MORGAN BROWNING VS. SHANNON BROWNING

As set forth below, Defendant Shannon Browning’s (“Defendant”) anti-SLAPP motion is GRANTED IN PART:

1. The motion is GRANTED as to the following causes of action in their entirety: 2-6, 10- 13, 15-16.

2. The motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: a. First Cause of Action, Common Law Invasion of Privacy: The motion is GRANTED as to this cause of action except to the extent it rests on Defendant’s allegedly “obtain[ing] Plaintiffs confidential medical and psychiatric information during the parties’ co-parenting period[.]” (Complaint,! p. 11.) Itis DENIED as to that claim for relief. b. Seventh Cause of Action, Interference with Parent-Child Relationship: The motion is GRANTED as to this cause of action except to the extent it rests on Defendant’s allegedly “withholding visitation immediately after personal disputes unrelated to the children’s welfare” and “pressuring the children to cancel visits or presenting visitation as contingent upon Plaintiff's compliance with Defendant’s demands.” (Complaint, p. 29.) It is DENIED as to those claims for relief.

1 The Complaint uses a variety of different page numbering schemes. The Court will cite to the Complaint by reference to the numbers in the upper right-hand corner of its pages.

c. Eighth Cause of Action, IED: The motion is GRANTED as to this cause of action except to the extent it is based on Defendant’s allegedly “[c]ausing hearings to occur without recording[.]” (Complaint, p. 33.) It is DENIED as to that claim for relief. d. Ninth Cause of Action, NIED: The motion is GRANTED as to this cause of

action except to the extent it rests on Defendant’s allegedly “causing hearings to proceed without recording[.]” (Complaint, p. 36.) It is DENIED as to that claim for relief. e. Fourteenth Cause of Action, Professional Negligence: The motion is GRANTED as to this cause of action except to the extent it rests on Defendant’s allegedly “obtaining” and “retaining” “Plaintiffs confidential medical and psychiatric information without authorization.” (Complaint, p. 51.) It is DENIED as to those claims for relief.

3. The motion is DENIED as to the Seventeenth Cause of Action (Injunctive Relief) in its entirety.

Plaintiff Morgan Browning’s (“Plaintiff”) request for “limited discovery” under Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, subdivision (g) is DENIED because Plaintiff has not filed the “noticed motion” required by that provision. The Court is not considering Plaintiff's unauthorized sur-reply.

Defendant requests that the Court “find that [she] is entitled to bring a motion for attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing party.” (Memorandum, p. 19.) Defendant does not need a court finding to be entitled to file a motion for attorney’s fees. The Court will determine whether she is a “prevailing defendant” (see Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1)) when it decides that motion.

Background

This is a family law case that has spilled over into civil court. Plaintiff and Defendant were formerly married and have two minor children. (Complaint, p. 8.) Plaintiff alleges that between their 2022 separation and late 2023, the parties managed their custody arrangement amicably without resorting to the courts. (Jbid.) In 2023, Defendant allegedly appealed to the Family Law | Division of this court for custody-related relief, including through ex parte procedures. (/bid.) These custody proceedings resulted in a January 16, 2025 order giving Defendant sole legal and physical custody of the children and giving Plaintiff limited visitation rights only upon completion of certain prerequisites (e.g., parenting class, psychiatric evaluation).

Plaintiff has filed a sprawling lawsuit against Defendant generally targeting her conduct in connection with their custody battle. The Court now considers Defendant’s motion to strike the lawsuit as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (““SLAPP”).

Legal Standard

“A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The purpose of this statute is to identify and dispose of lawsuits brought to chill the valid exercise of a litigant’s constitutional right of petition or free speech. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a); Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1055-1056.)

Courts use a two-step process to evaluate anti-SLAPP motions. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) First, the moving defendant must show that the challenged lawsuit arises from protected activity. (/bid.) To establish protected activity, the defendant must demonstrate that “the act or acts underlying the plaintiffs claim falls within one of the four categories [of protected activity] identified in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 538; accord Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 955, 968.) In determining whether a complaint or a subset of it “arises from” protected activity, “[t]he critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s free speech or petitioning activity.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 [emphasis added]; see also Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.) “Courts deciding an anti- SLAPP motion . .. must consider the claim’s elements, the actions alleged to establish those elements, and whether those actions are protected.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1015; accord Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.Sth 1057, 1062.)

If the defendant makes this “threshold showing[,]” the court proceeds to the second step, where the plaintiff must demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of the claims at issue. (Equilon Enterprises, supra, 29 Cal.4th 53, 67; Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) This is not a particularly weighty burden. (See Overstock.com, Inc. vy. Gradient Analytics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal. App.4th 688, 699; Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th 82, 95 [only “minimal merit” is “required to survive an anti-SLAPP motion].) The plaintiff must merely “ ‘demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 [quoting Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal. App.4th 539, 548]; see also Bergman vy. Drum (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 11, 18 [standard is similar to that governing a plaintiff's burden in opposition to a defendant’s motion for summary judgment].) The plaintiff is not entitled to rely on the allegations in his complaint; he “must set forth evidence that would be admissible at trial.” (Overstock.com, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th 688, 699.) The court does not weigh the credibility of the evidence or evaluate its weight but accepts all evidence favorable to the plaintiff as true and asks whether it makes the required prima facie showing. (/d. at pp. 699-700.) The court should consider evidence presented by the defendant at

the merits stage, but only to the extent of determining whether such evidence defeats the plaintiff's case as a matter of law. bid.)

“Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute —i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit — is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 [emphasis in original].)

Discussion

Evidentiary Objections

Overruled.

eo OPNAYMPYWN LY Overruled. Overruled. Overruled. Overruled. Overruled. Overruled. Overruled. Overruled. — . SUSTAINED. This exhibit list contains statements by Plaintiff that amount to unsigned jo)

declaration testimony and are hearsay. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.) — — . SUSTAINED. In substance, this is an unsigned declaration. It also consists entirely of hearsay. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

12. Defendant directs this objection at Page 76 of the Complaint. Based on her description of that document as a “Document entitled, ‘Executive Summary,’” (Evidentiary Objections, p. 6), she meant Page 77. Her objection to Page 77 of the Complaint is SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

13. This objection is overruled solely because the Court cannot tell what material it is directed at. Page 77 of the Complaint does not consist of a document entitled “late 2024 early 2025 — Attorney dismissal and discussion of joint agreement,” and the Court cannot locate a document with that title or similar anywhere within Plaintiff's Exhibit B.

14. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

15. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

16. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

17. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

18. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

19. This is another unsigned declaration consisting largely of legal argument and legal conclusions. Those are not evidence and have no place in a declaration. (See Jn re Marriage of Heggie (2002) 99 Cal. App.4th 28, 30, fn. 3 [including legal argument in a declaration is “a sloppy practice which should stop. . . . [I]t makes a mockery of the requirement that declarations be supported by statements made under penalty of perjury.

