ASHLEY R. RAVECHE, ET AL v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Defendant County of Marin’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.

Allegations in the Third Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs Ashley R. Raveche and Justin B. Raveche allege that they are the owners of the property at 12 Lomita Drive in Mill Valley (the “Property”). CalTrans owns State Route 101, approximately 200 feet west of the Property, including the State Route 101 drainage system. The natural culvert and swales responsible for drainage has been altered by Defendants County of Marin (the “County”) and/or Marin County Open Space District (“MCOSD”) so that water is diverted into the CalTrans drainage system, open v-ditch and buried pipes onto the Property. The County and/or MCOSD installed, maintains and operates the open v-ditch on the Property, in addition to buried pipes on the Property and a transition box. The State Route 101 drainage system includes an above-ground 24” metal pipe that encroaches onto and through the Property. None of the defendants has an easement for a drainage pipe on the Property and Plaintiffs have not consented to any drainage pipe on their Property. The drainage has caused slope erosion, damage to a retaining wall and to other structures on the Property, and a sink hole in the hillside and on adjacent property. The First Cause of Action seeks declaratory relief, and the Second Cause of Action is for inverse condemnation.

Standard “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer . . . It is axiomatic that a demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the pleadings. Consequently, when considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, [a]ll facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admitted . . . Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Sykora v. State Dept. of State Hospitals (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1535 [citations and internal quotations omitted].) A motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied where there are material factual issues that require evidentiary resolution. (Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216.)

Procedural Deficiency

The County failed to adequately engage in the meet and confer process as required under Code of Civil Procedure Section 439, which requires the moving party to “meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading . . . .” The motion for judgment on the pleadings will not be denied on this basis. (Code Civ. Proc. § 439(a)(4).) The Court nevertheless admonishes the County to follow all applicable rules when filing matters with the court.

Requests for Judicial Notice/Objections to Evidence

Both Plaintiffs and the County have requested judicial notice of a number of documents, and both have filed objections to the other parties’ requests.

The Court grants the request of both Plaintiffs and the County to take judicial notice of the Third Amended Complaint.

County’s Request/Plaintiffs’ Objections Recorded Deeds

The County’s request for judicial notice of the certified copies of two recorded deeds (Exhibits B and C) is granted to the extent noted below. (See Evid. Code §§ 452, 453; Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 194.)

“While courts cannot take judicial notice of factual representations in recorded documents, ‘a court may take judicial notice of ... a document’s recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document’s legally operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding the document’s authenticity. From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face.’” (Villa Zinfandel, LLC v. Bearman (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 848, 858 [citations omitted].)

The County argues that the Court can deduce the “legal effect” of the deeds, i.e., that Plaintiffs own the Property and that the County does not own the adjacent property. In Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of a purchase and assumption agreement between the FDIC and JPMorgan pursuant to which the FDIC sold WaMu’s assets to JPMorgan but not its liabilities. The court stated: “the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of the OTS Order, the P & A Agreement, and the legal effect of those documents in transferring to JPMorgan the stated assets of WaMu, but none of its liabilities for borrowers’ claims, as of September 25, 2008. The P & A Agreement expressly provided that this was the intent of the parties to the agreement, and that was its legal effect. These facts therefore derive from the legal effect of the documents themselves, rather than any disputed hearsay statement of fact within them. Moreover, there is no allegation in the second amended complaint that the P & A Agreement is not authentic . . .” (Id. at p. 755 [emphasis in original].) In Linda Vista Village San Diego Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Tecolote Investors, LLC (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 166, 185, the court took judicial notice of deeds reflecting transfers of land to or from the city for purposes of determining whether land was covered by city charter provision requiring voter approval for the sale or lease of city-owned land.

At most, under Scott and Linda Vista, the Court can take judicial notice of the legal effect of the deeds, i.e., the transfer of the Property to Plaintiffs in 2015 (Exhibit C) and the transfer of the adjacent property to MCOSD in 1992 (Exhibit B), as Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute the authenticity or validity of the deeds. However, these deeds are insufficient for the Court to also deduce that (i) MCOSD is the current owner of the adjacent property and/or that (2) MCOSD has been the owner of the adjacent property since Plaintiffs acquired the Property in 2015, which is what the County argues in its demurrer. The County’s request for judicial notice is granted only to the extent noted above.

