Wen v. Cruz, et al.
Case Information
Motion(s)
Motion to Quash Service of Summons
Motion Type Tags
Motion to Quash
Parties
- Plaintiff: Wen
- Defendant: Jocelyn Cruz
- Defendant: Doreen Kalfus
Ruling
Hearing Date: May 18, 2026 Case Name: Wen v. Cruz, et al. Case No.: 22STCP02799 Matter: Motion to Quash Service of Summons Moving Party: Defendants Jocelyn Cruz and Doreen Kalfus Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: Cruz’s Motion to Quash is granted. Kalfus? Motion is denied. Moving party to give notice. The Court encourages all parties to appear remotely via LA CourtConnect. If submitting on the Court's tentative ruling, please follow the instructions provided above. This is a landlord-tenant and roommate dispute filed by a pro per litigant. Defendants Jocelyn Cruz and Doreen Kalfus, who are also pro per litigants, now seek to quash service of summons, contending that service was improper. Specifically, they argue that “Plaintiff's repeated failure to serve the Defendants properly, personally attempting service only at Defendants’ workplace, where Defendants do not reside or receive mail, renders all purported service legally defective. Plaintiff sent first class mail to Defendants’ workplace and home address on July 25, 2025, which is - not compliant within the July 30, 2025 serving deadline: Service is considered complete 10 days after mailing - (CCP § 415.20(b)).” Defendants also make a number of irrelevant arguments such as lack of prosecution, a statute of limitations bar, and vexatious behavior. A defendant may move to quash service of summons on the ground the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc. § 418.10(a)(1).) “Although the defendant is the moving party, the plaintiff must carry the initial burden of demonstrating facts by a preponderance of evidence justifying the exercise of jurisdiction in California.” (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I and II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 110.) Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20(b) states, “If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person's dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing.” “A plaintiff may serve individual defendants through substitute service when they cannot be personally served with reasonable diligence. (§ 415.20, subd. (b); American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara, at p. 390, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 99.) The plaintiff may effect substitute service of a summons and complaint by leaving a copy of the documents at the defendant's “usual place of business’ with a person at least 18 years old who is “apparently in charge of his or her office [or] place of business,” and thereafter mailing a copy of the documents to the same place. (§ 415.20, subd. (b).) “Two or three attempts to personally serve a defendant at a proper place ordinarily qualifies as reasonable diligence.”? (Rodriguez v. Cho (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 742, 750.) Kalfus’ arguments lack merit because the proof of service that was executed by a registered process server shows personal service on July 22, 2025. Cruz’s arguments partly lack merit because the proof of service that was executed by a registered process server shows substituted service at Cruz’s workplace only after four attempts at personal service at her residential address. It also shows mailing the following day to Cruz’s workplace, followed by a second courtesy mailing to Cruz’s residence. The process server’s declaration is highly detailed with respect to the facts for
service. On the other hand, this sub-service is late given that the mailing occurred on July 25, 2025; sub-service is complete 10 days after the mailing (CCP § 415.20(b)), which here would be August 4, 2025; the three-year deadline to serve defendants was July 27, 2025; and the Court granted a final extension for service until July 30, 2025. Indeed,” The summons and complaint shall be served upon a defendant within three years after the action is commenced against the defendant? (CCP § 583.210(a)), and “If service is not made in an action within the time prescribed in this article: . . . (2) The action shall be dismissed by the court on its own motion or on motion of any person interested in the action, whether named as a party or not, after notice to the parties. (b) The requirements of this article are mandatory and are not subject to extension, excuse, or exception except as expressly provided by statute.” (CCP § 583.250.) Therefore, the Motion of Cruz is granted, and the Motion of Kalfus is denied. The action against Cruz is dismissed. Moving party to give notice. Home -->)" -->