The proper place for argument is in points and authorities, not declarations.”]; see also Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 26 [because plaintiff's showing at second step of anti-SLAPP inquiry must be made through admissible evidence, “declarations that lack foundation or personal knowledge, or that are argumentative, speculative, impermissible opinion, hearsay, or conclusory are to be disregarded”’].) The Court will consider Plaintiffs legal arguments to the extent he has placed them in his opposition brief, where they belong. It will not consider legal arguments or authorities offered only within his 200-page collection of complaint exhibits, because that would permit him to circumvent page limits. To the extent Plaintiff is offering this as evidence of his legal opinion, that is improper lay opinion testimony. (Evid. Code, § 800.) The objection to this material is SUSTAINED on the additional grounds that this material comprises an unsworn declaration and is hearsay. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

20. Overruled.

21. Overruled.

22. Overruled.

23. Overruled.

24. Overruled.

25. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

26. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

27. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

28. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

29. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

30. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, §§ 350 [relevance — the Court does not see what Plaintiff’s requests for vacatur and reassignment in the custody proceeding, or his complaints about the judge in that proceeding, have to do with this lawsuit against his ex-wife], 1200.)

31. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

32. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

33. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

34. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, §§ 800, 1200.)

35. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, §§ 800, 1200.)

36. SUSTAINED as to Page 205 only. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

37. SUSTAINED as to Page 208 only. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

38. SUSTAINED. (Evid. Code, § 350.)

39. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, §§ 800, 1200.)

40. SUSTAINED as to Pages 218-221 only. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

41. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, §§ 800, 1200.)

42. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

43. SUSTAINED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5; Evid. Code, § 1200.)

Merits

In Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, the Supreme Court addressed how a court hearing an anti-SLAPP motion should handle a “mixed cause of action” — “that is, a cause of action that rests on allegations of multiple acts, some of which constitute protected activity and some of which do not.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010.) Baral held that at the first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis,

“the moving defendant must identify the acts alleged in the complaint that it asserts are protected and what claims for relief are predicated on them. In turn, a court should examine whether those acts are protected and supply the basis for any claims.’ It does not matter that other unprotected acts may also have been alleged within what has been labeled a single cause of action; these are ‘disregarded at this stage.’ So long as a ‘court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached’ with respect to these claims.”

Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th 995, 1066 [quoting Baral, supra, | Cal.5th 376, 396].)

To use an anti-SLAPP motion to attack a pleaded cause of action “rest[ing] on multiple factual bases,” the defendant must either identify and move to strike particular claims within that pleaded cause of action, or show that al/ of the claims on which the pleaded cause of action is based arise out of protected activity. (See Littlefield y. Littlefield (2024) 106 Cal.App.Sth 815, 826; see also Young v. Midland Funding, LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.Sth 63, 100, fn. 15.) In this case, Defendant is moving to strike the entire Complaint; in the alternative, every numbered cause of action in the Complaint; and as a further alternative, to the extent any numbered cause of action is determined to be mixed, Defendant moves to strike discrete allegations she has identified in a separate statement as directed by Young.

The Court addresses a few overarching matters at the outset. First, the sole basis on which Defendant argues that any of the activity described in the Complaint is protected is Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) (“written or oral statement or writing made before a... judicial proceeding”) and (e)(2) (“written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a... judicial body’). (See Memorandum, pp. 11- 12; see generally Separate Statement.) By their terms, these provisions cover statements and writings only. Defendant will not satisfy her first-step burden to the extent that any of the claims at issue rest on conduct that does not consist of her making written or oral statements. Defendant urges the Court to conclude that every claim within the Complaint is protected under one or both of these provisions based on the eight-page narrative preceding the numbered causes ' of action in the Complaint, which focuses on Defendant’s conduct in the custody litigation. She further asks the Court to rely on the statement that all of the causes of action “arise from

2 The Supreme Court’s use of the word “claim” here is not synonymous with “pleaded cause of action,” i.c., the content that appears below a “First Cause of Action” heading in a complaint. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th 376, 381.) In Baral, the Supreme Court held that the phrase “cause of action” as used in subdivision (b)(1) of the anti-SLAPP statute does not have that meaning. (/d. at p. 382.) Instead, it refers to an “allegation[] of protected activity that [is] asserted as grounds for relief.” (Id. at p, 395.) The Baral court used the word “claim” synonymously with this anti- SLAPP-specific use of the phrase “cause of action.” (/d. at p. 382.) Accordingly, a pleaded cause of action may include numerous “claims.” (See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010.)

Defendant’s continuous course of conduct between 2023 and 2025, including” specified conduct occurring within the context of the custody litigation. (Complaint, p. 11.) The Court cannot do this. While treating Plaintiff's own characterization of the gravamen of his lawsuit as determinative would certainly make the Court’s task easier, the Court is required to look at the conduct that, as pleaded, supplies the elements of a given cause of action and determine whether that conduct is protected under the specific provisions of the anti-SLAPP statute Defendant has invoked. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th 995, 1015.)

Plaintiffs opposition addresses the merits of only the following causes of action: extrinsic fraud, abuse of process, invasion of privacy, wrongful publication of private facts, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. Having declined to address the merits of his other causes of action in his brief, he necessarily has not met his burden to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of those claims. The effect is that the motion will be granted as to any claim within those pleaded causes of action that Defendant establishes arises out of protected activity.

Plaintiff relies on various exhibits attached to the Complaint. The overwhelming majority of this material is not admissible evidence and so is incapable of meeting Plaintiff's burden at the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

Whether the exhibits to Plaintiff’s Complaint constitute admissible evidence has no bearing on whether the Court should rely on them at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis for their value in interpreting Plaintiff's Complaint. Regardless of their admissibility, they are attached to the Complaint and are part of the pleading, so they are properly considered at the first step. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)

Complaint as a Whole

If there is “at least one claim” within an entire pleading that does not arise solely from anti- SLAPP protected conduct, an anti-SLAPP motion directed at the entire pleading must be denied. (Park vy, Nazari (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1106.) As will be discussed, the Court has identified within the Complaint as a whole at least one allegation of conduct that is not protected and is asserted as a ground for relief. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th 376, 395.) Accordingly, the motion is DENIED to the extent it is directed at the whole Complaint.

First Cause of Action: Common Law Invasion of Privacy

The anti-SLAPP statute “protects litigation-related activity, i.e., ‘any written or oral statement or writing made before a. . . judicial proceeding’ or ‘in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a... . judicial body.’” (Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC vy. Schneider (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 980, 991 [quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (e)(1) and (e)(2)].) Courts have interpreted protected “litigation-related activity” to include not merely the filing of a lawsuit, but “ ‘conduct that relates to such litigation, including statements made in connection with or in preparation of litigation.’ ” (Alfaro v. Warehouse Management Corp. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 26, 33 [quoting Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1537.)

The “act or acts underlying” this claim (Lee, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 538) are twofold. First, Defendant is accused of “obtain[ing] Plaintiff's confidential medical and psychiatric information during the parties’ co-parenting period[.]” (Complaint, p. 11.) The Court reads the Complaint to allege this act of obtaining the information as an act of “intrusion” underlying this cause of action. (See Mezger v. Bick (2021) 66 Cal.App.Sth 76, 86 [elements].) Other portions of the Complaint suggest that Defendant “obtained” this information when Plaintiff voluntarily shared it with her or gave her access to it. (/d. at p. 23.) Defendant’s “obtaining” this information with Plaintiffs consent cannot support invasion of privacy liability, but that is irrelevant at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. The act of receiving or acquiring information does not amount to a “statement” or a “writing,” so this does not qualify as protected conduct under the only provision of Section 425.16(e) Defendant has invoked to satisfy her first-prong burden. As a result, the anti-SLAPP motion cannot be granted as to this claim without regard to its merit.

