Abello v. Envision MPS Toy Auto dba Envision Toyota of Milpitas, et al.

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Case Name: Abello v. Envision MPS Toy Auto dba Envision Toyota of Milpitas, et al. Case No.: 24CV434333

This is a putative class action. Plaintiff Oliver Abello alleges that defendants Envision WC CDJR Auto, LLC; Envision Mps Hon Auto, LLC; Envision Roc MB Auto, LLC; Envision Mps Toy, LLC; Envision EDH MB Auto, LLC; Envision Motors Management, LLC; Envision Motors REH, LLC; Envision Motors Holdings, LLC; Envision Rent-a-Car, LLC; Envision Motors Investments Toy WC, LLC; Envision Motors Investments, LLC; (collectively “Envision Motors Entities”); and individual owners Simon Ayman Sarriedine, and Frank Zarabi (collectively with the Envision Motors Entities, “Defendants”) committed various wage and hour violations.

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement, which is not opposed. For reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the motion.

IV. BACKGROUND

According to the allegations of the operative second amended complaint (“SAC”), Plaintiff worked for Defendants as an exempt employee in the finance department from December 2021 through February 2022. (SAC, ¶ 52.) Defendants failed to: pay all wages; pay wages due upon discharge; provide compliant meal periods or compensation in lieu thereof; provide compliant rest periods or compensation in lieu thereof; provide complete and accurate wage statements; maintain complete and accurate payroll records; and reimburse for necessary business expenses. (SAC, ¶¶ 53-80.)

On April 3, 2024, Plaintiff initiated this action with the filing of the Complaint and on July 23, 2025, he filed the first amended complaint, which asserted the following causes of action: (1) failure to pay overtime wages; (2) failure to pay minimum wages; (3) failure to provide meal period in violation of Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512; (4) failure to keep accurate and provide itemized wages statements in violation of Labor Code § 226 and IWC Wage Orders; (5) failure to pay waiting time penalties in violation of Labor Code §§ 201-203; (6) failure to timely pay earned wages in violation of Labor Code §§ 204 and 210; (7) failure to provide rest periods in violation of Labor Code § 226.7 and IWC Wage Order; (8) failure to reimburse business expenses in violation of Labor Code §§ 2800 and 2802; (9) failure to pay reporting time pay in violation of IWC Wage Orders; (10) failure to pay split shift wages in violation of IWC Wage Orders; (11) failure to provide notice of paid sick time and accrual in violation of Labor Code § 246; and (12) unlawful business practices in violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. On December 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed the operative SAC.

Plaintiff now moves for an order: preliminarily approving the proposed class action settlement; conditionally certifying the class for settlement purposes; appointing Haig B. Kazandjian Lawyers, APC; Southern California Attorneys, APC and Tom Wheeler Law, APC as Class Counsel; appointing Plaintiff as the class representative; appointing Simpluris, Inc. (“Simpluris”) as the settlement administrator; approving the form of the class notice; and setting a final approval hearing.

2 V. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR SETTLEMENT APPROVAL

B. Class Action

Generally, “questions whether a [class action] settlement was fair and reasonable, whether notice to the class was adequate, whether certification of the class was proper, and whether the attorney fee award was proper are matters addressed to the trial court’s broad discretion.” (Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 234–235 (Wershba), disapproved of on other grounds by Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260.)

In determining whether a class settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, such as the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.

(Wershba, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 244–245, internal citations and quotations omitted.)

In general, the most important factor is the strength of the plaintiffs’ case on the merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement. (See Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 130 (Kullar).) But the trial court is free to engage in a balancing and weighing of relevant factors, depending on the circumstances of each case. (Wershba, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 245.) The trial court must examine the “proposed settlement agreement to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” (Ibid., citation and internal quotation marks omitted.) The trial court also must independently confirm that “the consideration being received for the release of the class members’ claims is reasonable in light of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and the risks of the particular litigation.” (Kullar, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) Of course, before performing its analysis the trial court must be “provided with basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise.” (Id. at pp. 130, 133.)

