Britney Brown vs. Amazon.Com Services LLC

34-2021-00303135-CU-OE-GDS: Britney Brown vs. Amazon.Com Services LLC 11/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Protective Order in Department 22

Tentative Ruling

Defendant Amazon.com Services LLC (“Defendant” and/or “Amazon”) moves for a protective order prohibiting the depositions of Mr. Dave Clark and Mr. John Felton. (Notice.) Defendant’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows.

Moving counsel’s Notices of Motion do not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise them of Local Rule 1.06, the Court’s tentative ruling procedure, and the manner to request a hearing.

Defendant’s Motion to Seal

Pursuant to California Rule of Court Rules 2.550 and 2.551, Defendant concurrently moves to seal Exhibits C, F, and H to the Declaration of Amber McKonly and portions of Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order that quote or describe the details of Exhibits C, F, and H. (Notice of Motion to Seal.) Defendant lodged these materials under seal. (Defendant’s Notice of Lodging.) In opposition, Plaintiffs lodged additional materials under seal. (Plaintiffs’ Notice of Lodging.)

Rule 2.550 makes clear that Rules 2.550-2.551 “do not apply to discovery motions and records filed or lodged in connection with discovery motions or proceedings.” (CRC Rule 2.550(a)(3).) Defendant’s motion for a protective order is a discovery motion. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is unnecessary and the Parties’ lodged materials shall remain under seal. Redacted versions have already been filed.

Background

Plaintiff Britney Brown initiated this Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) action against Defendant on June 23, 2021. (Complaint.) Plaintiff Brown’s initial complaint focused on Defendant’s alleged failure to provide suitable seating and temperatures. Plaintiff Brown filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on October 12, 2021, dropping the suitable seating allegations. (FAC.) Pursuant to the Parties’ joint stipulation, Plaintiff Brown filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on March 15, 2023, adding Diana Cubas and Desta Smith as named Plaintiffs. (3-3-25 Stip and Order; SAC.)

Legal Standard

Generally, the Court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. (Code of Civil Proc. (“CCP”), § 2025.420(b).) A nonexclusive list of enumerated remedies available to a court when a party seeks a protective order includes prohibiting the deposition entirely, changing the place, limiting

34-2021-00303135-CU-OE-GDS: Britney Brown vs. Amazon.Com Services LLC 11/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Protective Order in Department 22

the scope of questioning permitted at the deposition, and limiting the form of discovery. (Ibid.; Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 316.) A motion for a protective order should only be granted if the Court “determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (CCP, §§ 2017.020(a), 2019.030(a).)

However, “when a plaintiff seeks to depose a corporate president or other official at the highest level of corporate management, and that official moves for a protective order to prohibit the deposition, the trial court should first determine whether the plaintiff has shown good cause that the official has unique or superior personal knowledge of discoverable information. If not, as will presumably often be the case in the instance of a large national or international corporation, the trial court should issue the protective order and first require the plaintiff to obtain the necessary discovery through less intrusive means. [] Should these avenues be exhausted, and the plaintiff make a colorable showing of good cause that the high-level official possesses necessary information to the case, the trial court may then lift the protective order and allow the deposition to proceed.” (Liberty Mutual Ins.

Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1289 [emphasis added].) “At the outset it would seem sensible to prevent a plaintiff from leapfrogging to the apex of the corporate hierarchy in the first instance, without the intermediate steps of seeking discovery from lower level employees more involved in everyday corporate operations.” (Id., at p. 1287.) Thus, when a plaintiff seeks to depose a president or other official at the highest level of management within a defendant corporation, the burden of showing good cause for a protective order that the deposition not be taken is shifted from the proposed deponent to the plaintiff. (Nagle v.

Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1467-1469.)

Discussion

Defendant argues that Mr. Clark and Mr. Felton are protected by the apex witness doctrine because Plaintiffs cannot show that either has “unique” or “superior” knowledge. (Mot., pp. 9:21-12:27.) Defendant further argues that even if Plaintiffs had met their burden, they have not exhausted less intrusive means to obtain the discovery. (Id., pp. 13:1-14:15.)

Plaintiffs oppose, arguing that (1) Mr. Clark and Mr. Felton are not apex witnesses in light of Defendant’s structure; (2) Mr. Clark has unique, superior, and direct knowledge regarding the comfortable temperature standards; and (3) Plaintiffs have explored less intrusive means of obtaining the information. (Opp., pp. 6:4-13:22.) Plaintiffs seek at least $16,000 in sanctions against Defendant and its counsel pursuant to CCP sections 2019.030(c) and 2025.420(h). (Id., pp 14:18-15:11.)

As a threshold matter, the Court is not persuaded that Mr. Clark and Mr. Felton fail to qualify as apex witnesses merely because they are not corporate presidents or corporate officers. (See Opp., pp. 6:4-7:1.) Plaintiffs cite no authority suggesting that an apex witness must be a company founder, CEO, or chairman of the board, or that the presence of other executives at the same

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00303135-CU-OE-GDS: Britney Brown vs. Amazon.Com Services LLC 11/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Protective Order in Department 22

level undercuts apex status. While not at the literal peak of Defendant’s organizational structure, Mr. Clark was, and Mr. Felton is, a high-level corporate officer. Mr. Felton is currently Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Amazon Web Services. (Felton Decl., ¶ 1.) His previous roles include Senior Vice President, Worldwide Operations (2022-2024); Senior Vice President, Global Delivery Services (2021-2022); and Vice President, Global Delivery Services (2019- 2021). (Ibid.) As Senior Vice President, Global Delivery Services, Mr. Felton reported to Mr. Clark, who was employed as CEO Worldwide Consumer at Amazon. (Id., ¶ 4; see also Rhodes Decl., ¶ 8, Exh. D [Mr. Clark’s LinkedIn profile].) Thus, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Mr. Clark and Mr. Felton have unique or superior personal knowledge and that Plaintiffs have exhausted less intrusive means of discovery.

Having reviewed the Parties briefing, including the materials lodged conditionally under seal, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden as it relates to Mr. Clark, but not Mr. Felton.

Unique or Superior Personal Knowledge

Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Clark and Mr. Felton “decide the temperature policies that should be implemented” and that the “documentary evidence confirms the unique knowledge that only Mr. Clark and Mr. Felton could gain through their involvement in creating and implementing the comfort cooling redesign.” (Opp., pp. 8:24-9:2.) However, none of the materials Plaintiffs discuss (and conditionally lodge under seal) demonstrate that Mr. Felton has unique or superior knowledge. In fact, these materials do not even reference Mr. Felton. (See id., pp. 7:24-8:23; Rhodes Decl., ¶¶ 9-13, Exhs. E-I.)

Mr. Felton attests that he “was generally aware that Amazon uses various methods to cool its facilities and that there were discussions about that in connection with launching new sites” but does “not recall discussions about those topics in meetings and was not involved in the day-today decisions regarding those issues,” while acknowledging that he “may have been asked to approve budgets or general plans for various building launches given [his] position.” (Felton Decl., ¶ 5.) He further attests that he “reviewed a document entitled Worldwide HVAC Comfort Cooling Re-Design, dated April 19, 2021” and does “not recognize this document and [does] not remember being involved in discussions about it.” (Id., ¶ 6.)

He also does “not recall being involved in discussions related to temperatures in the workplace or efforts to decrease temperatures within the workplace.” (Id., ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs do not rebut or otherwise respond to Mr. Felton’s declaration.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden as to Mr. Felton, and Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, in part. Should it become clear through additional discovery that Mr. Felton has unique or superior knowledge, Plaintiffs may seek to lift the protective order and depose Mr. Felton.

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34-2021-00303135-CU-OE-GDS: Britney Brown vs. Amazon.Com Services LLC 11/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Protective Order in Department 22

However, the Court is persuaded that the materials referenced above demonstrate Mr. Clark’s firsthand, unique, and superior knowledge, particularly as it relates to Defendant’s Worldwide HVAC Comfort Cooling Re-Design. (Rhodes Decl., ¶¶ 9-13, Exhs. E-I.) The Court is not persuaded that this conclusion turns on a single reference in a footnote. The Court also disagrees with Defendant’s characterization of Mr. Clark as a high-level executive who “was not involved in the actual design of a comfort cooling design temperature” (Mot., pp. 10:16-11:8), or who “simply directed a change that was proposed to him” (Reply, p. 6:24).

Mr. Clark may not have specific information regarding the set point temperatures at particular facilities, but it is clear to the Court – based on the limited information provided – that he does have information regarding what he and Defendant considered in deciding to issue the directive to shift from safety to comfort cooling, the people and/or teams responsible for the re-design; the development and implementation of Defendant’s comfort cooling policies; and insight into what other information Defendant considered in the process.