Second, Defendant is accused of “disclos[ing]” “Plaintiff's confidential medical and psychiatric information” “without authorization to third parties, including the court-appointed psychologist and family-court personnel” in the course of the parties’ custody proceeding. (Complaint, p. 11.) Exhibit G to the Complaint, a document Plaintiff created for the express purpose of documenting the “unauthorized disclosure, alteration, and augmentation of . . . private medical and psychiatric information to the court-appointed evaluator and, by extension, to the Court” (id. at p. 191), explains that “the unauthorized disclosures were sent directly to the court evaluator in the context of a custody dispute, with the foreseeable purpose and effect of prejudicing [Plaintiff's] parental rights.” (/d. at p. 192.) Based on Plaintiff's own characterization, Defendant’s allegedly disclosing this information constitutes protected activity. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (e)(1), (e)(2).) As pleaded, this disclosure supplies the “intrusion” element of the common law invasion of privacy cause of action. (Mezger, supra, 66 Cal.App.Sth 76, 86; Complaint, pp. 11- 12.)

Plaintiff argues that “unauthorized medical disclosure” is “illegal or independently tortious” and so is not protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, relying on Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299. (Opposition, p. 9.) In Flatley, the Supreme Court held that “where a defendant brings [an anti-SLAPP motion] based on a claim that the plaintiff’s action arises from activity by the defendant in furtherance of the defendant’s exercise of protected speech or petition rights, but either the defendant concedes, or the evidence conclusively establishes, that the assertedly protected speech or petition activity was illegal as a matter of law, the defendant is precluded from using the anti-SLAPP statute to strike the plaintiff s action.” (39 Cal.4th 299, 320.) “The term ‘illegal’ in Flatley means criminal, not merely violative of a statute.” (Price v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 962, 971; accord Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Section Services, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1654 [“[A] plaintiffs complaint always alleges a defendant engaged in illegal conduct in that it violated some common law standard of conduct.’’].) Conduct is “illegal as a matter of law” only where the defendant concedes as much or where “uncontroverted and conclusive evidence” demonstrates that it is. (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th 299, 320.) “[I]f a plaintiff claims that the defendant’s conduct is illegal and thus not protected activity, the plaintiff bears the burden of conclusively proving the illegal conduct.” (Cross v. Cooper (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 357, 385.) Plaintiff has neither alleged, nor argued, nor evidenced that Defendant’s allegedly disclosing his health information was a criminal act.

Having concluded that this cause of action arises out of protected activity to the extent it rests on Defendant’s alleged disclosure of Plaintiff's mental health information (as opposed to her “obtaining” such information), the Court turns to Plaintiff's showing at the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Plaintiff must establish that he is likely to prevail on this cause of action to the extent it rests on that disclosure.

Civil Code, section 47, subdivision (b)’s litigation privilege “generally protects from tort liability any publication made in connection with a judicial proceeding.” (Jacob B. v. County of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 952.) “ ‘The usual formation [of the privilege] is that [it] applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.’” (/d. at p. 955 [quoting Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212].) The purpose of the privilege is, among other things, to “ ‘afford litigants and witnesses free access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions[.]’” (Ud. at p. 955 [quoting Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1063.) The privilege is “broadly applied,” “absolute,” and applicable “regardless of malice.” (/d. at p. 955.) Where the litigation privilege applies, it “present[s] a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing” at the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th 299, 323; see also Seltzer v. Barnes (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 972, fn. 15 [if the litigation privilege bars the plaintiffs claim, plaintiff cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim, regardless of what evidence plaintiff has presented as to the elements of the cause of action].) .

The litigation privilege “ ‘absolutely protects litigants and other participants from being sued on the basis of communications they make in the context of family law proceedings.’ ” (Jacob B., supra, 40 Cal.4th 948, 956 [quoting Wise v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1302].) In Wise v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., a pharmacy supplied a husband with his wife’s prescription drug order history. (83 Cal-App.4th 1296, 1300.) The Third District held that the husband’s disclosure of this information in the couple’s divorce action “to persuade the court [the wife] was not deserving of custody of their children” fell squarely within the scope of the litigation privilege. (/d. at. p. 1302.) This case is representative of several authorities holding that the litigation privilege generally bars lawsuits based on the disclosure of sensitive personal information bearing on the best interest of the child in family law proceedings. (See, e.g., Jacob B., supra, 40 Cal.4th 948, 956 [litigation privilege barred invasion of privacy action based on letter submitted to court in family law proceeding to determine visitation rights; letter accused plaintiff, the father’s brother, of molestation]; Obos v. Scripps Psychological Associates, Inc, (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 103, 107-109 [litigation privilege barred invasion of privacy action based on court-appointed psychologist’s disclosure of information about mother’s boyfriend in the course making custody recommendation].)

In Plaintiff's own words, Defendant, a litigant in a family law proceeding, made the disclosure at issue to “the court-appointed psychologist and family-court personnel” (Complaint, p. 11) “in the context of a custody dispute[.]” Ud. at p. 192.) She allegedly did this “to portray Plaintiff as unstable” (id. at p. 12) and “with the foreseeable purpose .. . of prejudicing [Plaintiffs] parental rights” (id. at p. 192) — that is, she allegedly did it to “persuade” the family law judge that Plaintiff was “not deserving of custody of their children.” (Wise, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 1296,

1302.) Wise is controlling. This cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege to the extent it rests on Defendant’s disclosure of Plaintiff's mental health information.

Plaintiffs only counterargument is that “Defendant cannot shield unauthorized medical disclosure under the litigation privilege where the gravamen of the claim is illegal disclosure of confidential medical information, not communicative acts in litigation.” (Opposition, p. 10.) The Court reads this to mean that where a plaintiff accuses a defendant of a communicative act that is “illegal,” the litigation privilege does not apply. This does not make sense on its face. Any time a plaintiff sues a defendant over a communicative act, the plaintiff is alleging that the communicative act was illegal. Also, in Jacob B., supra, 40 Cal.4th 948, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a disclosure in a family court proceeding that violates confidentiality laws’ cannot claim the protection of the litigation privilege on that basis. (40 Cal.4th 948, 959.)

The anti-SLAPP motion is GRANTED as to this cause of action except to the extent it rests on Defendant’s allegedly “obtain[ing] Plaintiffs confidential medical and psychiatric information during the parties’ co-parenting period.” (Complaint, p. 11.)

Second Cause of Action: Wrongful Publication of Private Facts

The act underlying this claim is, again, Defendant’s disclosure of Plaintiff's medical and psychiatric information to court personnel in the course of the family law proceeding. (See Complaint, p. 14.) As pleaded, this conduct constitutes the publication element of this cause of action. (Ibid.; see also Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1440 [elements].) Defendant’s obtaining or receiving the information is not alleged as a basis for this cause of action — the claim rests entirely on the disclosure. Accordingly, this cause of action arises out of protected litigation-related conduct in its entirety. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (e)(1), (e)(2).) The Court adopts its litigation privilege analysis from above and concludes that this cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege.

