Looney v. Perez

The motion is CONTINUED to the next available hearing date of November 18, 2026, at 3:00 p.m., in Department 16.

3. 25CV01840, American Express National Bank v. Trujillo

Plaintiff American Express National Bank (“Plaintiff”) moves for summary judgment in its favor against Defendant Randy Trujillo, aka Randy J. Trujillo (“Defendant”), on Plaintiff’s single cause of action for breach of contract. The motion is GRANTED.

On March 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging breach of contract on a personal loan. Plaintiff alleges Defendant owes it $33,690.30.

On May 2, 2025, Defendant filed an answer generally denying each statement alleged in the complaint and stating he does not have the funds to pay back the debt. He states he is “currently filing bankruptcy due to sustainable loss with Crypto over $750,000.” As of the time the court reviewed this matter, no notice of a bankruptcy filing had been filed in this action.

Defendant applied to Plaintiff for a personal loan and entered into a written Loan Agreement for the account number ending in 1000 (the “Account”). (Plaintiff’s Undisputed Material Fact [“UMF”] No. 1.)

Pursuant to the direction of the Defendant, Plaintiff disbursed the loan/financed amount to the Defendant by check, to Defendant’s designated bank account or to a third-party designee. (UMF No. 2.)

The Defendant agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the Loan Agreement and, among other promises, promised to pay Plaintiff the principal amount advanced and/or financed along with the interest rate disclosed in the Truth in Lending disclosure statement. (UMF No. 3.)

The loan amount, the accrual of interest, and the amount of fees and payments applied to the loan account are duly reflected on the computerized records regularly kept and maintained by Plaintiff in connection with Defendant’s loan account. (UMF No. 4.) Those records were provided on a monthly basis in the form of billing statements to Defendant. (Ibid.)

Before 01/17/25, the Defendant defaulted in making the payments due under the terms of the Loan Agreement and Plaintiff accelerated the account balance so that the entire unpaid balance on the account became immediately due and payable. (UMF No. 5.)

The last payment applied to the account was on or about 10/04/24. (UMF No. 6.) Defendant owes Plaintiff $33,690.30 plus court costs. (UMF No. 7.)

Plaintiff has established the parties entered into an agreement; Plaintiff’s performance of its obligations under the agreement; Defendant’s breach; and, resulting damages to Plaintiff. (See Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1388 [elements of a cause of action for breach of contract].)

Defendant has not filed opposition. Therefore, he has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. This court will sign the proposed order.

4. 25CV03181, Looney v. Perez

Plaintiff Gary E. Looney dba Collectronics of California (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order appointing Landon McPherson as receiver to take possession of and, if necessary, sell the liquor license of defendant Gerardo Perez, individually as personal guarantor of The Maple Bar Cafe (“Judgment Debtor”) in order to carry out the judgment entered in this case in the amount of $8,862.85. 5

Specific statutory procedures are established for enforcement of money judgments. This includes the appointment of a receiver after judgment to carry the judgment into effect. (CCP section 564(b)(3).

The judgment debtor's interest in an alcoholic beverage license may be applied to the satisfaction of a money judgment. (CCP § 708.630(a).)

A trial court must consider the availability and efficacy of other remedies in determining whether to employ the extraordinary remedy of a receivership. (City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 734, 745.) In making this decision, the court must depend upon competent and admissible evidence submitted by the parties, and not conclusions and hearsay. (McCaslin v. Kenney (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 87, 94.)

“California rigidly adheres to the principle that the power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one which is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.” (Morand v. Superior Ct. (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 347, 351.) “It is said by the state's courts that the appointment of a receiver is ‘an extraordinary and harsh,’ and ‘delicate,’ and ‘drastic,’ remedy to be used ‘cautiously and only where less onerous remedies would be inadequate or unavailable...’” (Ibid.)

Mere difficulty in trying to collect a debt is not sufficient basis for the court to appoint a receiver. (Medipro Medical Staffing LLC v. Certified Nursing Registry, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 622, 628-629.) The Medipro Court explained, “Medipro's evidentiary showing demonstrated that it had, at most, encountered some difficulty in its initial efforts to collect on its money judgment. If this was sufficient to constitute the ‘necessity’ required to justify the ‘extraordinary’ remedy of the appointment of a receiver to take over a judgment debtor's business, it is difficult to see how the appointment of receivers would not become a routine part of the collection of judgments—a result at odds with the solid wall of precedent holding to the contrary.”

On September 22, 2025, judgment was entered in this action for the above stated amount.

Plaintiff states he has attempted to collect on the judgment by attempting to locate a bank or deposit account, mailing a letter requesting payment, serving post-judgment interrogatories and requests for production of documents, and mailing a letter requesting responses to the post-judgment discovery. (Looney decl., ¶¶6-10.) Judgment Debtor’s business is open. (Id., ¶4.)

According to Plaintiff, the sheriff’s office will not sell liquor inventory; the installation of a sheriff’s keeper is unavailable or ineffective; the size of the judgment makes it impractical to levy upon equipment, fixtures, or inventory; plus, the value of equipment and fixtures is depressed. Thus, Plaintiff concludes there is no other option but to appoint a receiver to seize and sell the liquor license to satisfy the judgment.

Plaintiff has not made a sufficient factual showing that appointing a receiver to seize and sell the liquor license is necessary. Plaintiff has failed to show the inadequacy of alternate remedies. Rather, as in Medipro, supra, Plaintiff has only shown that he has encountered some difficulties in his initial efforts to collect the judgment.

While Plaintiff states in his declaration that he investigated Defendant’s finances, there is no explanation regarding the depth of this investigation. This court is not convinced that no bank accounts exist linked to a business that is purportedly still open. Plaintiff’s representations regarding the inadequacy of alternative remedies are not supported by foundation. Finally, Plaintiff has not filed a motion to compel further responses to his postjudgment discovery requests.

Mere difficulties in collecting the judgment are insufficient grounds for appointing a receiver. Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving that a receiver is necessary in this matter. The motion is DENIED. Due to the lack of opposition, the court’s minutes shall constitute the order of the court.

5. 25CV05120, Rottman v. Svedise 6