Cheu v. RED SUN, LLC

“Section 1008, subdivision (a) requires that a motion for reconsideration be based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law. A party seeking reconsideration also must provide a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time. [Citation.]” (Cox v. Bonni (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 287, 312; New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212.)

“ ‘The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it’ at the original hearing.” (Dickson v. Mann (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 935, 951, citing to New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212- 213.)

In seeking reconsideration, the motion fails when it is nothing more than an attempt to relitigate the merits of the original motion that the party is now seeking reconsideration of. (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500; see J.W. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1171 [“‘the name of a

motion is not controlling, and, regardless of the name, a motion asking the trial court to decide the same matter previously ruled on is a motion for reconsideration”].)

This is now Defendants’ fourth attempt at seeking relief pursuant to section 17707.03, subdivision (c) of the Corporations Code. In fact, in denying Defendants’ third Motion for Stay, this Court found it had denied similar motions on two prior occasions, yet the third Motion to Stay still did not present any new or different facts, circumstances, or law.

The Court acknowledges there are a few notable differences between the first three Motions for Stay and this Motion, but none of these differences amount to new or different facts, circumstances, or law.

First, Defendants now seek the appointment of three appraisers to value Plaintiff’s interest in Red Sun, pursuant to section 17707.03, subdivision (c)(3). (See Sussman Reply Declaration, ¶¶ 5, 10.) They did not make such a request in their prior three Motions for Stay.

Second, and related to the first point, Defendants present a different appraisal than what they presented in their second and third Motions to Stay. (Sussman Motion Declaration, ¶ 4; Exhibit 4 to Sussman Motion Declaration; Sussman Reply Declaration, ¶¶ 3-4.)

Third, Defendants previously requested a bond of $7,500, but they now request the bond not exceed $10,000. (But see Sussman Reply Declaration, ¶ 8 [Defendants willing to post any bond or security the Court determines is appropriate].)

On page 7, footnote 3 of their Motion, Defendants contend that they “have not previously sought the relief requested in this motion based on the valuation of Plaintiff’s LLC interest.”

In their Reply, Defendants’ counsel states “the present motion is based on those later-developed facts: the September 30, 2025 appraisal, the December 10, 2025 written offer, Plaintiff’s written rejection, and the parties’ resulting inability to agree on fair market value. Defendants did not previously present this same record to the Court.” (Sussman Reply Declaration, ¶ 4.)

Superficially, Defendants have presented new evidence that they did not present in their three prior Motions for Stay, and they do seek relief that they did not previously request.

However, looking below the surface, the foregoing does not constitute new or different facts, circumstances or law. This is because Defendants could have, and should have, obtained that appraisal, and made that offer, which Plaintiff was likely to reject, at the outset. They also could have, and should have, requested the appointment of appraisers with their initial Motion for Stay.

The purpose of all four motions are the same, namely, to stay the dissolution proceeding so that Defendants can attempt to acquire Plaintiff’s membership interests in Red Sun. (See Sussman Reply

Declaration, ¶ 11 [admitting “Defendants’ request for a stay is directed to the dissolution and winding-up proceeding while the statutory buyout procedure proceeds”].)

Finally, the Court denied Defendants’ third Motion for Stay on May 11, 2023, yet Defendants did not file the present Motion until January 20, 2026. This is untimely, as they were required to seek reconsideration within 10 days after service of the written notice of entry of order. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).)

The Court has already denied Defendants’ Motion for Stay on three separate occasions. It now does so for the fourth time.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling.

7 Clinkenbeard v. Off calendar. Mesa

8 Alcantar v. Lopez Defendant Bianca Karina Lopez moves to compel further responses from Plaintiff Susan Alcantar to RFAs (Set Two) and Form Interrogatories (Set Two). For the following reasons, the motions are DENIED without prejudice.

“Civil discovery is intended to operate with a minimum of judicial intervention. [I]t is a central precept of the Civil Discovery Act . . . that discovery be essentially self-executing[.] [Citations].” (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 402.) To that end, motions to compel further responses must attach a meet and confer declaration “showing a reasonable and good faith attempt . . . to informally resolve each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2030.310(b), 2033.290(b)(1).) Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.040 was recently amended to require that that reasonable and good faith attempt be “either in person, by telephone or by videoconference.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.)

There must be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution. (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.) “Argument is not the same as informal negotiation.” (Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1437 [finding that “debate over the appropriateness of an objection” did not “constitute an earnest attempt to resolve impasses in discovery].) “[T]he law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.” (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.)

Here, Defendant does not submit a meet and confer declaration showing any meet and confer effort in person, by telephone, or by videoconference—as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.040.

The court expects the parties will be able to resolve completely or to significantly narrow the scope of these discovery disputes. To that end, the parties are ordered to further meet and confer to resolve informally their discovery disputes. Prior to the further meet and confer, Counsel shall review Code of Civil Procedure sections 2017.010, 2023.010(f),

2030.010 et seq., and 2033.010 et seq. Counsel shall allot sufficient time to these discussion(s) to enable counsel to “compare their views, consult, and deliberate,” and shall make good faith efforts to resolve any disputes. Following these discussions, if any issues remain outstanding for court intervention, Defendant Lopez may file a renewed motion setting forth the discovery response(s) remaining at issue, and including a detailed description of the proposals the parties made to resolve the dispute before Defendant Lopez filed the renewed motion. The court notes that failure to meet and confer in good faith and in compliance with this court’s order may result in monetary sanctions against the parties and/or their counsel of record.

Defendant is ordered to give notice.

Motion to Compel Deposition

Plaintiff Susan Alcantar moves to compel the deposition of Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.

At a mutually agreeable time no later than July 17, 2026 at 10:00 a.m., Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., SHALL produce the person(s) most knowledgeable as to deposition topic nos. 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33.

Standard on Motion to Compel Deposition

Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.450(a) provides that: “If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 2025.450(a).) “If a deponent fails . . . to produce any document or tangible thing under the dpeonent’s control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling . . . production.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480(a).)

The motion must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration (see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2025.450(b)(2)) and set forth good cause justifying the production of documents described in the deposition notice (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450(b)(1)). In order to show “good cause,” the burden is on the moving party to make a “fact specific showing of relevance.” (Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) Arguments made in the moving papers or in a separate statement are insufficient to satisfy this requirement; good cause must be shown by way of admissible evidence, such as by declaration. (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224.)

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