Cardona vs. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.

Statement of Law

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).) “The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Carver v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 864, 876.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1); R.J. Land & Associates Construction Co. v. Kiewit-Shea (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 416, 424.)

“A defendant or cross-defendant has met that party’s burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown

that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or crosscomplainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. The plaintiff or cross-complainant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

“First, and generally, from commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord, Stokes v. Forty Niners Stadium Management Co., LLC (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1199, 1213-1214.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)

“Second, and generally, the party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord, Carver v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 864, 876-877; accord, Stokes v.

Forty Niners Stadium Management Co., LLC (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1199, 1214; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1) [plaintiff meets its burden by proving each element of its cause of action].) “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 851.)

Breach of Express Warranty – Pursuant to California Commercial Code

Volkswagen contends the first cause of action – for Breach of Express Warranty Pursuant to California Commercial Code – fails because it requires privity between the buyer and the seller, yet Volkswagen did not sell Plaintiffs the subject vehicle, and it did not

extend any warranties to Plaintiffs in connection with the sale. (Lewis Declaration, ¶¶ 3-8; Exhibits A-B to Lewis Declaration; Kraft Declaration, ¶¶ 3-4; Exhibit A to Kraft Declaration; Espinosa Declaration, ¶ 2; Exhibit A to Espinosa Declaration.)

However, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division Two, remarked that, while the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act may not apply to used vehicles that was only accompanied by a balance of the original warranty, “the beneficiary of a transferrable express warranty can sue a manufacturer for breach of an express warranty to repair defects under the California Uniform Commercial Code. [Citations.]” (Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209, 225; accord, Leon v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (C.D. Cal., June 27, 2025, No. 2:24-CV-03863-SPG-MAA) 2025 WL 1843211, at *2; see Grismore v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (C.D. Cal. 2024) 710 F.Supp.3d 828, 837 [while a consumer who leased a used vehicle cannot recover against the manufacturer under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, it can sue the manufacturer under the California Uniform Commercial Code].)

And here, Volkswagen admits that, when Plaintiffs acquired the subject vehicle, it retained the balance of the New Vehicle Limited Warranty. (Lewis Declaration, ¶¶ 4, 6.)

Since Volkswagen did not meet its initial burden, there remains a triable issue of material facts as to Defendants’ Material Fact nos. 1- 5. Thus, the Court shall deny the Motion for Summary Adjudication as to the First Cause of Action.

Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty

Audi Mission Viejo seeks summary adjudication of the third cause of action, arguing that the breach of implied warranty claim fails because Plaintiffs cannot show the vehicle was unfit for ordinary use, and also because Plaintiffs did not present the subject vehicle for inspection or repair of said defects within the first three months of ownership. (Lewis Declaration, ¶¶ 3, 5, 9-10; Exhibits A, B, D to Lewis Declaration; Kraft Declaration, ¶¶ 3, 4, 7, 8; Exhibits A & B to Kraft Declaration; Espinosa Declaration, ¶ 2; Exhibits A-C to Espinosa Declaration.)

However, “[t]he Song–Beverly Act does not include its own statute of limitations. [Citation.] California courts have held that the statute of limitations for an action for breach of warranty under the Song– Beverly Act is governed by the same statute that governs the statute of limitations for warranties arising under the Uniform Commercial

Code: section 2725 of the Uniform Commercial Code. [Citations.] Under this statute, ‘(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued.... [¶] (2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.’ [Citation.]” (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1305–1306.)

The Mexia court held that the statute of limitations for an action for breach of the implied warranty under the Song-Beverly Act is four years, and that the earliest date the implied warranty of merchantability could have accrued was the date the plaintiff purchased the used boat, such that his action, which was filed more than three-and-a-half years after purchase, was not barred by the statute of limitations. (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306; see Reniger v. Hyundai Motor America (N.D. Cal. 2015) 122 F.Supp.3d 888, 902-905 [following Mexia in holding that latent defects that may have existed at the time of purchase, but which were not discovered until after the warranty period, are not time-barred where the complaint was filed within the four-year statute of limitations].)

In Mexia, the defendants argued, among other things, that the used boat was fit for its ordinary purpose since the plaintiff did not seek repair until over two years from the time of purchase. (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1308.) The defendants also argued that the duration provision of the statute precluded an action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act when the action is based on a latent condition that was not discovered by the consumer, and that was not reported to the seller, within the duration period. (Id. at pp. 1308-1309.)