VI. SETTLEMENT PROCESS

On April 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed the initial complaint. The parties engaged in informal discovery in preparation of engaging in mediation. On August 14, 2024, the parties attended mediation with Gig Kyriacou, however the parties were unable to reach a settlement. On February 28, 2025, they participated in a second mediation with Kelly Knight (“Knight”), which did not result in a settlement, but the parties receive a mediator’s proposal from Knight that was later accepted by the parties. Pursuant to the parties agreement, Plaintiff filed the first amended complaint, which added Envision WC CDJR Auto, LLC, Envision Mps Hon Auto, LLC, Envision EDH MB Auto, LLC, and Envision Roc MB Auto, LLC to the action. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the operative SAC, which clarified the scope of the proposed class.

VII. SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS The non-reversionary gross settlement amount is $435,000. Attorneys’ fees of up to one-third of the gross settlement amount ($144,985.50), litigation costs of up to $10,000, and administration costs of up to $8,000. Plaintiff will seek an enhancement payment of $10,000.

The net settlement amount—estimated to be $262,014.50—will be allocated to “Class Members” who are defined as “all current and former misclassified exempt and non-exempt employees who worked for Defendants in California during the Class Period [July 27, 2019 through the date of preliminary approval] who did not sign arbitration agreements].” For tax purposes, 20% of each Class Member’s payment will be allocated to wages and 80% will be allocated to penalties and interest. The average individual payment is $557.48. Funds associated with checks uncashed after 180 days will be transmitted to the State Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund.

In exchange for settlement, Class Members who do not opt out will release:

[A]ll claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the Class Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint and ascertained in the course of the Action including, e.g., claims for: Labor Code and applicable Wage Orders, including Labor Code sections 200, 201, 201.3, 202 203, 204, 204(b), 204.1, 204.2, 204.11, 205, 205.5, 206, 210, 216, 218, 218.5, 218.6, 221- 224, 225.5, 226, 226.3, 226(a)-(h), 226.2, 226.3, 226.7, 245-249, 256, 432, 450, 500, 510, 512, 512(a), 515(a), 516, 552, 553, 558, 558(a), 1174, 1174.5, 1174(d), 1175, 1182.12, 1182.2 1193, 1193.6, 1194, 1194.2, 1195, 1197, 1197.1, 1197.5, 1198, 1198,5, 1199, 2753, 2800, 2802, 2804, 2810.5. AB 12, and violations pursuant to Applicable Wage Order (Cal. Code of Regs., tit Section 11000, 11020, 11040, 11050(4)(C), 5(A) and IWC Wage Order 1-2001, 7-2001, 4-2001, 5-2001, 9-2001.); failure to reimburse business expenses in violation of Labor Code 2800 and 2802; unlawful business practices in violation of Bus. Prof. Code 17200-17208, et. seq. from July 27, 2019 through the date the Court grants preliminary approval or the date on which no more than 17,600 workweeks are released, whichever is earlier.5

The foregoing release is appropriately tailored to the allegations at issue. (See Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Management, LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 521, 537.)

VIII. FAIRNESS OF SETTLEMENT

Based on available data provided by Defendants, Class Counsel calculated Defendants’ maximum exposure as follows: $1,176,091 (meal period violations); $1,391,997 (rest period violations); $1,880,000 (wage statement violations); $1,405,231 (waiting time penalties); and $235,000 (failure to maintain accurate records claims)—totaling $6,088,319.00. 6

5 Participating Class Members do not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers’ compensation or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period. 6 Class Counsel reviewed the records and concluded that the other claims had nonconsequential or limited damages for Plaintiff, so their value was not taken into consideration in this analysis.

Class Counsel then considered the risks of prevailing on class certification, succeeding on the merits, obtaining plaintiff’s damages, and the possibility of an appeal or other delay in obtaining recovering.