The anti-SLAPP motion is GRANTED as to this cause of action.

Third Cause of Action: False Light

The conduct underlying this cause of action is Defendant’s allegedly “present[ing] Plaintiff’ in various unflattering manners (e.g., as “psychologically unstable” and “erratic or incapable of responsible parenting”) by numerous means (e.g., “argumentative framing in written declarations” and “misleading statements to the court via her attorney”). (Complaint, p. 16.) It is clear from the pleading that all of the written and oral statements at issue here allegedly occurred in the course of the family law proceeding. (See Complaint, p. 17 [in doing these things, Defendant “knew or should have known . . . she was leveraging [a] false narrative for custody advantage”; she was “intending to sway evaluators and the court”].) This constitutes protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and/or (e)(2). As pleaded, the conduct alleged here constitutes the means whereby Defendant allegedly “place[d] . . . [Plaintiff before the public in a false light[.]” (Complaint, p. 16; Jackson v. Mayweather

3 To be clear, the Court is not implying that Defendant did anything in violation of any confidentiality laws.

(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1264.) This cause of action, its entirety, arises out of protected activity. Defendant, a litigant in a family proceeding regarding child custody, is accused of “present[ing] Plaintiff as: psychologically unstable, unsafe with the children, erratic or incapable of responsible parenting, unreliable in co-parenting, in need of psychiatric oversight, and a source of emotional harm to the children.” (Complaint, p. 16.) Obviously, all of these representations are logically relevant to the object of this custody proceeding, which was to determine the extent to which Plaintiff’s having custody of the children was in their best interest. (See Obos, supra, 59 Cal. App.4th 103, 107.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant did this “to achieve the objects of the litigation[,]’’ i.e., to obtain “custody advantage.” (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205, 212; Complaint, p. 17.) The litigation privilege bars this claim.

The anti-SLAPP motion is GRANTED as to this cause of action.

Fourth Cause of Action: Violation of State Constitutional Privacy Rights

The conduct underlying this cause of action is set forth in six bullet points on Page 20 of the complaint under the subheading “Defendant Committed a Serious invasion of Plaintiff's Privacy.” All of it is communicative in nature, consisting of written and oral statements, disclosures, and other communications. The context of the pleading makes clear that all of the conduct underlying this cause of action occurred in connection with the custody proceeding. (See Complaint, pp. 20-21 [conduct occurred “for the purpose of manipulating custody determinations”; conduct allegedly caused “contamination of court-ordered evaluation” and “adverse judicial findings”’].)

As pleaded, all of this conduct constitutes the “invasion” element (sometimes referred to as “intrusion”) of this invasion of privacy claim. (Complaint, p. 20; Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [elements].) This cause of action, in its entirety, arises out of protected activity. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (e)(1), (e)(2).)

All of the alleged conduct underlying this cause of action is communicative conduct that Defendant, then a litigant in a child custody proceeding, undertook in connection with that proceeding for the purpose of achieving the object of that proceeding. (See Complaint, p. 21 [alleged acts underlying this claim were committed “for the purpose of manipulating custody determinations”].) Sharing information about a parent’s behavior, mental health, level of parental involvement, stability, co-parenting behavior, and communications regarding co-parenting is all logically related to the issues at hand in a child custody proceeding. (See Obos, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 103, 107.) This cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege. (bid; Wise, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1302; see also Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.) The anti-SLAPP motion is GRANTED as to this cause of action.

Fifth Cause of Action: Violation of Health Information Privacy Rights

The conduct underlying this claim is Defendant’s alleged disclosure of “Plaintiff’s confidential medical information” to “the court-appointed psychologist, her legal counsel, and indirectly to the court, without Plaintiffs consent and for the purpose of influencing legal outcomes.” (Complaint, pp. 23-24.) The disclosures included “added handwritten commentary and

selectively presented information to portray Plaintiff negatively.” (/d. at p. 24.) As pleaded, these disclosures are the “unauthorized disclosure[s]” around which the whole cause of action revolves. (Complaint, p. 23.)

This cause of action also refers to Defendant “possess[ing]’” or “obtain[ing] access” to the information in the first place. The Court reads these allegations as supplying context to explain what, in Defendant’s view, gave the disclosure its wrongful character (specifically, she obtained this information as his wife, and he believes it is unfair that she then used it against him). (Complaint, p. 23.) Defendant’s obtaining the information is not offered as a basis for liability the way it was in connection with the First Cause of Action, and could not be, as the nature of this cause of action targets disclosure, specifically, as contrasted with generalized intrusion into private matters. That Defendant’s “obtaining” this information is not protected conduct under Section 425.16(e)(1) or (e)(2) does not render this a mixed cause of action.

For reasons already discussed, this cause of action arises out of protected litigation-related activity under Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and/or (e)(2) and is absolutely barred by the litigation privilege.

The anti-SLAPP motion is GRANTED as to this cause of action.

Sixth Cause of Action: Defamation

The conduct underlying this cause of action is Defendant’s allegedly making and circulating “statements portraying Plaintiff’ as having various negative qualities. (Complaint, p. 26.) Plaintiff alleges that “[t]hese statements were conveyed through: written communications to the court-appointed psychologist; written declarations submitted in custody proceedings; attorneydirected submissions; oral statements during hearings; and communications directed to others involved in the custody process.” (Ibid.) In other words, all of the statements underlying this claim occurred in connection with the child custody proceeding, and thus constitute protected litigation-related activity, based on Plaintiff’s own allegations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (e)(1), (e)(2).) These “statements” constitute the false publications at the center of Plaintiffs defamation claim. (John Doe 2 v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.Sth 1300, 1312.) This cause of action, in its entirety, arises out of protected activity.

Based on Plaintiff’s own allegations, all of these statements were made in connection with a judicial proceeding, by a litigant in that proceeding, in order to achieve the objects of the litigation. (See Jacob B., supra, 40 Cal.4th 948, 955; Complaint, p. 27 [statements “aligned with litigation strategy” and were made “to obtain leverage in custody litigation’’].) Statements about a parent’s mental stability, safety, psychological impact on the children, fitness to parent, consistency or reliability, and compliance with court orders are unquestionably logically connected to the issues on the table in a child custody proceeding. (See Obos, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 103, 107; Complaint, p. 26.) This cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege. (Ibid. [defamation claim barred by litigation privilege]; see also Si/berg, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.)

The anti-SLAPP motion is GRANTED as to this cause of action.

Seventh Cause of Action: Interference With Parent-Child Relationship

This cause of action is based on eight actions, or categories of conduct, set forth in bullet points on Page 29 of the Complaint. As an initial matter, the Court cannot locate any authority defining the elements of the tort cause of action Plaintiff pleads here (essentially, intentional alienation of a child from a parent) or establishing that it exists. Of the three authorities Plaintiff cites in the Complaint (he does not address this claim in his opposition), one is a case the Court cannot locate in the absence of a citation (“In re Marriage of Segovia’); the second has no apparent relevance (Barber v. Barber (1958) 51 Cal.2d 244); and the third is a provision of the Restatement (2nd) of Torts pertaining to kidnappings (§ 700). For purposes of the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, it is sufficient to note that the eight bullet points on Page 29 of the Complaint describe the acts of interference on which the tort rests, so this cause of action arises out of that conduct.