The defendants’ position was rejected, as their interpretation of the duration provision had no support in the text of the statute, and there was nothing to suggest a requirement that the purchaser discover, and report to the seller, a latent defect within that time period. (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1310.) “If the Legislature intended to create a deadline by which a purchaser of goods covered by the Song–Beverly Act must report a defect to the seller, it had a ready model for doing so ... If the Legislature intended the duration provision to impose a deadline for consumers

to give notice of defects under the Song–Beverly Act, it could have easily done so. It did not.” (Ibid.)

Pursuant to the holding in Mexia, and without even addressing whether the coolant system defect rendered the subject vehicle unfit for its ordinary purpose (see Chiulli v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2023) 690 F.Supp.3d 1038, 1053-1054 [defective infotainment system sufficient to assert a claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability, even if plaintiffs continued operating the defective vehicle]), Audi Mission Viejo’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the third cause of action fails because there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether said defects existed at the time Plaintiffs purchased the vehicle, and whether said defects were undiscoverable at the time of purchase.

Contrary to its position, the fact that Plaintiffs did not present their vehicle for repair within three months does not necessarily bar their claim. (See Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1308-1310 [rejecting the defendants’ contention that the used boat was fit for its ordinary purpose, and did not breach the implied warranty of merchantability, because plaintiff did not discover, report, or otherwise seek repair of the alleged latent defect, until over two years from the time of purchase].)

Since Audi Mission Viejo did not meet its initial, or its ultimate, burdens as to Material Fact nos. 6 through 9, the Court shall deny the Motion for Summary Adjudication as to the third cause of action for Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty.

Negligent Repair

Audi Mission Viejo moves for summary adjudication of the negligent repair cause of action, arguing this claim is barred by the economic loss rule.

“When California courts encounter a dearth of California appellate decisions on a particular legal question, they ‘often look to decisions of California federal courts and out-of-state cases in resolving’ the issue. [Citation.]” (Fourth Inv. LP v. U.S. (9th Cir. 2013) 720 F.3d 1058, 1069.) Unpublished federal court decisions do not violate rule 8.1115 of the California Rules of Court, and they may be cited as persuasive authority. (In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1096, fn. 18; Olinick v. BMG Entertainment (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1301, fn. 11.)

Relevant here, numerous Federal District Courts have found the economic loss doctrine does not bar a negligent repair cause of action. (Sabicer v. Ford Motor Company (C.D. Cal. 2019) 362 F.Supp.3d 837, 840-842; Luna v. Fca US, LLC (C.D. Cal., July 31, 2020, No. 220CV2354ODWASX) 2020 WL 4383475, at *3; Madison v. Ford Motor Company (E.D. Cal., Aug. 6, 2019, No. 2:19- CV-00853 WBS DB) 2019 WL 3562386, at *2; McAdams v. Ford Motor Company (N.D. Cal., June 5, 2019, No. 18-CV-07485-LHK) 2019 WL 2378397, at *4–5; McKeown v.

Ford Motor Company (C.D. Cal., Mar. 13, 2019, No. CV1900281CJCPLAX) 2019 WL 1199468, at *2-3; see Cortez v. Nissan North America, Inc. (C.D. Cal., Dec. 10, 2024, No. 2:24-CV-05909-ODW (PDX)) 2024 WL 5054378, at *6 [“ ‘District courts in California “have been virtually unanimous in rejecting the argument that a dealer is fraudulently joined because the economic loss rule bars a negligent repair claim” ’ ”].)

While Audi Mission Viejo’s Motion for Summary Adjudication cites to the general law regarding the economic loss rule, it did not cite to any cases that have applied said rule to negligent repair cases.

However, and as discussed, Federal District Courts have overwhelmingly held that the economic loss rule does not bar a negligent repair claim. The Court finds these rulings to be persuasive, and it shall follow them in this instance.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Audi Mission Viejo did not meet its initial burden as to its Motion for Summary Adjudication as to the fourth cause of action for Negligent Repair, such that its Motion for Summary Adjudication is denied.

Civil Penalties

In their First Amended Complaint’s Prayer for Relief no. 3, Plaintiffs seek civil penalties against Volkswagen, for $246,054.06. (Exhibit A to Espinosa Declaration.)

In their Opposition, Plaintiffs concede this request for civil penalties should be removed, as “[t]he request for civil penalties appears to have been left in the FAC during the process of amending the original complaint to become the FAC. As such, Plaintiffs do not object if the Court strikes the request for civil penalties in the prayer for relief.”

Since Plaintiffs concede as to this point, the Court shall grant the Motion for Summary Adjudication.