of, and had no knowledge of, any purported stipulation to add the Trust or trustee capacity and thus could not and did not authorize or consent to such a stipulation.
A judgment that purports to reach a non’pleaded, non’served trust and trustee capacity based on the no objections from counsel whose written authority runs only the individual insureds, is void for lack of personal jurisdiction and violates due process. Counsel cannot, by acquiescence, confer jurisdiction over a legal capacity he was never retained or authorized to represent. (See, e.g., Portico Management Group, LLC v. Harrison 202 Cal. App.4th 464, 476-477 (FN7)). Improper Mid?Trial Attempt To Add Trustee Capacity.
Plaintiff waited until after the jury was sworn to