Bullet points #1, #2, #7, and #8 plainly reference Defendant’s statements or writings in connection with the custody litigation (e.g., #7, “[u]sing contaminated or misleading information to influence custody recommendations”). For reasons already discussed, this is protected litigation-related conduct. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (e)(1), (e)(2).) Regarding the allegation that she “conceal[ed] . . . factual circumstances to portray Plaintiff as dangerous or unstable” (Complaint, p. 29), this refers to a statement notwithstanding the fact that it is phrased as though it targets a failure to speak. Plaintiff is accusing Defendant of describing him in a manner that left out information he thought should be included in her “portray[al]” of him. This takes issue with a “statement” as much as does an allegation that Defendant lied to the court.

Two of the bases for this cause of action relate to an incident surrounding the parties’ daughter’s birthday. Defendant is accused of “[u]ninviting Plaintiff from his daughter’s birthday moments after the child invited Plaintiffs fiancée, followed by false accusations of ‘control’ and ‘psychological abuse” and of “[t]hreatening to call police if Plaintiff attempted to attend the same birthday.” (Complaint, p. 29.) In connection with this, Plaintiff refers to Exhibit O to the complaint. (Jbid.)

In Exhibit O, Plaintiff alleges that on September 6, 2025, Defendant sent him an email accusing him of failing to satisfy requirements contained in the family law court’s January 16, 2025 custody order. (Complaint, p. 256.) The Complaint describes this email as “leverag[ing] the January 2025 order as a punitive measure.” (/d. at p. 254.) In the email, Defendant allegedly described the custody order as making Plaintiff's visitation with the children contingent on completion of a parenting class, and stated that he had not completed the class. (Jbid.) She stated that his recent behavior had “raised concerns,” and while she had previously tried to be. “flexible,” she would “need to ensure the custody order [was] followed” moving forward. She stated that future visitation would need to occur “in compliance with the January 2025 custody order, including the required parenting class prior to visits.” (/bid.) Plaintiff alleges that after receiving this email, he confronted Defendant by text message. (Complaint, p. 258.) She requested that he provide the completion certificate for the parenting class. (/d. at p. 259.) She subsequently informed him, “Regarding [Daughter’s] birthday, you are not welcome as I have yet to see the parenting class name or certificate... . I will stand by the legal custody agreement. If you don’t text me a copy of the certificate and the name of the class, I won’t be able to verify it and you will not be welcome[.]” (/d. at p. 260.) Defendant is accused of subsequently stating,

“Please know I have yet to see any parenting class certificate. I do plan on calling the police if you show up here.” (7d. at p. 261.)

This context makes it beyond dispute that Page 27’s allegations that Defendant uninvited Plaintiff from his daughter’s birthday party and threatened to call the police if he attended (Bullet #4 and #5) refer to Defendant’s statements “in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a... judicial body[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(2); see also Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266 [“[A] statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.”].) To be clear, at the time of these alleged communications, the parties’ family law action was still open to the extent it concerned child custody and visitation, and remains so today.

This leaves the allegations that Defendant “with[held] visitation immediately after personal disputes unrelated to the children’s welfare” and “pressur[ed] the children to cancel visits or present[ed] visitation as contingent upon Plaintiff’s compliance with Defendant’s demands” (Bullets #3 and #6). After careful consideration, the Court cannot conclude that these allegations refer exclusively to Defendant’s prohibiting Plaintiff from attending his daughter’s birthday party until he supplied proof of compliance with the custody order or otherwise refer exclusively to statements by Defendant with a connection to the custody litigation. Where a plaintiff's allegations are vague enough that the reader cannot tell what conduct is at issue, those allegations are effectively immune to an anti-SLAPP motion. (See Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities Agency (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 611, 628 [“impossible” to see how defendants could meet their first-step burden given plaintiffs lack of specificity in the complaint].)

The Court proceeds to the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis as to Bullets # 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8. Plaintiff does not address the merits of his cause of action for interference with parentchild relationship in his brief. Accordingly, he has not carried his burden. The motion is GRANTED as to the Seventh Cause of Action except to the extent it rests on Defendant’s allegedly “withholding visitation immediately after personal disputes unrelated to the children’s welfare” and “pressuring the children to cancel visits or presenting visitation as contingent upon Plaintiff’s compliance with Defendant’s demands.” (Complaint, p. 29.) It is DENIED to that extent.

Eighth Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The conduct underlying this cause of action appears in eight bullet points on Pages 32-33 of the Complaint. The conduct described here supplies the “extreme and outrageous conduct” element of Plaintiff's ITED claim. (Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 494.)

Bullet #1 describes protected activity because filing an ex parte application constitutes making a “statement or writing... before a ... judicial proceeding[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(1).) Bullets #2 and #6 are references to Defendant’s alleged disclosures and statements to the court-appointed psychologist, which the Court has already concluded were protected activity.

Bullet #3 accuses Defendant of “[s]abotaging the 2024 cooperative agreement, lying to the Court about its contents and sabotaging the party’s progress.” A theme of Plaintiffs lawsuit is that he

and Defendant were initially amicable and agreed on a co-parenting arrangement in approximately “late 2024 and early 2025,” and then she pivoted, turned her back on the progress they had made, and involved the courts. (See Complaint, p. 77.) Bullet #3 is a clear reference to these allegations. Making statements to a court and appealing to a court for custody orders both constitute protected activity. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(1).)

Bullet #4 accuses Defendant of “[w]ithholding children, canceling visits, and issuing threats,” including that she would call the police if Plaintiff showed up at his daughter’s birthday party. The pleading’s reference to Exhibit O here makes clear that this refers to the conduct the Court already concluded was protected litigation-related activity in connection with the Seventh Cause of Action (interference with parent-child relationship).

Bullet #7 accuses Defendant of “[e]nsuring Plaintiffs statements were ignored or misrepresented in court,” including at two identified hearings, an allegation that can only be read to allege courtroom advocacy as a ground for relief and thus targets activity that is protected under Section 425.16(e)(1).

Bullet #5 accuses Defendant of “[e|ngaging in a pattern of coercive control, including demands, goalpost-moving, and emotional withdrawal documented across years of messages[.]” (Complaint, p. 33.) The Complaint ties this allegation to Plaintiff's “Exhibit N,” a “synthesized. .. archive of text messages” between the parties intended to provide a “summary of communication dynamics relevant to the ex parte filings and resulting [custody order].” (/d. at p. 248.) Plaintiff alleges that Exhibit N demonstrates how Defendant’s communications were “directly correlated with key litigation events.” (/bid.) The reference to Exhibit N persuades the Court that the allegation in Bullet #5 targets Defendant’s statements in connection with an issue under review by a judicial body (the parties’ custody arrangement). (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(2).)

Bullet #8 accuses Defendant of “[c]ausing hearings to occur without recording, eliminating appellate protections and undermining due-process access.” (Complaint, p. 33.) This refers to the failure to record or transcribe a November 15, 2023 hearing in the family law matter. (/d. at p. 145.) Obviously, this identifies conduct in connection with an issue under review by a judicial body, but there is no basis in the record for the Court to conclude that Defendant is accused of “[c]ausing hearings to occur without recording” by means of a statement or writing. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (e)(1), (e)(2).) If Plaintiff is accusing her of, for example, tampering with courtroom equipment, that would not fall within Section 425.16(e)(1) or (e)(2). Because this allegation is too vague to determine what conduct by Defendant is at issue, and because the only “protected conduct” grounds Defendant has invoked require a statement or a writing, the anti- SLAPP motion must be denied as to this basis for relief.