Class Counsel then calculated Defendants’ realistic exposure as follows: $705,654.60 (meal period violations); $278,399.40 (rest period violations); $188,000 (wage statement violations); $421,569.30 (waiting time penalties); and $23,500 (failure to maintain accurate records claims)—totaling $1,617,123.30.

The proposed gross settlement amount represents approximately 7.1% of the maximum exposure and it represents approximately 26.8% of the realistic exposure, both of which are within the range generally approved by courts. (See Cavazos v. Salas Concrete, Inc. (E.D. Cal., Feb 18, 2022, No. 1:19-cv-00062-DAD-EPG) 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30201, at *41-42 [citing cases approving settlements in the range of 5 to 35 percent of the maximum potential exposure].)

Considering the portion of the case’s value attributable to uncertain penalties, claims that could be difficult to certify for Class treatment, and the multiple, dependent contingencies that Plaintiff would have had to overcome to prevail on his claims, the settlement achieves a good result for the Class. For purposes of preliminary approval, the Court finds that the settlement is fair and reasonable to the Class.

IX. PROPOSED SETTLEMENT CLASSES

Plaintiff requests that the following settlement class be provisionally certified:

All current and former misclassified exempt and non-exempt employees who worked for Defendants in California during the Class Period.

A. Legal Standard for Certifying a Class for Settlement Purposes

Rule 3.769(d) of the California Rules of Court states that “[t]he court may make an order approving or denying certification of a provisional settlement class after [a] preliminary settlement hearing.” California Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 authorizes certification of a class “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court ....”

Section 382 requires the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) an ascertainable class and (2) a well-defined community of interest among the class members. (Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326, 332 (Sav- On Drug Stores).) “Other relevant considerations include the probability that each class member will come forward ultimately to prove his or her separate claim to a portion of the total recovery and whether the class approach would actually serve to deter and redress alleged wrongdoing.” (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435.) The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that class treatment will yield “substantial benefits” to both “the litigants and to the court.” (Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 381, 385.)

5 In the settlement context, “the court’s evaluation of the certification issues is somewhat different from its consideration of certification issues when the class action has not yet settled.” (Luckey v. Superior Court (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 81, 93.) As no trial is anticipated in the settlement-only context, the case management issues inherent in the ascertainable class determination need not be confronted, and the court’s review is more lenient in this respect. (Id. at pp. 93–94.) But considerations designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions require heightened scrutiny in the settlement-only class context, since the court will lack the usual opportunity to adjust the class as proceedings unfold. (Id. at p. 94.)

B. Ascertainable Class

A class is ascertainable “when it is defined in terms of objective characteristics and common transactional facts that make the ultimate identification of class members possible when that identification becomes necessary.” (Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955, 980 (Noel).) A class definition satisfying these requirements

puts members of the class on notice that their rights may be adjudicated in the proceeding, so they must decide whether to intervene, opt out, or do nothing and live with the consequences. This kind of class definition also advances due process by supplying a concrete basis for determining who will and will not be bound by (or benefit from) any judgment.

(Noel, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 980, citation omitted.)

“As a rule, a representative plaintiff in a class action need not introduce evidence establishing how notice of the action will be communicated to individual class members in order to show an ascertainable class.” (Noel, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 984.) Still, it has long been held that “[c]lass members are ‘ascertainable’ where they may be readily identified ... by reference to official records.” (Rose v. City of Hayward (1981) 126 Cal. App. 3d 926, 932, disapproved of on another ground by Noel, supra, 7 Cal.5th 955; see also Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 966, 975-976 [“The defined class of all HD Package subscribers is precise, with objective characteristics and transactional parameters, and can be determined by DIRECTV’s own account records. No more is needed.”].)

