Hannah Barca (Plaintiff) filed this action on July 27, 2023, against Ford Motor Company (FMC) and Santa Maria Ford Lincoln alleging violations of the Song Beverly Warranty Act arising from the purchase of a new 2020 Ford Ranger (the Subject Vehicle). Santa Maria Ford Lincoln was dismissed on June 13, 2024.

FMC moves for summary adjudication as to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment on three issues: (1) Plaintiff cannot establish that Ford had knowledge of a defect at the time of sale; (2) Plaintiff cannot establish that Ford had any transactional relationship triggering any duty to disclose a known defect at the time of sale; and (3) Plaintiff cannot establish an independent duty to except the fraudulent inducement-concealment cause of action from the economic loss rule.

Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth below, FMC’s motion for summary adjudication is granted.

I. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

The fifth cause of action in the complaint alleges “fraudulent inducement – concealment” against FMC.

The complaint alleges Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract regarding the Subject Vehicle on February 17, 2021. (Cmp., ¶ 9.) “Defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to, transmission defects, infotainment defects; among other defects and non-conformities.” (Id., ¶ 14.) FMC “failed to conform the Subject Vehicle to the terms of the express warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts.” (Id., ¶ 17.) FMC “failed to either promptly replace the Subject Vehicle or to promptly make restitution in accordance with the Song-Beverly Act.” (Id., ¶ 18.)

The complaint alleges that FMC had superior and/or exclusive knowledge of the transmission defect. “FMC knew that vehicles equipped with the same 10-speed transmission as the Vehicle suffered from one or more defects that can cause the vehicles and their 10-speed transmissions to experience hesitation and/or delayed acceleration; harsh and/or hard shifting; jerking, shuddering, and/or juddering (“Transmission Defect”).” (Cmp., ¶ 25.) FMC “acquired this knowledge prior to Plaintiff purchasing the Vehicle through various sources of information.” (Id., ¶¶ 26, 61.) “As a result of this internal knowledge and investigations, Defendant FMC subsequently issued technical service bulletins (“TSBs”) concerning the Transmission Defect.” (Id., ¶ 27.)

“Although [FMC] has been fully aware of the Transmission Defect, [FMC] actively concealed the existence and nature of the Defect from Plaintiff at the time of purchase, repair, and thereafter.” (Cmp., ¶¶ 36, 62.) “In failing to disclose the defects in the Vehicle’s transmission, [FMC] has knowingly and intentionally concealed material facts and breached its duty not to do so.” (Id., ¶ 65.) Plaintiff would not have purchased the Subject Vehicle had she known about the transmission defect. (Id., ¶ 35, 62, 66.) “Furthermore, Plaintiff unknowingly exposed themselves to the risk of accident, injury, and/or liability to others as a result of the nature or the Transmission Defect.” (Id., ¶¶ 35, 70, 71.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants may move for summary judgment where an action has no merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) Similarly, summary adjudication may be had as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, where the motion completely disposes of the cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for damages, or issue of duty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) Issues that do not dispose of an entire cause of action may only be adjudicated pursuant to the procedures set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (t).

As the moving party, FMC has the initial burden to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact and that they are entitled to adjudication as a matter of law. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “And, defendants moving for summary judgment bear the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the cause of action in question ‘cannot be established,’ or that ‘there is a complete defense’ thereto.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025) ¶ 10:224.1, citing Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., at p. 850; see Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The burden can be satisfied by a showing through evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., at p. 855.)

If defendants make a prima facie showing, then the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce admissible evidence showing a triable issue of material fact exists. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim for fraudulent concealment, Plaintiff must plead: (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact, (2) a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) intentional concealment or suppression of the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) that the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as she did if she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiffs sustained damage. (Boschma v.

Home Loan Center Inc., (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248.) Unless the defendant actually knew of the concealed fact prior to the plaintiff’s reliance, the defendant cannot have intentionally concealed or suppressed that fact. (See Santana v. FCA US, LLC, (2020) 56 Cal. App. 5th 334, 345-346 [plaintiff required proof that the Chrysler knew of the defect prior to Plaintiff’s purchase of the vehicle to demonstrate an intent to conceal the defect].)

“There are four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. [Citation.]” (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)

A. FMC’s Knowledge of the Transmission Defect

FMC contends Plaintiff does not have evidence that FMC “had knowledge of a manufacturing defect in the subject vehicle at the time of sale.” (Mot., p. 10, ll. 24-25.) FMC supports its contention by citing Plaintiff’s discovery responses, which FMC claims are factually devoid.

The moving party in a summary judgment motion must first make a prima facie showing demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact exist by presenting sufficient evidence to support its position. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025) ¶¶ 10:225, 10:225.2, citing Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, 851.) A defendant may do “so by presenting evidence that plaintiff ‘does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” [Emphasis added.] (Id., ¶ 10:242, citing Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., at p. 854.)

“Circumstantial evidence supporting a defendant’s summary judgment motion ‘can consist of “factually devoid” discovery responses from which an absence of evidence can be inferred,’ but ‘the burden should not shift without stringent review of the direct, circumstantial and inferential evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96, 101, fn. 2 omitted.) “If plaintiffs respond to comprehensive interrogatories seeking all known facts with boilerplate answers that restate their allegations, or simply provide laundry lists of people and/or documents, the burden of production will almost certainly be shifted to them once defendants move for summary judgment and properly present plaintiffs’ factually devoid discovery responses.” (Id., at p. 107, fn. 3 omitted.)