The Court proceeds to the merits analysis as to Bullets #1-7. Plaintiff has declined to address the merits of his TED claim in his brief and so has not carried his burden. The motion to strike is GRANTED as to the Eighth Cause of Action except to the extent it is based on Defendant’s allegedly “[c]ausing hearings to occur without recording[.]” (Complaint, p. 33.)

Ninth Cause of Action: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The conduct underlying this cause of action appears in seven bullet points on Pages 35 and 36 of the Complaint. These acts are the means by which Defendant is alleged to have breached a duty for purposes of the NIED claim. (See Klein v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 889, 894 [elements].)

Bullet points #1, #3, and #4 describe conduct the Court has already determined is protected litigation-related activity. References to Exhibits O and N indicate that Bullets #6 and #7, respectively, target Defendant’s protected litigation-related conduct.

Bullet #2 refers to Defendant’s allegedly “withholding, misrepresenting, and misusing children’s psychological information and private medical records.” (Complaint, p. 36.) Based on the reference to Plaintiff's Exhibit G in connection with this bullet point, the reference to “private medical records” is about her sharing Plaintiffs mental health records with the court-appointed evaluator. That was protected conduct. As for Defendant’s conduct with regard to the “children’s psychological information,” Plaintiff refers the court to his Exhibit F, which he drafted to explain how the custody ruling “was not the product of a fair, evidence-based judicial process,” but of other factors, including “improper influence on the Court-appointed evaluator.” (Complaint, p. 150.) The exhibit contains a document entitled “Mother’s Influence Over the Child Interview” that essentially accuses Defendant of manipulating the children to affect their interviews and therefore the custody outcome. (Complaint, p. 152.) She is accused of “framing . . . [Plaintiff's] conduct” in a misleading way and spouting “protectionist rhetoric” to the children about their father. With this context, the Court concludes that the balance of the conduct described in Bullet #2 is protected. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(2).)

Bullet #5 targets Defendant’s “causing hearings to proceed without recording[.]” (Complaint, p. 36.) As discussed, the Court has no basis to conclude that this is a reference to conduct within the scope of Section 425.16(e)(1) or (e)(2).

Bullet #6 accuses Defendant of “repeatedly cancelling visits, refusing parenting-plan cooperation, and threatening to involve law enforcement in non-emergency contexts.” (Complaint, p. 36.) The reference to Exhibit O indicates that this refers to conduct the Court has already concluded is protected, including Defendant’s resorting to the court system instead of adhering to the parties’ prior unofficial agreement, disinviting Plaintiff from his daughter’s birthday party, and telling him she would call the police if he appeared at her home.

Bullet #7 accuses Defendant of “engaging in sudden communication shifts that aligned entirely with litigation milestones, destabilizing the family structure.” (Complaint, p. 36.) This is an allegation of communicative conduct in connection with the issues of the custody litigation and is protected.

In summary, the Court reaches the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis as to Bullets #1-4 and 6-7. The motion is GRANTED as to these claims because Plaintiff has not addressed the merits of his cause of action for NIED in his brief. The motion is DENIED to the extent this cause of action rests on Bullet #5, Defendant’s allegedly causing hearings not to be recorded.

Tenth Cause of Action: Civil Harassment

This cause of action is based on Code of Civil Procedure, section 527.6, which permits a “person who has suffered harassment” to seek an order prohibiting that conduct. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (a)(1).) “Harassment” includes “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b)(3); see also subd. (b)(1) [defining “course of conduct’’].) The conduct underlying this cause of action appears in seven bullet points on Page 38 of the Complaint, and the actions described there are alleged to comprise the “course of conduct” for purposes of this claim. All of them plainly reference Defendant’s statements or writings in connection with custody proceeding except the last one, “repeatedly obstructing Plaintiffs parental rights.” (Complaint, p. 38.) The Complaint makes a point to establish that “(hjarassment may include repeated litigation abuse, fabricated accusations, and leveraging procedural mechanisms to intimidate or isolate a parent” (ibid.) — in other words, to establish that conduct in the course of family law proceedings can support a harassment claim. In light of that, the Court sees no basis to understand the “obstructing Plaintiff's parental rights” allegation as targeting something other than Plaintiff's communicative conduct in the course of the custody proceeding. This cause of action, in its entirety, targets protected litigation-related activity. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(1)-(e)(2).) Plaintiff has not addressed the merits of his civil harassment cause of action in his brief, so the motion to strike is GRANTED as to this whole cause of action.

Eleventh Cause of Action: Civil Harassment — Coercive Control

This cause of action is based on California Family Code, section 6320, which permits a court to issue an ex parte order enjoining a party from “disturbing the peace of the other party[.]” (Fam. — Code, § 6320, subd. (a); Complaint, p. 40.) This is defined to include “coercive control, which is a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty.” (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (c).)

The conduct underlying this cause of action appears in nine bullet points on Pages 40 and 41 of the Complaint. As pleaded, these allegations are the coercive behaviors underlying this cause of action. All of them describe communicative conduct (e.g., filing for ex parte relief, making statements about Plaintiff's entitlement to visitation, accusing Plaintiff of maltreatment, making demands of him, citing the children “as leverage in disputes,” lying to the judge, sharing Plaintiffs private medical information). Before describing the conduct that is the subject of this claim, Plaintiff asserts that “California courts recognize coercive control as actionable, particularly when used to influence custody outcomes[.]” (Complaint, p. 40.) This indicates that the communicative conduct Plaintiff is targeting here is conduct intended “to influence custody outcomes[,]” i.e., communicative conduct in connection with the custody litigation. This cause of action rests entirely on protected conduct. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (e)(1), (e)(2).) Because Defendant has met her burden and Plaintiff has neglected to address the merits of this cause of action at all in his brief, the motion is GRANTED as to the cause of action for coercive control.

Twelfth Cause of Action: Extrinsic Fraud

“Extrinsic fraud occurs when a party is deprived of the opportunity to present his claim or defense to the court; where he was kept ignorant; or, other than from his own negligence,

fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the proceeding.” (City and County of San Francisco v. Cartagena (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1067 [superseded by statute in unrelated part as discussed in County of Fresno y. Sanchez (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 15, 19].) “The essence of extrinsic fraud is one party's preventing the other from having his day in court.” (/bid.) The conduct underlying this cause of action appears on Page 43 of the Complaint under the subheading “Defendant’s Misrepresentations to Legal Actors and Evaluators” and on Page 42 under the subheading “Specific Examples of Extrinsic Fraud.” It consists entirely of statements or writings made in connection with the child custody proceeding. At times, Plaintiff takes issue with what Defendant did not say. For example, he accuses her of “withholding exculpatory evidence regarding Plaintiffs consistent parenting.” (Complaint, p. 43.) The context makes clear that this and similar allegations attempt to hold Defendant liable for failing to include in her statements information Plaintiff thinks she should have included. (See Complaint, pp. 43-44 [Plaintiff alleges that this “withholding exculpatory evidence” amounted to a “misrepresentation[] .. . designed to produce a distorted record for judicial consideration”; accuses her of “depriving the court of full context’].) These allegations take issue with her protected conduct — her statements made before a judicial body — just as much as allegations accusing her of lying to the court.

