Petitioner's Motion to Disqualify Cyril L Lawrence and Cyril Lawrence Inc. from Representing Respondent, and for Related Relief
Court is inclined to DENY the petition.
On January 7, 2026, Petitioner Gilton Solid Waste Management Inc. ("Gilton") filed the instant Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate to set aside 14 administrative citations issued by Respondent City of Modesto ("City) for the illegal dumping of over 1,200 mattresses at City's mattress recycling center. On April 16, 2026, City submitted an Opposition and Request for Judicial Notice. On May 1, 2026, Petitioner Gilton submitted a Reply.
Writ of Administrative Mandate
"Where the writ is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer, the case shall be heard by the court sitting without a jury." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1094.5(a).)
"The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1094.5(b).)
"Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence." (Ibid.)
"If the administrative decision involved or substantially affected a 'fundamental vested right,' the superior court exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo in which the court must examine the administrative record for errors of law and exercise its independent judgment upon the evidence. [Citations.]" (JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1057.)
"Where no fundamental vested right is involved, the superior court's review is limited to examining the administrative record to determine whether the adjudicatory decision and its findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record." (Ibid.)
Respondents unopposed Request for Judicial Notice
The Court is inclined to GRANT City's unopposed request for judicial notice.
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Gilton's Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate
Modesto Municipal Code Section 5-5.106(a) makes it unlawful to dump bulky items on public property without consent or approval. (AR 3-13.)
Petitioner Gilton received 14 citations for illegally dumping over 1,200 mattresses at the City's mattress recycling center, often when the site was closed, from April 4, 2025 to May 2, 2025. (AR 3-173-3-176.)
Petitioner argues that it was proper to leave the mattresses at the recycling center site because that is the location City has established to recycle mattresses and there is a sign posted stating that the mattresses can be left at the site when the recycling center is closed. (AR 4-2.)
City contends that the recycling center is for residents only and is not for Petitioner because Petitioner is franchised as a collector for City and is contractually required to take waste to another facility. (AR 3-33; AR 5-8.)
The parties' contract does not appear to specify the location where Petitioner is required to take recyclable materials, which the contract defines as distinct from waste. (AR 3-33-AR 3-35.)
In addition, City's recycling center has a drop off limit of 10 units maximum. (AR 3-167; AR 5-3.) It is undisputed that Petitioner exceed the 10 unit maximum.
Petitioner also argues that City was required to "[i]ssue 5-day Notice of Violation to offender if it meets the requirements of the City of Modesto Municipal Code sections 5-5.106 and 9-9.301." (AR 4-11.) But the 5-day notice applies to mattresses dumped on private property only. (AR 5-33-5-35.)
Accordingly, it does not appear that City violated any provision of California Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.
CV-26-001469 - AARZA GROUP INC vs MARTIN, ROBERT - Defendants, CCTMO LLC & T-Mobile's Demurrer to Complaint - OVERRULED as MOOT.
The original complaint was superseded by the First Amended Complaint filed on June 3, 2026. Consequently, the demurrer to the original complaint is OVERRULED as MOOT
PR-25-001101 - IN THE MATTER OF EOFF, MATTHEW - Petitioner's Motion to Disqualify Cyril L Lawrence and Cyril Lawrence Inc. from Representing Respondent, and for Related Relief - DENIED as MOOT.
A substitution of attorney form having been filed on June 8, 2026, indicating that Attorney Lawrence and his firm no longer represent the Respondent (but rather, she is currently representing herself), the motion to disqualify Attorney Lawrence and his firm is DENIED as MOOT.
The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:
CV-25-002532 - K, E vs TOM, KATHY, DO - a) Kaiser Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action - DENIED; b) Kaiser Defendants' Motion to Seal Confidential Declaration of Vladimir Bien-Aime in Support of Motion to Compel Arbitration - GRANTED, and unopposed.
a) Based on review of the papers and evidence submitted by the parties, the Court finds that Defendants, as the moving parties, have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate the existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement herein.
In this context, the party seeking to compel arbitration must still demonstrate the employee member's assent to the arbitration provisions. (Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569.)
Here, Defendants are unable to produce evidence of the decedent's participation in the health plan enrollment procedures which sufficiently demonstrates that she was aware of and assented to the subject arbitration provisions at any time relevant to the analysis herein.
In view of the Court's conclusion in this regard, the Court finds it unnecessary to rule on the application of Health & Saf. Code Sec. 1363.1 and the federal preemption issues raised by the defense herein.
Lastly, Defendants' counsel are cautioned that citation to Superior Court cases is generally not permitted. (See TBG Ins. Service Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 447 fn. 2; California Rule of Court 8.1115.) Defendants' attempt to cite such rulings in order to persuade the Court herein is facially improper. The Court has a duty of independence which prevents reliance on unpublished cases. (Judicial Canon 1.)
b) The Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated that the subject declaration of Mr. Bien-Aime, and specifically Exhibits H and I thereto, contains Plaintiff's private and confidential health information that arguably is unrelated to the issues to be determined in the case.
As such, the Court finds that the subject materials implicate Plaintiff's overriding privacy interests in her personal information and that a substantial probability exists that such interests will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed with regard to such materials.
In addition, the scope of the information to be shielded from disclosure is sufficiently narrow, specifically concerning very minimal portions of the subject exhibits. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 2.550.)
The Court further notes that Defendants' reply brief seeks an order sealing additional materials submitted in connection with said reply; the Court declines to consider this request, which has not been made with proper notice at this juncture.
CV-25-008224 - SALAS, LADONNA S vs MODESTO MMP VI INC - Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss or, Alternatively Stay Proceedings; Alternatively Request for Statement of Decision - GRANTED.
Based on review of the papers and evidence submitted by the parties, the Court finds that Defendants, as the moving parties, have demonstrated the existence of an arbitration agreement covering the claims asserted herein, and that Plaintiff has refused to submit to arbitration as agreed. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1281.2.)
In addition, the Court finds that the agreement is subject to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, due to Defendant's evidence demonstrating that the subject agreement involves interstate commerce. (9 U.S.C. Sec. 2.)
The Court also recognizes that the agreement herein expressly elects the application of California procedural law and rules regarding arbitration in this instance; however, the Court finds that the agreement does not unambiguously express a specific intent to apply the provisions of Labor Code Sec. 229 to the parties' dispute herein, and that section is preempted by the FAA. (See, e.g. Nixon v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 934, 948-949.)
Regarding Plaintiff's assertion of unconscionability, the Court finds only a slight degree of procedural unconscionability in connection with the presentation of the agreement by the employer.
In addition, the Court finds only one example of substantive unconscionability in the agreement, i.e., the fee-shifting provision relative to the instant motion to compel arbitration. (See, e.g. Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5 th 478, 507.)
In that regard, the Court finds that the offending provision should be severed from the agreement