This information is directly relevant to phase one. Notably, Defendant did not provide a declaration from Mr. Clark to dispute the extent of his knowledge or participation in the comfort cooling redesign.

Exhaustion of Less Intrusive Means

Defendant makes much of the fact that Plaintiffs did not propound written discovery specific to the comfort cooling redesign despite indicating that they would, did not specifically notice the redesign as a PMK deposition topic, and did not seek to depose Mr. Walker (who was already deposed as a PMK), noting Mr. Walker is “likely to have information about the re-design” because he appears on the same emails Plaintiffs reference above. (Reply, pp. 7:21-9:16.) However, exhaustion is a factor for the Court’s consideration, not an absolute requirement. (Hunt v.

Continental Cas. Co. (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2015) 2015 WL 1518067, at *2.) Moreover, Plaintiffs persuasively demonstrate that they have pursued less intrusive means of discovery and have not been able to obtain the information needed regarding Defendant’s temperature monitoring and regulation practices, policies, and procedures. (See Opp., pp. 9:13-21, 9:27-12:20; Rhodes Decl., ¶ 3 [describing discovery conducted to date], ¶¶ 14-18, Exhs. J-N [deposition excerpts].) Moreover, it is not clear that Mr.

Walker or additional PMKs would be able to provide the same information as Mr. Clark.

While Plaintiffs’ prior PMK deposition notice topics do not specifically reference the redesign, they do seek information regarding Defendant’s “policies, practices, procedures, guidelines, and/or training related to indoor temperatures within the FULFILLMENT NETWORK during the PAGA PERIOD” and the “individuals and/or entities responsible for drafting, circulating, training, and/or enforcing Defendant’s temperature-related policies, practices, procedures, guidelines, and/or training that apply to FULFILLMENT NETWORK employees during the PAGA PERIOD.” (McKonly Decl.

ISO Reply, ¶, Exhs. A, B, C [Topic Nos. 4-5].) The Court struggles to understand how the comfort cooling redesign would not be considered part of Defendant’s “policies, practices, procedures [or] guidelines” or how the individuals responsible for drafting and enforcing the redesign would not be included within these topics. Nonetheless,

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34-2021-00303135-CU-OE-GDS: Britney Brown vs. Amazon.Com Services LLC 11/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Protective Order in Department 22

PMK deponents (and less senior employees) were unable to identify the department making policy determinations regarding temperature controls, unable to identify any information Defendant relied upon when setting comfort temperatures as opposed to safety temperatures, or were not even familiar with the comfort redesign or policy. (See Opp., pp. 9:27-12:20; Rhodes Decl., ¶¶ 14-18, Exhs. J-N [deposition excerpts].) The Court is persuaded Plaintiffs have satisfied their obligation to exhaust less intrusive means before seeking to depose Mr. Clark.

Unlike the stereotypical apex deposition, Plaintiffs are not seeking to depose Mr. Clark first without evidence of his unique or superior personal knowledge. Nor does it appear on this record that Plaintiffs’ reason for the deposition is to harass or abuse Mr. Clark. Instead, there is a core of legitimate discovery to which Plaintiffs are entitled.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for protective order is DENIED in part as to Mr. Clark.

Sanctions

Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions is DENIED. The Court invited this motion, and Defendant partially prevailed. As such, Defendant acted with substantial justification and the imposition of sanctions under these circumstances would be unjust.

Disposition

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED in part as to Mr. Felton and DENIED in part as to Mr. Clark.

Plaintiffs have offered to take Mr. Clark’s deposition remotely and limit the deposition to a halfday. (Opp., p. 14:3-8.) The Court finds these limitations appropriate. Mr. Clark’s deposition may be taken through remote means and shall be limited to four hours. The Parties shall meet and confer to promptly schedule Mr. Clark’s deposition.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (CCP, § 1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)

To request oral argument on this matter, you must call Department 22 at (916) 874-5762 by 4:00 p.m., the court day before this hearing and notification of oral argument must be made to the opposing party/counsel. If no call is made, the tentative ruling becomes the order of the court. (Local Rule 1.06.)

Parties requesting services of a court reporter may arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00303135-CU-OE-GDS: Britney Brown vs. Amazon.Com Services LLC 11/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Protective Order in Department 22

Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. The list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore is available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/courtreporters/docs/crtrp-13.Pdf.

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