As pleaded, this conduct is the means whereby Defendant supposedly prevented Plaintiff from “having his day in court.” (Cartagena, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1067.) This cause of action, in its entirety, arises out of protected litigation-related activity. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(1), (€)(2).) Defendant argues that the litigation privilege bars this cause of action. These allegations describe communications made in a judicial proceeding by a litigant in that proceeding. (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.) As alleged, these were statements to the court-appointed psychologist and/or the coutt itself regarding Plaintiff's mental health; his consistency or stability (or lack thereof) as a parent; his “conduct and intentions” relating to the parties’ co-parenting arrangement; and the status of the parties’ informal co-parenting agreement. (Complaint, pp. 43- 44.) These topics obviously had a “logical relation” to the custody proceeding. (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.) Plaintiff himself alleges that these statements were made to sway the family court’s ruling in the custody matter and thus “to achieve the objects of the litigation[.]” (/bid.; see Complaint, pp. 43, 44 [Defendant’s alleged “misrepresentations were designed to produce a distorted record for judicial consideration”; she “created a false narrative that the judge relied upon in issuing the [custody order]’”].) This cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege and the motion is GRANTED as to the extrinsic fraud claim.

Thirteenth Cause of Action: Abuse of Process

The elements of a cause of action for abuse of process are that the defendant “(1) entertained an ulterior motive in using the [legal] process and (2) committed a wrongful act in a wrongful manner.” (Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Group (1986) 41 Cal.3d 782, 792.) Because “the essence of the tort of abuse of process” is “some misuse of process in a prior action[,] . . . it is hard to imagine an abuse of process claim that would not fall under the protection of the [anti-SLAPP] statute.” (Booker v, Rountree (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1370.)

The conduct underlying this cause of action appears under subheadings reading “Improper Use of Ex Parte Procedures,” “Manipulation of Evaluations and Court Actors,” and “Improper Influence in the January 2025 FOAH Hearing.” (Complaint, pp. 47-48.) As one would expect from these headings, the conduct supporting this cause of action invariably consists of Defendant filing petitions for custody-related relief in family court or making statements to the court and to court personnel, including statements that left out “positive or mitigating information.” (Complaint, p. 47.) This cause of action arises out of protected activity in its entirety (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(1)), so the Court turns to the merits.

These allegations describe communications made in a judicial proceeding by a litigant in that proceeding. (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.) These communications took the form of petitions seeking ex parte relief related to child custody; statements regarding Plaintiff's mental health and fitness as a parent; statements about the parties’ co-parenting history that omitted information Plaintiff would have liked included; statements about the status of the parties’ informal parenting agreement; and straightforward courtroom advocacy regarding the custody order (i.e., Defendant is accused of urging the judge to adopt his tentative custody order). (Complaint, pp. 47-48.) All of these have a logical connection to the custody determination. (See Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s conduct demonstrates a use of court procedures “to secure a strategic advantage in custody proceedings.” (Complaint, p. 48.) These allegations establish that he is suing her for conduct intended to achieve the object of the child custody litigation, which was a favorable custody order. The litigation privilege bars this cause of action and the motion is GRANTED.

Fourteenth Cause of Action: Professional Negligence

The Complaint alleges that Defendant is a licensed registered nurse/nurse practitioner. (Complaint, p. 50.) The conduct underlying this claim is her allegedly “obtaining, retaining, and disseminating” Plaintiff’s confidential medical and psychiatric information “to a court-appointed psychologist in the context of an adversarial proceeding” without his consent; “annotating or altering” those documents “with subjective commentary intended to influence the evaluator”; “representing or implying medical judgments about Plaintiffs mental state without clinical basis or proper evaluation”; “using her profession to lend illegitimate credibility to health-related accusations in family-court litigation”; and “engaging in conduct below the standard of care expected of licensed professionals entrusted with health information.” (Complaint, p. 51.)

“Obtaining and retaining” information does not involve a “statement” or a “writing,” so is not protected under Section 425.16(e)(1) or (e)(2). This conduct is alleged to amount to a breach of duty constituting professional negligence. (See Giacometti v. Aulla, LLC (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1137 [elements].) The motion cannot be granted as to this claim for relief.

The context supplied by the Complaint makes clear that the balance of this cause of action rests entirely on Defendant’s disclosing Plaintiff's mental health information to court personnel in connection with the child custody proceeding, or on statements she made to court personnel in connection with that disclosure. (See Complaint, p. 24 [regarding disclosure of this information to the court: “Because Defendant holds RN/NP licensure, the disclosures also constitute professional misconduct subject to administrative discipline.”].) As pleaded, these actions comprise the breach of duty underlying this professional negligence claim. (See Giacometti,

supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1137 [elements]; Complaint, p. 51.) The Court adopts its earlier analysis and concludes that this cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege to this extent.

The motion is GRANTED as to this cause of action except to the extent it rests on Defendant’s allegedly “obtaining” and “retaining” “Plaintiff's confidential medical and psychiatric information without authorization.” (Complaint, p. 51.)

Fifteenth Cause of Action: Civil Conspiracy

The conduct underlying this cause of action is Defendant’s allegedly “collaborat[ing]” with “egal counsel, advisors, and individuals affecting the custody proceedings” to “further a wrongful plan to “isolate Plaintiff from his children” and “secure an unjust custody outcome{,]” among other goals. (Complaint, p. 53.) Defendant and her unnamed co-conspirators are alleged to have taken several “overt acts . . . in furtherance of the conspiracy[,]” all of which were communicative acts in connection with the custody proceeding (e.g., making statements or offering evidence that Plaintiff contends was incomplete or “distorted” for “litigation advantage”; “jointly advocating for” the final order in the custody proceeding, which Plaintiff contends was “erroneous”; “falsely describing” something to the judge). (Complaint, p. 54.) As pleaded, this conduct supplies the “agreement” and “act in furtherance of the common design” elements of Plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim. (See Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 511.) The Court concludes that this cause of action, in its entirety, arises out of protected litigation-related activity. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (e)(1), (€)(2).) This showing shifted the burden to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of the claim. Plaintiff has neglected to address the merits of his civil conspiracy cause of action in any way in his opposition and so has failed to carry his burden. Also, there is no such thing as a cause of action for civil conspiracy under California law. (Applied Equipment Corp., supra, 7 Cal.4th 503, 510, 514.)

The anti-SLAPP motion is GRANTED as to this cause of action.

Sixteenth Cause of Action: Declaratory Relief

The declaratory relief statute provides that where there is an “actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties[,]” a plaintiff may bring a claim for declaratory relief seeking a binding judicial declaration of the parties’ respective rights and duties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.)

