DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 2 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________
2:00 PM LINE 1 22-CIV-00303 AETNA INC VS GILEAD SCIENCES, INC
AETNA INC DANIEL A. SASSE GILEAD SCIENCES, INC MICHAEL J SHIPLEY
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
TENTATIVE RULING:
By stipulation and order filed April 6, 2026, the court allowed plaintiff Aetna Inc. (Aetna) to file a third amended complaint (TAC). Now defendants Gilead Sciences, Inc.; Gilead Holdings, LLC; Gilead Sciences, LLC; and Gilead Sciences Ireland, UC’s (Gilead) seeks to strike the following allegations in the TAC:
- Paragraph 135 in its entirety.
- The following language in Paragraph 136: “and from the HIV Treatment Regimen Market.”
- The following sentence in Paragraph 137: “It also had market power at all relevant times in the HIV Treatment Regimen Market.”
- The following sentence in Paragraph 147: “The HIV Treatment Market is an alternative relevant market.”
- The following sentence in Paragraph 148: “[A]t least from 2014 to 2020, Gilead had market power in the HIV Treatment Regimen Market, and consistently possessed more than 70% share of that market.”
- Paragraph 151 in its entirety.
- The following language in Paragraph 152: “in the HIV Treatment Regimen Market.”
- The following sentence in Paragraph 167: “At all relevant times, Gilead had substantial market power in the HIV Treatment Regimen Market in the relevant geographic market.”
- The following sentence in Paragraph 178: “At all relevant times, Gilead had substantial market power in the HIV Treatment Regimen Market in the relevant geographic market.”
The court DENIES Gilead’s motion to strike.
June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 3 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ Gilead cannot bring a demurrer since its argument is that a portion of the cause of action rather than the entire cause of action is deficient; therefore a motion to strike is the proper vehicle to challenge the portion of a cause of action. (
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This is an antitrust lawsuit brought by health insurance provider Aetna alleging that an anticompetitive agreement between Gilead and competing manufacturer Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (Teva) constitutes “an unlawful contract, combination and restraint of trade in the markets for certain HIV cART regimen drugs in violation of California’s Cartwright Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16700, et seq.) and various states’ laws.” (TAC, ¶ 8.)
Aetna provides the following as background for the lawsuit:
- “Gilead manufactures three of the four best-selling HIV drugs on the market, as well as many other drugs that are used in HIV combination antiretroviral therapy (‘cART’)” (TAC, ¶ 2);
- “Modern cART therapies often combine two antiretrovirals called nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors (‘NRTIs’), or ‘backbone’ drugs, with at least one antiretroviral of another class, called a ‘third agent.’ These components can be combined into a single pill, known as a ‘fixed-dose combination’ (‘FDC’), which contains all or some of the components of the complete regimen” (TAC, ¶ 3);
- “Since 2004, Gilead has marketed and sold Truvada. Truvada is a ‘backbone’ drug used in modern cART therapies” (Id. at ¶ 4);
- “Gilead also markets and sells Atripla, a fixed-dose combination treatment drug containing Truvada and a third agent” (TAC, ¶ 5);
- “Gilead’s ability to sustain supracompetitive profits in its multi-billion-dollar HIV treatment franchise has been greatly facilitated by an anticompetitive agreement it executed in 2014 with Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (‘Teva’), a competing generic manufacturer. Pursuant to the terms of this agreement, Teva delayed entering the market with competing generic versions of Truvada and Atripla for at least two years. In exchange, Gilead contractually provided Teva with six months of exclusivity from generic competition” (TAC, ¶ 6);
- “This anticompetitive agreement insulated Gilead’s products Truvada and Atripla from the drastic price erosion that would have occurred with effective competition, and resulted in billions of dollars in annual excess profits that accrued (and continue to accrue) to Gilead and its co-conspirator Teva” (TAC, ¶ 7).
Aetna alleges three markets over which Gilead has control, the following two of which are relevant here: