Vishal Shah v. Constellation Brands, Inc.

Defendant moves to quash service for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Motion, p. 2:1-7.)

A.

Legal Standard

A defendant may specially appear and file a motion to quash for service for lack of personal jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1). “[W]here a defendant properly moves to quash service of summons the burden is on the plaintiff to prove facts requisite to the effective service.” (Sheard v. Super. Ct. (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 207, 211.) “[T]he burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Evangelize China Fellowship, Inc. v. Evangelize Ching Fellowship Hong Kong (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 440, 444.) The plaintiff must 2 provide affidavits and other authenticated documents to demonstrate competent evidence of specific evidentiary facts that would permit a court to form an independent conclusion on the issue of jurisdiction. (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 113 (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II).) Allegations in an unverified complaint are insufficient to satisfy this burden of proof. (Id.)

Evidence of the jurisdictional facts or their absence may be in the form of declarations. “Where there is a conflict in the declarations, resolution of conflict by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal if the determination is supported by substantial evidence. However, where the evidence of jurisdictional facts is not conflicting, the question of whether a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction is one of law. (Elkman v. National States Ins. Co. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1312-1313 (Elkman); see also Greenwell v. Auto-Owners Ins. Company (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 783, 789 (Greenwell), citing Elkman.)

Under the minimum contacts test, personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. (Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062 (Snowney).) Where general jurisdiction exists due to a non-resident defendant’s “continuous and systematic” activities in a state, the defendant can be sued on causes of action not related to its activities within the state. (Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 147.) Absent the showing adequate to confer general jurisdiction, a defendant may still be subject to specific jurisdiction, meaning “jurisdiction in an action arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.” (Healthmarkets, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1167.)

If a non-resident defendant’s contacts with California are not sufficient for general jurisdiction, it may still be subject to California’s specific personal jurisdiction if a three-prong test is met. First the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the state’s benefits. Second, the controversy must be related to or arise out of the defendant’s contacts with the state. Third, considering the defendant’s contacts with the state and other factors, California’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant must comport with fair play and substantial justice. (Pavlovich v. Super. Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269.) The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the first two requirements. If the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that California’s exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (See Greenwell, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at 792.)

B.

Discussion

Defendant moves to quash service for lack of personal jurisdiction on the grounds that there is no general or specific jurisdiction over it.

1. General Jurisdiction

“The standard for general jurisdiction is considerably more stringent than that for specific jurisdiction. A defendant is subject to general jurisdiction when it has substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts in the forum states, i.e., its contacts are so wide-ranging that they take the place of a physical presence in the state. In assessing a defendant’s contacts with the forum for purposes of general jurisdiction, we look at the contacts as they existed from the time the alleged conduct occurred to the time of service of summons.” (Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 222-223 (Strasner).) 3

Constellation is incorporated in Delaware and its principal place of business is in Rochester, New York. (Declaration of Gautham Sunkara (“Sunkara Decl.”), ¶ 3.) It owns and operates the Modelo Website, which is accessible nationwide. (Sunkara Decl., ¶ 28.) Plaintiff does not offer any argument regarding general jurisdiction. Plaintiff does not offer any argument as to general jurisdiction, therefore it is waived. (See Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 (Badie) [“When [a party] fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”].) Instead, Plaintiff focuses his argument on specific jurisdiction.

2. Specific Jurisdiction

“When determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, courts consider the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the ligation.” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269 (Pavlovich).) “A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: (1) the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits; (2) the controversy is related to or arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum; and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.” (Ibid.)

“Where a nonresident defendant challenges a trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to demonstrate facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. To meet this burden, a plaintiff must do more than make allegations. A plaintiff must support its allegations with ‘competent evidence of jurisdictional facts. Allegations in an unverified complaint are insufficient to satisfy this burden of proof.’ If the plaintiff makes this showing by a preponderance of the evidence on the first two requirements (i.e., that the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the forum and the plaintiff’s claims relate to or arise out of the defendant’s forum related contacts), the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” (Rivelli v. Hemm (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 380, 393 (Rivelli).)

i. Purposeful Availment

“An out -of-state defendant purposefully avails itself of a forum state’s benefits if the defendant (1) purposefully directs its activities at the forum state’s residents, (2) purposefully derives a benefit from its activities in the forum states, or (3) purposefully invokes privileges and protections of the forum state’s laws by (a) purposefully engaging in ‘significant activities’ within the forum states or (b) purposefully creating ‘continuing [contractual] obligations’ between itself and the residents of the forum state. Purposeful availment can occur from afar; the out-of-state defendant’s physical presence in the forum state is not required.” (Jacqueline B. v. Rawls Law Group, P.C. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 243, 253 (Jacqueline B.).)