To determine whether a claim for declaratory relief arises from protected activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute, a court considers whether the conduct creating the “actual controversy” is protected. (See CKE Restaurants, Inc. v. Moore (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 262, 271 [agreeing with trial court’s conclusion that declaratory relief claim arose out of the protected activity of filing a Proposition 65 notice where ‘without the Notice, there would have been no actual, present controversy, and no controversy at all’”’]; WasteXperts, Inc. v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 652, 661 [There is a dispute here over who has the right to move [trash bins] .. .; more specifically, . . whether [defendant] has the exclusive right

to move them or the [municipal code] creates an exception that permits [plaintiff] to do so as well. The dispute arises from the fact that [plaintiff] has been moving the bins.”| [emphasis added].) Accordingly, the Court addresses each of the “controversies” alleged in the Complaint.

Controversy as to “the lawfulness of Defendant’s disclosures of confidential information”: This is a clear reference to Defendant’s sharing Plaintiff's mental health information in connection with the custody litigation. As previously discussed, that was protected conduct. Controversy as to “the integrity and validity of the court-appointed psychological evaluation”: This is a reference to Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant’s sharing his mental health information with the court-appointed evaluator in the custody proceeding “contaminat[ed]” that psychological evaluation. (Complaint, p. 9.) The conduct by Defendant that created this “controversy” is her allegedly disclosing Plaintiff's mental health information to the courtappointed evaluator, which was protected conduct.

Controversy as to “the extent to which ex parte procedures were improperly used and contaminated the judicial process”: This references Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant wrongfully triggered ex parte proceedings in the child custody litigation when there was no “emergency” that justified her reliance on those proceedings. (See Complaint, p. 8.) As discussed, filing an ex parte application is protected litigation-related activity.

Controversy as to “the status of co-parenting agreements negotiated in 2024-2025”: This refers to Defendant’s allegedly refusing to inform the family law judge about the parties’ “progress” in arriving at a co-parenting agreement outside of court, and her seeking a formal custody order instead of adhering to their prior agreement. (Complaint, p. 77; see also p. 32 [alleging as basis for ITED claim that Defendant “sabotag[ed] the 2024 cooperative agreement, [lied] to the Court about its contents and sabotag[ed] the parties’ progress”].) The conduct that created this “controversy” consists of Defendant’s resorting to the court for custody-related relief and making certain statements to the judge in connection with that request for relief. That is protected litigation-related activity.

Controversy as to “Defendant’s rights and limits regarding communication, information-sharing, and litigation conduct”: “Information-sharing” refers to Defendant’s disclosures of Plaintiff's mental health information and/or to her representations to the family law judge. The Court has no trouble concluding that a declaratory relief claim based on a controversy relating to Defendant’s “rights and limits regarding . . . [her] information-sharing and litigation conduct” arises out of protected activity. After careful consideration of the context in which this allegation appears, the Court interprets the pleading’s reference to Defendant’s “communications” to refer to her communications in connection with the custody litigation. The basis for this conclusion is that these “communications” are lumped together with her “information-sharing” and “litigation conduct,” both of which plainly reference her conduct in connection with the custody litigation. The entire alleged controversy over her “rights and limits regarding communication, information-sharing, and litigation conduct” is presented as the fifth of a list of alleged controversies, and the preceding four are each based entirely on Defendant’s litigation-related conduct, as discussed. There is no allegation anywhere within the declaratory relief cause of action that clearly references any conduct by Defendant outside the litigation context. This “controversy” was born out of Defendant’s protected litigation-related activity. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.15, subds. (e)(1), (€)(2).)

Controversy over “Plaintiff's rights to be free from further harassment, interference, and misuse of process”: The word “further” indicates that this alleged controversy is derivative of the preceding five, all of which were created by Defendant’s protected litigation-related conduct. “Harassment” and “interference” here refer to the manner in which Defendant allegedly conducted the custody litigation. The declaratory relief claim arises out of protected litigationrelated activity to the extent it rests on this “controversy.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.15, subds. (e)(1), (e)(2).) Having concluded that the declaratory relief claim arises out of protected activity in its entirety, the Court turns to Plaintiff's showing on the merits. Plaintiff has pleaded a list of the “declaratory rulings” he is seeking and thus what “prevailing” on this claim would look like. (Complaint, p. 56.) He wants declaratory judgments that would modify the current custody arrangement. For example, Plaintiff seeks a ruling declaring that he “remains entitled to meaningful and ongoing participation in co-parenting” and “defining [his] right[] to . . . coparenting participation[.]” (Complaint, pp. 56-57.) Plaintiff also seeks declaratory judgments that would unwind the custody order by declaring it to be procedurally invalid. (See, e.g., Complaint, p. 57 [requesting declaratory ruling that “prior custody-related outcomes were tainted by contaminated process”].)

Where a proceeding has been assigned to one department of a superior court, and that proceeding has not been “finally disposed off,]” “it is beyond the jurisdictional authority of another department of the same court” “to interfere with the exercise of the power of the department to which the proceeding has been so assigned.” (Williams v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County (1939) 14 Cal.2d 656, 662.) “In other words, while one department is exercising the jurisdiction vested by the Constitution in the superior court of that county, the other departments thereof are as distinct therefrom as other superior courts. If such were not the law, conflicting adjudications of the same subject-matter by different departments of the one court would bring about an anomalous situation and doubtless lead to much confusion.” (/bid.)

The parties’ family law proceeding is still open to the extent it concerns child custody and visitation. The Court notes that Plaintiff continues to actively request custody- and visitationrelated relief from the Family Law Division. He has filed a motion to vacate the January 2025 custody order, temporarily reinstate the parties’ prior custody and parenting arrangement, and redetermine the custody and visitation order. (See Resp. Req. for Order and Mot. to Vacate, filed Nov. 24, 2025 in Marin County Sup. Ct. Case No. FL 2200436.) That motion is set to be heard on April 2, 2026. Under these circumstances, Williams dictates that this Court does not have “jurisdictional authority” to issue any declaratory judgment that would interfere with the Family Division’s power to rule on the parties’ custody issues, including considerations of court procedure and evidence bearing on those custody issues.

The motion is GRANTED as to the declaratory relief cause of action.

Seventeenth Cause of Action — Injunctive Relief

The First District has held that claims for injunctive relief are “request[s] for a remedy[,]” not “causes of action” and so “not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Golden Gate Land Holdings, LLC v. Direct Action Everywhere (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 82, 91; see also Wong v. Jing (2010)

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189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1360, fn. 2 [“purported .. . cause of action” for “injunctive relief’ sought an equitable remedy and so was not a cause of action subject to anti-SLAPP statute].) Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as to this “cause of action.”

All parties must comply with Marin County Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 2.1 0(B) to contest the tentative decision. Parties who request oral argument are required to appear in person or remotely by ZOOM. Regardless of whether a party requests oral argument in accordance with Rule 2.10(B), the prevailing party shall prepare an order consistent with the announced ruling as required by Marin County Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 2.11.

The Zoom appearance information for February, 2026 is as follows: hitns://marin-courts-ca- gov. coompoy. cond] 605267272’ pwd=908ChP6TV 2maC Ayal laro6lyrid Khaw. I

Meeting ID: 160 526 7272 Passcode: 026935

If you are unable to join by video, you may join by telephone by calling (669) 254-5252 and using the above-provided passcode. Zoom appearance information may also be found on the Court’s website: https:/www.marin.courts.ca.gov

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