FMC requested that Plaintiff describe in detail all information forming the basis for the allegation that, before Plaintiff acquired the vehicle, FMC knew the transmission installed in the Vehicle was defective and failed to disclose this fact to Plaintiff at the time of sale and thereafter. [Emphasis added.] (UMF No. 6.) In response, Plaintiff objected and directed FMC to the complaint and a 74-page document production. (Ibid.) Plaintiff was also asked to provide all documents supporting her interrogatory response. “Plaintiff confirmed in discovery that she would produce all documents supporting her allegation.” (UMF No. 7.)

Plaintiff supplemented her response to FMC’s request for all documents supporting her allegation by citing to her document production. (UMF No. 8.) Plaintiff confirmed in her supplemental response to Request for Production, Set One, No. 58 that no responsive documents were withheld. (UMF No. 9.) However, “Plaintiff’s 74-page document production is limited to the Retail Installment Sale Contract (‘Sales Contract’) and accompanying disclosures, repair orders and receipts, DMV registration and renewal documents, AAA auto insurance documents, a copy of the vehicle’s window sticker, and a vehicle photo.” (UMF No. 10.) “Plaintiff’s remaining interrogatory responses are nearly, if not exactly, identical to the aforementioned discovery responses.” (UMF 11.) 3

Plaintiff does not dispute that these documents do not demonstrate FMC’s knowledge of a transmission defect in the Subject Vehicle prior to Plaintiff acquiring the vehicle. Nor does Plaintiff request a continuance to conduct additional discovery to obtain such evidence. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s responses to FMC’s comprehensive interrogatories merely rely on the complaint’s allegations and provide a list of documents produced, which do not demonstrate that FMC had knowledge at the time of sale. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025) ¶ 10:253, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2) (defense motion) [“The opposing party may not rely on allegations or denials in its pleadings”].) The Court further finds that FMC has met its initial prima facie burden, which shifts the burden to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff, however, fails to proffer any evidence in support of her claim. Instead, Plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice of FMC’s technical service bulletins (TSBs) and internal documents from an unrelated federal case, in which FMC is a Defendant. Plaintiff appears to seek that the Court consider the truth of the matters contained in the exhibits for purposes of showing that FMC had knowledge of the defect at the time of sale. FMC objects to the request.

While a court may take judicial notice of court records under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), that “does not mean taking judicial notice of the existence of facts asserted in every document of a court file, including pleadings and affidavits. The concept of judicial notice requires that the matter that is the proper subject of judicial notice be a fact not reasonably subject to dispute. Facts in the judicial record that are subject to dispute, such as allegations in affidavits, declarations, ..., are not the proper subjects of judicial notice even though they are in a court record.

Therefore, although a court may take judicial notice of the existence of ... court documents, ..., it may not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in other decisions or court files, or of the truth of factual findings made in another action.” (Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2025) Judicial Notice, § 49.10.)

The Court sustains FMC’s objections and denies Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. Even if the Court were to overrule FMC’s objections and consider Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice, the materials cited in the RJN do not establish that FMC had presale knowledge of a defect in Plaintiff’s vehicle. 1

Plaintiff fails to meet her respective burden of producing admissible evidence showing the existence of a triable issue of material fact. The Court therefore grants FMC’s motion for summary adjudication on the ground that Plaintiff cannot establish that FMC had knowledge of the transmission defect at the time of sale.

1 In its reply brief, FMC persuasively demonstrates why the materials submitted with the request for judicial should not be considered by this Court. First, Plaintiff’s RJN exhibits are not competent summary-judgment evidence because they were not disclosed in Plaintiff’s verified discovery responses (UMFs 6–13) and are unauthenticated and unsupported by any declaration from a witness with personal knowledge. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (d).) Even if considered, the documents do not show that FMC knew at the time of the 2021 sale of a defect it was unwilling or unable to fix—many predate the sale by years, are not tied to Plaintiff’s vehicle, and are mischaracterized. Plaintiff’s TSB compilation is likewise unauthenticated, largely unrelated to Plaintiff’s 2020 Ranger, and many TSBs postdate the purchase, so it does not create a triable issue of presale knowledge. 4

B. Duty of Disclosure and the Economic Loss Rule

With respect to the second issue, FMC argues Plaintiff cannot establish that Ford had any transactional relationship triggering any duty to disclose a known defect at the time of sale. FMC does not deny that it entered into a warranty agreement with Plaintiff. Furthermore, the Court finds FMC’s reliance on the Ford Warranty Cases (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1122 to be misplaced, as that decision addressed whether a manufacturer could compel arbitration of Song-Beverly claims based on the plaintiff’s sale agreement with the dealership. FMC has not persuaded this Court that the warranty agreement did not establish a direct relationship between FMC and the Plaintiff. Thus, FMC fails to negate the existence of a duty of disclosure with regard to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment.

FMC argues Plaintiff cannot establish an independent duty sufficient to avoid the economic loss rule on her fraudulent inducement by concealment claim. FMC clarifies that FMC “does not dispute that fraudulent inducement is a recognized exception to the economic loss rule. Rather, Ford asserts that Plaintiff does not have proof to establish that the exception applies.” [Emphasis added.] (Reply, p. 9, ll. 3-5.) The Court agrees. As previously addressed, FMC has shown that Plaintiff does not have evidence of FMC’s knowledge of the transmission defect at the time of sale, and Plaintiff has not met her burden of producing admissible evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact on this issue.

The Court finds that since Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement claim cannot be established without the essential element of FMC’s knowledge, Plaintiff’s tort claim is not independent of the contract claim and would be barred by the economic loss rule.

ORDER (PROPOSED)

Because FMC has met its burden of showing that Plaintiff cannot prove an essential element of the claim – namely that FMC had knowledge of the transmission defect in the Subject Vehicle at the time of sale, the Court finds the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment lacks merit. (Code Civ. Proc., 437c, subd (f)(1).)

The motion for summary adjudication is granted. FMC shall serve notice.