Here, the estimated 470 Class Members are readily identifiable based on Defendants’ records, and the settlement Class is appropriately defined based on objective characteristics. The Court finds that the settlement Class is numerous, ascertainable, and appropriately defined.

C. Community of Interest

The “community-of-interest” requirement encompasses three factors: (1) predominant questions of law or fact, (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class, and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. (Sav-On Drug Stores, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 326, 332.)

For the first community of interest factor, “[i]n order to determine whether common questions of fact predominate the trial court must examine the issues framed by the pleadings and the law applicable to the causes of action alleged.” (Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home

6 Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 908, 916 (Hicks).) The court must also examine evidence of any conflict of interest among the proposed class members. (See J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 195, 215.) The ultimate question is whether the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a class action would be good for the judicial process and to the litigants. (Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1096, 1104–1105 (Lockheed Martin).) “As a general rule if the defendant’s liability can be determined by facts common to all members of the class, a class will be certified even if the members must individually prove their damages.” (Hicks, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 916.)

Here, common legal and factual issues predominate. Plaintiff’s claims all arise from Defendants’ wage and hour policies and practices.

As for the second factor,

The typicality requirement is meant to ensure that the class representative is able to adequately represent the class and focus on common issues. It is only when a defense unique to the class representative will be a major focus of the litigation, or when the class representative’s interests are antagonistic to or in conflict with the objectives of those she purports to represent that denial of class certification is appropriate. But even then, the court should determine if it would be feasible to divide the class into subclasses to eliminate the conflict and allow the class action to be maintained.

(Medrazo v. Honda of North Hollywood (2008) 166 Cal. App. 4th 89, 99, internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted.)

The anticipated defenses are not unique to Plaintiff, and there is no indication that Plaintiff’s interests are otherwise in conflict with those of the class.

Finally, adequacy of representation “depends on whether the plaintiff’s attorney is qualified to conduct the proposed litigation and the plaintiff’s interests are not antagonistic to the interests of the class.” (McGhee v. Bank of America (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450.) The class representative does not necessarily have to incur all of the damages suffered by each different class member in order to provide adequate representation to the class. (Wershba, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 238.) “Differences in individual class members’ proof of damages [are] not fatal to class certification. Only a conflict that goes to the very subject matter of the litigation will defeat a party’s claim of representative status.” (Ibid., internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)

Plaintiff has the same interest in maintaining this action as any Class member would have. Further, he has hired experienced counsel. Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated adequacy of representation.

D. Substantial Benefits of Class Certification

“[A] class action should not be certified unless substantial benefits accrue both to litigants and the courts. . . .” (Basurco v. 21st Century Ins. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 110, 120, internal quotation marks omitted.) The question is whether a class action would be superior to

7 individual lawsuits. (Ibid.) “Thus, even if questions of law or fact predominate, the lack of superiority provides an alternative ground to deny class certification.” (Ibid.) Generally, “a class action is proper where it provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress and when numerous parties suffer injury of insufficient size to warrant individual action.” (Id. at pp. 120–121, internal quotation marks omitted.)

Here, there are an estimated 470 Class Members. It would be inefficient for the Court to hear and decide the same issues separately and repeatedly for each class member. Further, it would be cost prohibitive for each class member to file suit individually, as each member would have the potential for little to no monetary recovery. It is clear that a class action provides substantial benefits to both the litigants and the Court in this case.

X. NOTICE

The content of a class notice is subject to court approval. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(f).) “The notice must contain an explanation of the proposed settlement and procedures for class members to follow in filing written objections to it and in arranging to appear at the settlement hearing and state any objections to the proposed settlement.” (Ibid.) In determining the manner of the notice, the court must consider: “(1) The interests of the class; (2) The type of relief requested; (3) The stake of the individual class members; (4) The cost of notifying class members; (5) The resources of the parties; (6) The possible prejudice to class members who do not receive notice; and (7) The res judicata effect on class members.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.766(e).)