MarinMap

The County’s request for judicial notice of two maps from “MarinMap” (Exhibits D and E) is denied. “ʽSimply because information is on the Internet does not mean it is not reasonably subject to dispute.’” (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 889 [citation omitted].) The County does not provide sufficient information for the Court to determine the source and veracity of the attached maps.

There are no dates on the maps to show if they accurately reflect ownership of land as of specific dates, and little to no information about who prepared the maps or the source(s) used for their preparation. The County also does not make any showing that these are current, official maps of the County or any other public entity. (Cf. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1009, 1021 and n. 2 [court took judicial notice of official maps maintained by city’s public works department]; South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 745-746 [court took judicial notice of official maps but not of private maps].)

Plaintiffs’ Request/County’s Objections

Plaintiffs request that the Court take judicial notice of a Marin County Parks Road and Trail Management Plan dated December 16, 2014 (Exhibit B), a County of Marin Community Development Agency Planning Division Mitigated Negative Declaration regarding the Lomita Drive Road Rehabilitation Project dated June 12, 2025 (Exhibit C), and the Court’s ruling on demurrer dated April 19, 2023 (Exhibit D).

The Court denies Plaintiffs’ request on the ground that these documents are not relevant to its determination of the County’s motion. (See AL Holding Co. v. O’Brien & Hicks, Inc. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1313 n. 2.) Plaintiffs submit Exhibits B and C as evidentiary support for their allegations. However, a motion for judgment on the pleadings only challenges the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint; the court is not concerned with the evidentiary support for those allegations. Exhibit D is not relevant to any substantive issue raised in the parties’ pleadings.

Discussion

The County argues that Plaintiffs cannot state viable claims against it because MCOSD, not the County, owns the adjacent property where the open v-ditch and drainage pipe are allegedly located or operated. Plaintiffs rely on the deeds and maps for which they have requested judicial notice.

The County’s motion is denied. First, for the reasons discussed above, the Court does not take judicial notice of the deeds for purposes of establishing ownership of the adjacent property from 2015 through the present, and does not take judicial notice of the attached maps from MarinMap.

Therefore, the County has failed to show that it cannot be liable based on ownership of the adjacent property.

Further, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the County are not based on the County’s ownership of the adjacent property, but rather on the County’s conduct with respect to events or occurrences on that adjacent property. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege:

• “The natural culvert and swales responsible for drainage has been altered by Marin County and/or MCOSD so that water is diverted into the CalTrans drainage system, open v-ditch and buried pipes onto the Subject Property, causing damage to the Subject Property.” (TAC, ¶9.)

• “Marin County and/or MCOSD have installed, maintains and operates an open v-ditch on the Subject Property, in addition to buried pipes on the Subject Property and a transition box.” (TAC, ¶10.)

• “As a proximate, direct and necessary result of the plan, design, approval, construction, operation, maintenance, and use of the property adjacent to the Subject Property, including the diversion of water onto the Subject Property, County of Marin and MCOSD have caused damage to the Subject Property, slope erosion, a sink hole in the hillside, a sink hole on adjacent property, damage to a retaining wall on the Subject Property, and damage to the residence, and other improvements on the Subject Property.” (TAC, ¶21.)

• “The damage to the Subject Property was reasonably foreseeable, was not remote, and the Raveches have suffered direct physical damage as a proximate result of County of Marin and MCOSD acts and omissions as deliberately planned and carried out by County of Marin and MCOSD.” (TAC, ¶24.)

• “County of Marin and MCOSD’s plan, design, approval, construction, operation, and maintenance of the drainage system, and alterations of the natural swale drainage, was the actual cause of damage to the Raveches’ property, and was a substantial cause to the damage to the Raveches’ property.” (TAC, ¶30.)

• “The cause and effect relationship between the plan, design, approval, construction, operation, and maintenance of the county drainage system, was entirely within County of Marin and MCOSD’s control.” (TAC, ¶32.)

• “The plan, design, approval, construction, operation, and maintenance of the county drainage system affirmatively averted and/or intentionally diverted by act or omission runoff and road surface water onto the Raveches’ property, essentially turning the Raveches’ property into part of the county drainage system, joining the Raveches’ property with, and making the Subject Property a part of, the county’s drainage system.” (TAC, ¶36.)

• “The County of Marin and MCOSD have failed to act reasonably in the plan, design, approval, construction, operation, and maintenance of the county drainage system, and the damage to the Subject Property was a foreseeable result of the County of Marin and MCOSD CalTrans’ acts and omissions.”

