Motion for Attorney Fees
# Case Name Tentative 1 Celis vs. General Motors LLC
2023-01308014 Motion for Attorney Fees
Plaintiffs Katty Celis and Juan Celis’s motion for attorney fees is GRANTED in the total amount of $15,123.50. (See Major Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. L [settlement agreement stating defendant expressly “agree[s] that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party” “[f]or purposes of any ... motion” for “attorney’s fees ... pursuant to California Civil Code § 1794(d)”]; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096 (PLCM) [lodestar method]; Reynolds v. Ford Motor Company (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1112 [same].)
The court finds that all of the hours requested to be reasonable (see Jacobson Decl. at Ex. 24; Jacobson Reply Decl. ¶ 8), with the exception of the following:
(1) All of Matt Xie’s 0.3 hours. Mr. Xie popped into this case on only one occasion to do nothing more than review the initial repair and purchase documents on 8/24/25, long after the case had been filed, and did absolutely nothing else in the case. (See Jacobson Decl. at Ex. 24.) As there was no apparent reason for Mr. Xie to be reviewing the file, all of his time is denied. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 [padding in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation]; Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38 [same]; Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1186
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(2) All of Solange Tadros’s 0.4 hours. Ms. Tadros billed a total of 0.4 hours on 8/15/25, for “communication with clients” (0.3 hours) and updating “notes on clio after speaking with client” (0.1 hours). (Jacobson Decl. at Ex. 24.) Given that Ms. Tadros had not done any work on this case before this “communication with [the] clients” and did not do any work on the case thereafter, this entry does not appear reasonable, especially since an attorney who was working on the case also called the clients later the same day. (See ibid.)
It appears as if Ms. Tadros simply answered a client call and took down a message for the handling attorneys. (See, e.g., Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635, fn. 21 [clerical tasks billed at attorney rates questionable]; SOURCE, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1186-1187 [the trial court “could reasonably have determined that billing at partner rates for” “some work that appears ... to be clerical” was “excessive”].)
(3) 1.0 anticipated hour of Derek Chipman’s time to prepare for and appear at the hearing on this fee motion. (See Jacobson Reply Decl. ¶ 8 [requesting two hours for this task].) Mr. Chipman reviewed the opposition and prepared the reply. (Ibid.) He should need no more than an hour to prepare for and attend the hearing on this matter.
The court finds many of the requested hourly rates to be unreasonably high, however, and outside the reasonable range for attorneys of their experience, expertise, and skill. (See Morris v. Hyundai Motor America, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 41 [“ ‘the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees [citation], the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied [citations], and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases’ ”]; accord, Doskocz v. ALS Lien Services (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 107, 120.)
The court has reduced the following attorneys’ hourly rates as set forth below, as their requested rates are unreasonably high for attorneys of their experience, expertise, and skill (all attorneys’ admission dates have been checked against the California State Bar website):
(1) Managing partner Kevin Jacobson (admitted May 2018), co-founder of Quill & Arrow, LLP as of 2019—reduced to $500/hour from and through 2023-2025. (See Jacobson Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3-6.)
(2) Former associate attorney Siyun Yang, LL.M. (admitted May 2022)—2023 rate reduced to $300/hour. (See Jacobson Decl. ¶¶ 38-39.)
(3) Senior associate attorney Nicholas Yowarski (admitted July 2021)—2024 rate reduced to $375 and 2025 rate reduced to $400. (See Jacobson Decl. ¶¶ 40-41.)
(4) Attorney Nicolas Lee (admitted Sept. 2017)—2025 rate reduced to $450. (See Jacobson Decl. ¶¶ 32-33.)
(5) Attorney Derek Chipman (admitted Dec. 2019)—2026 rate reduced to $450. (See Jacobson Decl. ¶¶ 44-45; Jacobson Reply Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.)
(6) Attorney Joshua Kohanoff (admitted Nov. 2022)—2025 rate reduced to $375. (See Jacobson Decl. ¶¶ 42-43.)
The court finds all of the remaining requested rates to be within the reasonable range.
After accounting for the time and hourly rate reductions above, plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees come out to a total of $15,123.50 (see Jacobson Decl. ¶ 73, Ex. 24 [billing records]; Jacobson Reply Decl. ¶¶ 8-9), as follows:
Attorney Year Rsbl. Rate Hours Amount Kevin Jacobson 2023 $500 0.6 $300.00 Eff. Jan. 2025 $500 0.2 $100.00 Eff. May 2025 $500 0.7 $350.00 Kim Anglin 2023 $400 1.7 $680.00 Siyun Yang 2023 $300 10.3 $3,090.00 2024 $350 1.8 $630.00 2025 $375 7.6 $2,850.00 Nicholas Yowarski 2024 $375 0.1 $37.50 2025 $400 1.4 $560.00 Nicolas Lee 2025 $450 2.4 $1,080.00 Matt Xie 2025 -- -- $0.00 Solange Tadros 2025 -- -- $0.00 Derek Chipman 2025 $395 6.8 $2,686.00 2026 $450 5.8 $2,610.00 Joshua Kohanoff 2025 $375 0.4 $150.00
TOTAL: $15,123.50
Plaintiffs’ request for a multiplier enhancement is denied. (See Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132 [multiplier factors].) This case did not involve novel or difficult legal or factual issues, and plaintiffs’ counsel did not display any exceptional skill in prosecuting the matter. There is no evidence that this case precluded plaintiffs’ counsel from taking on other clients. As for the contingent nature of the fee award, this factor is already accounted for and reflected in the high hourly rates granted above.
Plaintiffs shall give notice.
2 Coconut Funding Corp. vs. Pearlman
2025-01479665 Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiff Coconut Funding Corp.’s application for preliminary injunction is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The court orders that a preliminary injunction shall issue on the following terms, upon plaintiff posting bond within seven calendar days after the hearing, in an amount to be determined at the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 526, subd. (a) [authorizing injunctive relief], 526, subd. (a) [bond]; Costa Mesa City Employees' Assoc. v. City of