Motion to Strike
TENTATIVE RULING(S) FOR June 17, 2026 Department S37 – Judge Winston Keh This court follows California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(b) for tentative rulings. (See San Bernardino Superior Court Local Emergency Rule 8.) Tentative rulings for each law & motion will be posted on the internet (https://www.sb-court.org) by 3:00 p.m. on the court day immediately before the hearing.
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RULING.
Burgett vs Redwood Private Security
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TENTATIVE RULING(S):
Before the Court is Defendant Fortes’ Motion to Strike portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint, relating to
the allegations and prayers for punitive damages. Fortes specifically seeks to strike the following
on the grounds that the Complaint contains conclusions, not factual assertions sufficient to
establish oppression, fraud, or malice:
1) Plaintiff’s prayers for punitive damages as stated in the Complaint, page 8, numbers
1(c), 2(c), and 3(c), lines 1, 7, and 13, reference to “for punitive and/or exemplary
damages in an amount appropriate to punish Defendant and deter others from
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engaging in similar conduct.”
2) Complaint, page 3, para. 15, lines 24-27, reference to “Defendant JOHN DOE
aggressively approached Plaintiff, leaning forward and getting within inches of his
person, and in a loud bellicose manner threatened to touch and/or grab Plaintiff in a
harmful manner such that it reasonably appeared that Defendant JOHN DOE was
about to carry out the threat.”
3) Complaint, page 4, para. 19, lines 8-12, reference to “Defendant JOHN DOE’s
malicious and oppressive despicable conduct set forth above was intended to cause
injury to the Plaintiff and subjected the Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship with a
willful and conscious disregard for the Plaintiff’s rights and safety such that defendant
are subject to punitive damages as set forth in California Civil Code § 3294.”
4) Complaint, page 5, para. 25, lines 1-5, reference to “Defendant JOHN DOE’s
malicious and oppressive despicable conduct set forth above was intended to cause
injury to the Plaintiff and subjected the Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship with a
willful and conscious disregard for the Plaintiff’s rights and safety such that defendant
are subject to punitive damages as set forth in California Civil Code § 3294.”
5) Complaint, page 5, para. 31, lines 22-26, reference to “Defendant JOHN DOE’s
malicious and oppressive despicable conduct set forth above was intended to cause
injury to the Plaintiff and subjected the Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship with a
willful and conscious disregard for the Plaintiff’s rights and safety such that defendant
are subject to punitive damages as set forth in California Civil Code § 3294.”
Plaintiff opposes the motion to strike. Defendant replies to the opposition.
MERITS OF THE MOTION
Defendant Fortes argues that Plaintiff fails to plead “specific facts” rather than mere legal
conclusions and assumptions. He states the allegations in paragraphs 15, 19, 25, and 31 of the
Complaint do not satisfy the higher pleading requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section
3294. And he states that Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to show requisite “evil motive” to
support a punitive damages claim. Fortes thus seeks to strike out any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in the Complaint or strike out any part of the Complaint not drawn or
filed in conformity with the laws of this state. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b).)
Plaintiff, in turn, argues that punitive damages are sufficiently alleged in the Complaint.
This is because Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fortes approached Plaintiff in his parked car and
demanded he exit; Plaintiff complied; Defendant Fortes immediately and violently assaulted
Plaintiff, causing injury; Defendant’s Fortes’ conduct was threatening, aggressive, and
outrageous, far beyond what is tolerated in a civilized community; and such conduct was both
despicable and carried out with a willful and conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff
also relies on Perkins v. Superior Court (General Telephone Directory Company) (1981) 117
Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7 (“Perkins”), where the Court of Appeal held that a motion to strike conclusory
language in a punitive damages allegation must be denied, where read in context, the facts
alleged describe a malicious state of mind. The Perkins Court stated: “What is important is that
the complaint as a whole contain sufficient facts to apprise the defendant of the basis upon
which the plaintiff is seeking relief.” (Id., at p. 6.) And it also stated that: “The word ‘retaliation’ in
paragraph 10 of the complaint describes defendants’ motive for shutting off petitioner’s home
phone service -- a motive which, if proven, would sustain a finding of malice. The allegation that
defendants were guilty of ‘oppression, fraud, and malice’ simply pleaded a claim for punitive
damages in the language of the statute authorizing such damages. (Civ. Code, § 3294.)
Pleading in the language of the statute is not objectionable when sufficient facts are alleged to
support the allegation.” (Id., at pp. 6-7, emphasis added by Plaintiff and footnote omitted.)
In the reply, Fortes reiterates that Plaintiff’s conclusory statements are not sufficient to
support the claim for punitive damages. And he argues that to be legally sufficient, a complaint
seeking punitive damages must allege specific facts that manifest an evil motive on the part of
the defendant to injure the plaintiff.
Here, Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is sufficiently supported by the allegations in
the Complaint as “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole,
all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)
There is no need at the pleading stage that Plaintiff prove by clear and convincing evidence that
Fortes is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. He only needs to allege facts supporting the claim
(Monge, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d 503, 510; Perkins, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7), which Plaintiff
does by alleging that Fortes, acting within the course and scope of his employment with
Redwood, committed an unprovoked physical attack and assault against Plaintiff, causing
significant harm. Plaintiff is also alleging before contact, that Fortes threatened to touch and/or
grab Plaintiff in a harmful manner. These allegations, taken as true for purposes of this motion,
are more than sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages against Fortes. (See Compl., at
¶¶ 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 27, 28, 31.) For example, “malice” means conduct which is
intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)
Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant Fortes’ Motion to Strike because the allegations
in the Complaint are sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages at the pleading stage.