Vivian v. MHCC, Inc.

Defendant’s reliance on Changsha Metro Group Co. Ltd. v. Xufeng (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1 is misplaced. The court in Changsha held the 21-day safe harbor provision under Section 128.5, subdivision (f) does not apply to frivolous motions to strike pursuant to the anti- SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, and instead, plaintiff’s request for anti-SLAPP attorney’s fees should be made in the opposition to the motion to strike. (Id. at 21-23.) The conflict noted in Changsha between the safe harbor provision of 128.5(f) and section 425.16 does not exist with respect to an allegedly frivolous complaint.

The motion for sanctions is therefore DENIED.

Motion for Attorney Fees:

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, a party is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees for having to prove matters at trial which were denied by the adverse party in response to requests for admission (RFAs), unless an exception applies, e.g., the party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that the party would prevail on the matter. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2033.420, subd. (a), (b).) Costs may be awarded when the requesting party proves the matter at trial or on a motion for summary judgment. (Barnett v.

Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 494, 497-499.) The burden of showing one of the exceptions in Section 2033.420 applies is on the party seeking to avoid paying costs. (Samsky v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 517, 524.) The determination of whether there were no good reasons for the denial of a requested admission, whether the requested admission was of substantial importance, and the amount of expenses to be awarded, if any, are all within the sound discretion of the trial court; an abuse of discretion occurs only where it is shown that the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. (Bloxham v.

Saldinger (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 729, 753.)

Here, Defendant argues it is entitled to attorney’s fees for having to prove the truth of the matters denied by Plaintiffs regarding entitlement to benefits under the insurance policy issued by Defendant to Affordable Coastal Glass, Inc. Plaintiffs contend that, at the time of the denials early in this action, they had reasonable grounds for denying the RFAs because they are named additional insureds on the insurance policy. “In evaluating whether a good reason exists for denying a request to admit, a court may properly consider whether at the time the denial was made the party making the denial held a reasonably entertained good faith belief that the party would prevail at trial.” (Laabs v.

City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1276 [internal quotes and citations omitted]; Grace v. Mansourian (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 523, 532 [party’s subjective belief alone insufficient, i.e., reasonable ground “means more than a hope or a roll of the dice”].)

While Plaintiffs assert they believed the policy covered “damaged or stolen property” (Declaration of Jeffrey Arlen (“Arlen Decl.”), Ex. 3 at ¶¶ 5-8), the belief is not reasonable. The plain language of the policy states insurance coverage is for indemnification and duty to

defend against third party lawsuits, not for damages to the property resulting from the insured’s faulty work on the project. (ROA 207.) Notably, Plaintiffs do not state the insurance policy was unavailable at the time they responded to the RFAs. Plaintiffs’ position was clearly untenable and unreasonable. Had Plaintiffs’ counsel simply read the policy or conducted routine research, Plaintiffs would have realized they could not prevail at trial on the insurance coverage issue. Defendant has shown entitlement to reasonable attorney fees.

Nevertheless, Defendant failed to show the attorney fees incurred were reasonable. Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 allows “reasonable expenses” in proving matters in RFA true, including “reasonable attorney’s fees.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2033.420, subd. (a)[emphasis added].) The party seeking attorney’s fees is not entitled to all hours they claim in an attorney fee request and must prove that the hours sought are reasonable and necessary. (Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1320.) While detailed billing timesheets are not required, the declaration of counsel should set forth the reasonable hourly rate, the number of hours worked and the tasks performed. (Id.)

Here, defense counsel’s declaration merely states the total amount of fees incurred, without any information as to time spent, hourly rates or tasks performed. As such, the Court cannot determine whether the fees incurred were reasonable, and Defendant failed to meet its moving burden. While Counsel does state his billing rate for purposes of drafting the motion for attorney fees, those fees are not incurred in proving the truth of the matter in the RFAs and Defendant fails to cite to any authority such fees are recoverable under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420.

In its reply, Defendant requests the opportunity to submit further evidence regarding the fees sought. The Court grants the request, and hereby CONTINUES the hearing on the motion for attorney fees to July 20, 2026, at 2:00 p.m. Defendant to submit further evidence no later than July 6, and Plaintiff may submit a further response no later than July 10.

Counsel for Plaintiffs shall give notice. 10 Mahgerefteh Demurrer vs. Garza Defendant Steven Anthony Garza’s (“Defendant”) demurrer to pro per plaintiff Nasser Mahgerefteh’s (“Plaintiff”) Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) is SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part.

Sustained as to causes of action (“COA”) Nos. 2 – 3, 5 – 6, and 8 – 12.

Overruled as to COA Nos. 1, 4, and 7.

Defendant demurs to all 12 causes of action (“COA”) in the TAC on the basis that they fail to sate sufficient facts and are uncertain. (Civ. Proc. Code § 430.10(e) and (f).) It should be noted Defendant