“As the name and definition of purposeful availment make plain, an out -of-state defendant’s conduct toward the forum State or its residents is relevant to the jurisdictional analysis only if that conduct is purposeful, deliberate, and intentional. An out-of-state defendant’s contact with a forum state that is ‘random’ ‘fortuitous’ or ‘attenuated’ is not enough. This is why the mere fact that the out-of-state defendant’s conduct has some ‘effect’ on a California resident is not enough, by itself, to constitute purposeful availment; to count, that 4 effect must be intended.” (Jacqueline B., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 254 [internal citations omitted].)

In Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783, 789 (Calder), a reporter in Florida wrote an article for the National Enquirer about a celebrity that lived and worked in California; the actress subsequently filed suit against him and the editor for libel. The defendants initially successfully moved to quash service of summons on the ground that they lacked minimum contacts with California. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, holding that California could exercise jurisdiction over the defendants “based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.” (Calder, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 789.) The Court explained that the allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a California resident, “impugn[ing] the professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered in California ... and the brunt of the harm ... was suffered in California.” (Id. at 788-789.) The court also noted that the defendants wrote an article they knew would injure the actress and that the brunt of the injury would be suffered in the state where she lived and worked, and where the National Enquirer had its largest circulation. (Id. at 789-790.) The Calder “effects” test requires that a defendant: “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” (Id. at p. 789.)

Defendant argues that operation of a website is not sufficient to establish purposeful availment or conduct purposefully directed towards a forum state. (Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“MPA”), p. 9:12-14.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues Defendant purposefully directed marketing activities at California consumers. (Opp., p. 6:4-5.)

In order to analyze whether an out-of-state defendant’s operation of a website constitutes purposeful availment, courts look at whether the website targets California residents (Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 10054, 1063 (Snowney)), and if it does not, (2) where the website falls on a “sliding scale” or “interactivity” with Internet users, with websites allowing the out-of-state defendant to conduct business with California residents at one end of the scale and websites that passively make information available at the other end. (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1063-1064; see also Jacqueline B., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 254-255.)

Defendant contends that it did not target California and Plaintiff did not nor could he have purchased anything on the Modelo Website. (MPA, p. 9:23-24.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s California market share is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. (Opp., p. 7:1-2; see also Declaration of Seth Safier (“Safier Decl.”), ¶¶ 2-4 [stating that California is Modelo’s largest market].)

Plaintiff relies on Thurston v. Fairfield Collectibles of Georgia, LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1231, 1240 (Thurston) in support of his assertion that sales volume can confer jurisdiction. In Thurston, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision granting defendant’s motion to quash service because the defendant made about 8%-10% of its sales to Californians. (Id. at p. 1235.) Thus, it reasoned that the website was equivalent to having a physical store in California. (Ibid; see also p. 1240 [“here Fairfield made eight percent of its sales in California... that is the equivalent of having a brick-and-mortar store in California—a ‘virtual store.’”.].) However, central to the appellate court’s analysis in Thurston was the fact that sales were made via the Website. (Id. at p. 1240 [“under California case law, making a 5 substantial number of sales of goods or services to California residents via one’s own website constitutes purposeful availment.”] [emphasis added].) This is distinguishable from the instant matter as Plaintiff does not argue or offer any evidence stating that Modelo sales in California were made via the Website. Here, it appears that Defendant owns and operates the Modelo website and it also makes substantial sales in physical stores in California. Thus, Plaintiff’s reliance on Thurston is unavailing.

