LINE CASE NO. CASE TITLE TENTATIVE RULING 9:00 21CV386366 Christopher Morales The partition referee seeks confirmation of the partition referee’s sale of property. 1 vs. Del Real Lopez The confirmation of sale is GRANTED.

9:00 23CV414851 Bank of America v. Plaintiff moves this court to allow Plaintiff to amend caption of complaint. Platiniff’s 2 John Campona motion is GRANTED.

9:00 24CV446754 Lesniak vs. County of See below 3 Santa Clara

9:00 24CV454184 Erlach vs. General See below 4 Motors

9:00 24CV454605 Jenna Arruda vs. Plaintiffs move this court to quash a subpoena for each of Plaintiff’s medical 5 Trenna Sutcliffe providers. Since Plaintiff has placed her mental health at issue it appears the subpoenas are relevant. A protective order is in place. Plaintiff’s motion to quash is DENIED.

9:00 25CV458954 Kostick & Wang, LLC Defendant petitions this court to compel discovery responses; deem the truth of all 6 vs. Jia Sung matters specified in requests for admissions admitted; and a motion for sanctions in the amount of $2,480.00. These requests were served on Plaintiff on August 11, 2025. Plaintiff failed to respond. Defendant petitioned this court on January 23, 2026. Plaintiff has failed to file any objections to Defendant’s petition. Defendant’s petition to compel discovery responses is GRANTED. Defendant’s request to deem the truth of all matters specified in its request for admissions is GRANTED. Defendant’s motion for sanctions in the amount of $2,480.00 is GRANTED.

9:00 25CV464655 Unsuk Heo vs. FCA Defendant petitions this court to compel Plaintiff to attend a deposition and 7 US, LLC produce documents. Defendant propounded this request on July 9, 2025 and had originally set a deposition date for October 6, 2025. Plaintiff later served his objection to the date on the basis of unavailability. Since then, Defendant has made several attempts to reach Defendant to set a new date and propound discovery. On December 23, 2025, Defendant filed its petition to compel. Plaintiff did not respond. Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to attend a deposition within thirty days of the granting of this order.

9:00 25CV467995 Prashant Tiwari, Phd, Off calendar 8 vs Monte Kaehr, et. al.

9:00 25CV471732 Creditors Adjustment Plaintiff petitioned this court to compel responses to Plaintiff’s first set of special 9 Bureau vs. Olguin interrogatories and requests monetary sanctions for not complying. Plaintiff and Vazquez emailed defendant his first set of special interrogatories on December 10, 2025. Landscape & Tree Defendant never responded and issued no objection to Plaintiff’s petition. Service. Plaintiff’s motion to compel is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion for monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,875.41 is GRANTED.

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9:00 25CV474448 Milz Development & See below 10-11 Construction vs. Shawn Dean, et. al.

9:00 25CV483492 Mario Diaz Ruiz v. See below 12 Ford Motor Company, et. al.

Cross-defendants’ demurrer to the fifth cause of action of the XC for slander per se is SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend.

Cross-defendants shall prepare and submit a proposed final order consistent with this tentative ruling.

Calendar Line 12 Case Name: Mario Diaz Ruiz v. Ford Motor Company et al. Case No.: 25CV483492

Plaintiff Mario Diaz Ruiz purchased a 2021 Ford Explorer (Subject Vehicle) in October 2021 from Hemborg Ford (Dealership). (Complaint at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff delivered the Subject Vehicle to Dealership for substantial repair on at least one occasion. (Id. at ¶ 59.) Plaintiff alleges that Dealership “breached its duty to Plaintiff to use ordinary care and skill by failing to properly store, prepare, and repair the Subject Vehicle in accordance with industry standards.” (Id. at ¶ 61.) Plaintiff sued Dealership and Ford Motor Company in December 2025. The sole cause of action alleged against Dealership is for negligent repair.

At issue is Dealership’s petition to compel arbitration, based on the Retail Installment Sales Contract (RISC) signed by Plaintiff and Dealership when Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle. Having reviewed the language of the RISC’s arbitration provision and the circumstances of its execution, the court will grant the petition and stay the action.

Dealership maintains that the FAA governs the arbitration provision based on the language itself and because the agreement affects interstate commerce. (Mtn. to Compel Arbitration at p 6:19-22.) The arbitration provision states “[a]ny arbitration under this Arbitration Provision shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.) and not by any state law concerning arbitration.” (Declaration of Trina Clayton [“Clayton Decl.”], Ex. A.) Under the FAA, the court’s role is limited to determining “(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and if it does (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” (Chiron Corp. v.

Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130.) To determine “whether a valid contract to arbitrate exists,” courts apply “ordinary state law principles that govern contract formation.” (Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 755 F.3d 1089, 1093 [citations omitted]; Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 328 F.3d 1165, 1170.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 provides: “On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: [¶] The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or [¶] (b) Grounds exist for rescission of the agreement.”

In determining the threshold question of whether an arbitration agreement exists between the parties, the court employs a three-step burden shifting analysis. (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755 (Iyere); Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060.) The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the initial burden of showing an agreement to arbitrate. If that burden is met, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show a factual dispute regarding the agreement’s existence. If the opposing party does so, then the burden shifts back to the proponent of arbitration to show the existence of a valid agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 755.)

There is a Valid Agreement to Arbitrate

The arbitration provision in the RISC provides, in relevant part:

Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, any allegation of waiver of rights under this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this Vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.

(Clayton Decl., Ex. A.) Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the RISC when he purchased the Subject Vehicle. Plaintiff signed and acknowledged the following notice of the arbitration provision: “Agreement to Arbitrate. By signing below, you agree that pursuant to the Arbitration Provision on the reverse side of this contract, you or we may elect to resolve any dispute by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action. See the Arbitration Provision for additional information concerning the agreement to arbitrate.” (Ibid.)

The RISC further drew the arbitration provision to Plaintiff’s attention through the following disclaimer: “. . . YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOU HAVE READ BOTH SIDES OF THIS CONTRACT, INCLUDING THE ARBITRATION PROVISION ON THE REVERSE SIDE, BEFORE SIGNING BELOW.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff’s signature on those sections of the RISC indicates express assent to the arbitration provision. (See Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 777 [“ ‘ “A party’s acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as where a party signs the agreement.” ’ ”].)

Plaintiff argues Dealership failed to properly authenticate the RISC and thus failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate. “The moving party ‘can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party’s] signature. Alternatively, the moving party can meet is burden by setting forth the agreement’s provisions in the motion.’ ” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165, internal citations and quotations omitted.)

Here, Dealership attached a copy of the RISC signed by Plaintiff as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Trina Clayton. Dealership has also set forth the terms of the arbitration provision in the motion itself. (Mtn. to Compel Arbitration at pp. 3:17-4:8.) In any event, “[f]or purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of authentication.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 165-166.) Dealership has shown a valid agreement to arbitrate.

The Scope of the Arbitration Agreement Covers Plaintiff’s Claims

Here, the arbitration provision broadly applies to “[a]ny claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise..., between you and us..., which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this Vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship.” (Clayton Decl., Ex. A.) Plaintiff’s sole cause of action against Dealership is a tort action for negligent repair. Plaintiff and Dealership are the parties to the transaction. Plaintiff’s action relates to the condition of the vehicle, namely the condition of the vehicle following repair by Dealership.

That the allegedly negligent repair occurred after the parties signed the RISC is ultimately irrelevant because the arbitration provision states it applies to both “this contract” and “any resulting transaction or relationship” between the parties. Plaintiff’s claim against Dealership is covered by the arbitration provision.

Plaintiff relies on Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1122 to argue “warranty performance is not arbitrable through the form Sales Contract proffered by [Dealership].” (Opposition at p. 2:8-10.) That opinion is distinguishable. Ford Motor Warranty Cases involved an attempt by an automobile manufacturer to compel arbitration based on a sales contract between a buyer and a dealership to which the manufacturer was not a party. The Supreme Court rejected the manufacturer’s attempt to compel arbitration on a third party equitable estoppel theory. (Id. at p. 1126.) By contrast, here the entity petitioning to compel arbitration is a party to the contract containing the arbitration provision. The RISC is an agreement Plaintiff entered into with Dealership. As the dealership and a party to the agreement, Dealership may compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims.

The court does not reach Dealership’s arguments about lack of waiver and lack of unconscionability. Plaintiff forfeited any argument about waiver and unconscionability by not addressing Dealership’s arguments on those points.

This Action is Stayed in its Entirety

Dealership requests a stay of the entire action. As Dealership notes, Plaintiff has sued two entities, Ford Motor Company and Dealership, for different causes of action. Dealership argues “[p]roceeding against both defendants in separate forums carries an extremely high risk of rendering inconsistent rulings and rendering arbitration as to [Dealership] ineffective.” (Reply at p. 8:26-27.) Plaintiff has not offered any arguments opposing a stay to the entire action. A stay of these proceedings is proper under Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.4 and 9 U.S.C. § 3. The court STAYS this action in its entirety pending the outcome of arbitration.

The petition to compel arbitration is GRANTED. This action is STAYED in its entirety pending the outcome of arbitration.

The court will prepare the order.