Here, the notice, which will be provided in English, informs the Class Members of the nature of the lawsuit and their rights under the terms of the Settlement and applicable law. It includes: a detailed explanation of the case, including the basic contentions or denials of the Parties and the basic terms of the Settlement; a statement that the court will exclude the member from the class if they request so by a specified date; a procedure for the member to follow in requesting exclusions from the class; an explanation that members of the Class can participate in the Settlement by doing nothing; a statement that the judgment, whether favorable or not, will bind all members who do not request exclusion; and a statement that any member who does not request exclusion may, if the member so desires, enter an appearance through counsel. Class Members are given 45 days to exclude themselves or object. Class Members who received re-mailed notices will have an additional 14 days.

The form of notice is generally adequate, but must be modified to instruct Class members that they may opt out of or object to the settlement simply by providing their name, without the need to provide their phone number or other personal information.

Regarding appearances at the final fairness hearing, the notice shall be modified to instruct class members as follows:

Although class members may appear in person, the judge overseeing this case encourages remote appearances. (As of August 15, 2022, the Court’s remote platform is Microsoft Teams.) Class members who wish to appear remotely should contact class counsel at least three days before the hearing if possible. Instructions for appearing remotely are provided at https://www.scscourt.org/general_info/ra_teams/video_hearings_teams.shtml

8 and should be reviewed in advance. Class members may appear remotely using the Microsoft Teams link for Department 7 (Afternoon Session) or by calling the toll free conference call number for Department 7.

Turning to the notice procedure, as articulated above, the parties have selected Simpluris as the settlement administrator. No later than thirty (30) days after preliminary approval, Defendants will deliver the Class Data to Simpluris. Simpluris, in turn, will mail the notice packet within 14 days after receiving the Class data, subsequent to updating Class members’ addresses using the National Change of Address Database. Any returned notices will be re-mailed within 3 days to any forwarding address provided or a better address located through a skip trace or other search. These notice procedures are appropriate and are approved.

XI. SERVICE AWARD, FEES, AND COSTS

Plaintiff requests an enhancement payment of $10,000.00. The rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class. An incentive award is appropriate if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit. Criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an incentive award include: 1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both financial and otherwise; 2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class representative; 3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; 4) the duration of the litigation and; 5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation. These “incentive awards” to class representatives must not be disproportionate to the amount of time and energy expended in pursuit of the lawsuit. (Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394-1395, internal punctuation and citations omitted; see also Covillo v. Specialty’s Café (N.D. Cal. 2014) 2014 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 29837, at *29 [incentive awards are particularly appropriate where a plaintiff undertakes a significant “reputational risk” in bringing an action against an employer].)

Plaintiff submitted a declaration in support of his request. He stated he spent approximately 30 hours in this action which included meeting with Class Counsel; gathering documents and information; reviewing documents with Class Counsel; identifying potential witnesses; helping develop strategy regarding document collection; reviewing the settlement documents and discussing the contents with Class Counsel. (Plaintiff’s Declaration (“Decl.”), ¶¶ 4-6.) He further stated he considered the financial risks and personal responsibility of pursuing this case. The Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to a service award and the amount requested is reasonable, thus, it is preliminarily approved.

The court also has an independent right and responsibility to review the requested attorney fees and only award so much as it determines reasonable. (See Garabedian v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 123, 127-128.) Plaintiffs’ counsel will seek attorney fees of up to 35% of the gross settlement amount (currently estimated to be $144,985.50), and litigation costs for up to $10,000.00. Prior to any final approval hearing, Class Counsel shall submit lodestar information (including hourly rate and hours worked) as well as evidence of actual litigation costs incurred.

XII. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval is GRANTED.

The final approval hearing shall take place on November 19, 2026 at 1:30 in Department 22. The following class is preliminarily certified for settlement purposes:

[A]ll current and former misclassified exempt and non-exempt employees who worked for Defendants in California during the Class Period.

The Court will prepare the order.

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