Plaintiffs argue that even if the County did not own the adjoining property, the County could still be liable because the County substantially participated in the planning and approval of a public project or operation, which is sufficient to impose liability on the County.

“A public entity is a proper defendant in an action for inverse condemnation if the entity substantially participated in the planning, approval, construction, or operation of a public project or improvement that proximately caused injury to private property. So long as the plaintiffs can show substantial participation, it is immaterial ‘which sovereign holds title or has the responsibility for operation of the project.’” (Arreola v. County of Monterey (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 722, 761 [citation omitted].) “The necessary finding is that the wrongful act be part of the deliberate design, construction, or maintenance of the public improvement.” (Id. at p. 742.) “[I]n order to prove the type of governmental conduct that will support liability in inverse condemnation it is enough to show that the entity was aware of the risk posed by its public improvement and deliberately chose a course of action—or inaction—in the face of that known risk.” (Id. at p. 744.) The public entity must have “the power to control or direct the aspect of the public improvement that is alleged to have caused the injury. The basis for liability in such a case is that in the exercise of its governmental power the entity either failed to appreciate the probability that the project would result in some damage to private property, or that it took the calculated risk that damage would result.” (Id. at pp. 762-763.) In Arreola, the court found that the defendants were liable for inverse condemnation, based on their failure to properly maintain a levee, because the defendants’ knowing failure to clear the channel in the face of repeated warnings and complaints was not merely negligent execution of a reasonable maintenance plan. Rather, it was a long term failure to mitigate a known danger. (Id. at pp. 745-746.)

As reflected by the court’s discussion in Arreola, the deliberate nature of the public entity’s act is essential. Mere routine maintenance of an improvement is generally insufficient because the wrongful act must be part of the deliberate design, construction or maintenance of the improvement. (See Tilton v. Reclamation Dist. No. 800 (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 848, 857-858.) In Tilton, the court found that a demurrer was properly sustained where the complaint alleged only that the defendant was responsible for maintenance of the levee, the failure was due to defendant maintaining the levee in a manner such that it was too steep for underwater conditions, defendant substantially participated in the maintenance of the levee, and the plaintiffs were damaged by defendant’s failure to properly maintain the levee. The court reasoned that “garden variety inadequate maintenance, as distinguished from a faulty plan involving the design, construction and maintenance of a levee, is not an adequate basis for an inverse condemnation claim.” (Id. at p. 859; see also Mercury Casualty Co. v. City of Pasadena (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 917, 931; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 87.)

While their allegations could be more concise, Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to put their allegations within the scope of Arreola and outside the scope of Tilton. (See Gluck v. City and County of San Francisco (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 769, 790 [in ruling on demurrer, court gives complaint a “reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context”]; Miyahara v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA (2014) 99 Cal.App.5th 687, 703 [on demurrer, court draws reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff].) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the County altered the natural water flow, had a plan and design to maintain the drainage system and alteration of drainage to divert water onto the Property, and that the County exercised control. (TAC, ¶¶9, 21, 30, 32.) Plaintiffs also allege that damage to the Property resulting from the County’s conduct was reasonably foreseeable and that the County engaged in deliberate, affirmative and/or intentional conduct in diverting water onto the Property. (TAC, ¶¶24, 36.) Accordingly, the County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.

Parties must comply with Marin County Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 2.10(A), (B), which provides that if a party wants to present oral argument, the party must contact the Court at (415) 444-7046 and all opposing parties by 4:00 p.m. the court day preceding the scheduled hearing. Notice may be by telephone or in person to all other parties that argument is being requested (i.e., it is not necessary to speak with counsel or parties directly.) Unless the Court and all parties have been notified of a request to present oral argument, no oral argument will be permitted except by order of the Court. In the event no party requests oral argument in accordance with Rule 2.10(B), the tentative ruling shall become the order of the court.

IT IS ORDERED that evidentiary hearings shall be in-person in Department L. For routine appearances, the parties may access Department L for video conference via a link on the court website. Kindly turn your camera on when your case is called and make sure the party or lawyer making the appearance is properly identified on the screen.

FURTHER ORDERED that the parties are responsible for ensuring that they have a good connection and that they are available for the hearing while using the virtual remote courtroom. If the connection is inadequate, the Court may proceed with the hearing in the party’s absence. If it is determined that you are diving your car during the hearing, you will be removed from the virtual courtroom. (Yes, this happens).