Next, Plaintiff alleges and argues that the Website is a “sophisticated, technical marketing tool designed to gather personal demographic information about and target California consumers.” (Opp., p. 7:9-11.) He relies on Snowney, supra, in which the court ruled that California could exercise specific jurisdiction over a hotel company in Nevada because the hotel made telephone and e-mail contacts with California residents and it purposefully solicited Nevada business from California residents. (Id. at pp. 1065-1069.) Here, Plaintiff does not provide evidence of such efforts by Defendant. He identifies a marketing campaign with a Latino actress and LA street vendor advocate to provide direct cash assistance to five California-based street vendors. (Safier Decl., ¶ 7; Exh. G.) However, Plaintiff fails to provide any authority which states a single marketing campaign by itself is sufficient to confer specific jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in California.

Plaintiff further argues that Defendant purposefully directed Website activity toward California. (Opp., pp. 7:26-8:2.) He also argues that Defendant’s website creates expectations specific to California residents under California data privacy laws. (Opp., p. 8:17-25.)

Plaintiff’s reliance on Briskin v. Shopify, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 135 F.4th 739, 746 (Briskin) is distinguishable. In Briskin, the plaintiff asserted a privacy-related tort arising from the defendant Shopify’s activity in connection with a purchase he made in California from a California retailer. (Ibid.) Shopify facilitated his credit card transaction for the merchant and thereafter “took the opportunity to install ‘cookies’ on the device he used to buy the athletic wear and . . . Shopify did so without his knowledge or consent.” (Ibid.) The cookies then tracked the plaintiff’s location and collected his online shopping data. The Ninth Circuit determined that jurisdiction was proper because Shopify deliberately targeted the plaintiff in California. (Ibid.) In Briskin, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant compiled that data whereas here, Plaintiff alleges that the third parties tracked and collected data on users’ behaviors and communications. Moreover, there are no allegations or evidence that Defendant collected location data and used that location data to market to California retailers. Thus, Plaintiff’s reliance on Briskin is unavailing.

Moreover, Plaintiff relies entirely on his allegations to establish Defendant’s purportedly purposefully directed activity towards California. (Opp., pp. 7:26-8:16.) This is insufficient to meet Plaintiff’s burden on this motion. (See Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449 (Vons) [“on a challenge to personal jurisdiction by a motion to quash, the plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the factual bases for justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.”]; see also In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.Ap.4th 100, 110 [The Plaintiff must come forward with affidavits and other competent evidence and cannot simply rely on allegations in an unverified complaint.].) 6 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits of doing business in California or purposefully directed its activities toward California. (See Jacqueline B., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 253.) ii. Controversy Arising out of Defendant’s Contacts with California

California uses a “substantial connection” test in determining if a controversy is related to a defendant’s purported contacts with California which is satisfied if there is a substantial nexus or connection between the defendant’s forum activities and the plaintiff’s claim. (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1068.) The more significant the forum contacts are, the less related to the cause of action they need to be. (Ibid.)

Specific jurisdiction “requires a showing not only that the defendant ‘ “purposefully directed” ’ its activities at the forum but also that ‘the litigation results from alleged injuries that “arise out of or relate to” those activities.’ There must be ‘a c onnection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.’ ‘If the operative facts of the allegations of the complaint do not relate to the [nonresident’s] contacts in this state, then the cause of action does not arise from that contact such that California courts may exercise specific jurisdiction.’” (Rivelli, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 399.) “[T]he forum-relatedness requirement may be supplied only by those contacts with the forum that relate to the specific claims at issue.” (Id. at p. 400.) “[A] ‘substantial connection’ between the claim and the forum contacts satisfies forum -relatedness only when consistent with a finding that the claim ‘ “arises out of or relate[s] to” ’ the forum - related activities.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff argues that his claims arise out of Defendant’s website marketing activities. (Opp., p. 9:17-21.) As the Court explained above, Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendant purposefully availed itself or purposefully directed its activities towards California. Plaintiff does not direct the Court to any authority that a website’s privacy statement on a website generally available and accessible nationwide is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Thus, Plaintiff fails to establish the connection between the Defendant’s purported forum activities and his claims. (See Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1068.)

As a result, the Court does not need to reach the last prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis. (See Greenwell, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at 792; see also Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.) Therefore, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden to demonstrate facts to justify the exercise of jurisdiction and the burden does not shift to Defendant. (See Rivelli, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 393.) Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to quash is GRANTED. Consequently, Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is MOOT.