PERLA SOJKA VS. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC

Background

According to the Complaint’s allegations, on May 6, 2025, Plaintiff Perla Sojka leased a 2025 Mercedes-Benz GLC-Class (the Vehicle) for which MBUSA provided an express written warranty. Sojka contends that the Vehicle was defective and that, despite multiple repair attempts, MBUSA’s authorized dealer was unable to conform it to warranty and has refused to repurchase it in accordance with the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBCWA”).

On December 26, 2025, Sojka filed this lawsuit against MBUSA, asserting causes of action for (1) breach of express warranty and (2) breach of implied warranty under the SBCWA.

MBUSA brings this motion to compel Sojka to arbitrate this matter and to stay this action pending arbitration.

The Motion Is Granted

California law strongly favors arbitration, finding it a speedy and relatively inexpensive manner of dispute resolution. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125; Armendariz v. Foundation

June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 23 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 97.) A party to an arbitration agreement may seek a court order compelling the parties to arbitrate a dispute covered by the agreement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1291.2.) The court must grant the petition to compel arbitration unless it finds the right to compel arbitration has been waived by the moving party; grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting rulings on common issues. (Id., at § 1281.2.)

Private arbitration is a matter of agreement between the parties and is accordingly governed by contract law. (Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 307, 313.) A proceeding to compel arbitration is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract. (Freeman v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 473, 479.) The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 [citing Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972].)

MBUSA contends that there is a valid, enforceable agreement to arbitrate, and that it may enforce it as a third-party beneficiary. MBUSA cites the lease agreement between plaintiff and the lessor (who is not a party to this action). (Mar. 23, 2026 Declaration of Will Wang, exh. 1 (“Lease”).) The lease agreement includes an agreement to arbitrate. (Id., at pp. 4–5.) Sojka signed the lease agreement May 6, 2025. (Id., at p. 6.) The signature area specifies: “By signing below, you acknowledge that: ... [y]ou have received and read all 10 pages of this lease carefully and agree to all of its terms, INCLUDING THE IMPORTANT ARBITRATION DISCLOSURES ON PAGES 4 AND 5 ... .” (Ibid.)

While MBUSA is not a signatory to the contract, MBUSA has standing to compel arbitration here as an expressly named third-party beneficiary of the Arbitration Agreement. The Arbitration Agreement explicitly applies to MBUSA, providing that:

Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort or otherwise (including any dispute over the interpretation, scope, or validity of this lease, arbitration section or the arbitrability of any issue), between you and us or any of our employees, agents, successors, assigns, or the vehicle distributor, including Mercedes-Benz USA LLC (each a “Third Party Beneficiary”), which arises out of or relates to a credit application, this lease, or any resulting transaction or relationship arising out of this lease (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at the election of either you, us, or a Third Party Beneficiary, be resolved by a neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.

(Lease, p. 4 (italics added).) MBUSA has shown that the Arbitration Agreement was made expressly for its benefit, so that it may enforce the Arbitration Agreement. (Ronay Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. Tweed (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 830, 838 (“third party beneficiary of an arbitration agreement may enforce it”); Civ. Code § 1559 (“A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it”).)

Sojka’s reliance on Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2025) 17 Cal. 5th 1122, 1127 ignores that the arbitration agreement there, unlike here, did not state that the manufacturer could compel the

June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 24 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ plaintiff’s claims against it to arbitration. Here, the agreement identifies MBUSA by name as a “third party beneficiary” who may enforce the agreement and compel any dispute “which arises out of or relates to ... this lease[] or any resulting transaction or relationship arising out of this lease (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract).” (Lease, p. 4.)

Sojka makes no attempt to address this distinction, which MBUSA raised in the initial moving papers. Sojka instead—albeit possibly inadvertently—misstates the language of the arbitration agreement, averring that the contract makes no mention of MBUSA whatsoever, when, indisputably it is a named beneficiary to whom Sojka expressly granted the power to compel disputes to arbitration.

A party meets its burden to establish the existence of the arbitration agreement by providing a copy thereof to the Court, or by stating the paragraph verbatim. (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1160; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) MBUSA has provided the lease agreement and its included agreement to arbitrate, meeting this burden. Sojka does not dispute the validity of the agreements or contend MBUSA has waived any right. Thus, MBUSA has established a valid arbitration agreement. (See Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 754–755.)

The motion is therefore GRANTED, and the case is stayed pending the completion of arbitration. (See 9 U.S.C. § 3; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.) The Court sets a case management conference for January 19, 2027 at 9:30 a.m. in Department 4 with a joint case management conference statement due five court days before the conference. If the parties want to advance or continue the conference, they should jointly email Department 4 with alternative dates.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, counsel for Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA LLC shall prepare, for the court’s signature, a written order consistent with this ruling, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, and shall provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and by the California Rules of Court.

June 16, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 25 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________

2:00 PM LINE 7 26-CIV-00001 H. HERRERA VS. STEWART CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM, ET AL.

H. HERRERA DANIEL L FEDER STEWART CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM

DEFENDANT MONTALBANO, INC.’S PETITION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Montalbano, Inc.’s Petition to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED, as follows:

Background:

Plaintiff Heriberto Herrera alleges he began his employment with defendants STEWART CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM and Montalbano, Inc. on or around 2016-2017 as a Counter Parts Employee. (Complaint, ¶6.) In April of 2024, he was promoted to Parts Manager. (Id., at ¶9.) In July 2024, he suffered a stroke and was placed on disability leave for one year. (Id., at ¶10.) Plaintiff was initially released by his medical provider to return to work on July 1, 2025, but he suffered a second minor stroke shortly before that date and thereafter received a revised return-to-work date of July 14, 2025, with work restrictions. (Id., at ¶15.) Plaintiff alleges he was not offered any accommodations when he returned to work, and that he was terminated on August 5, 2025 with the explanation that “the owner Scott Wright said you are 50% and we need 100%.” (Id., at ¶¶18-23.)

Plaintiff brought this action on January 2, 2026, and defendant Montalbano, Inc. filed the present Petition to Compel Arbitration on March 4, 2026, presenting three arbitration agreements signed over the course of plaintiff’s employment.

Montalbano attaches the three employment agreements to the declaration of Mike Keylin, general manager for Montalbano:

Exhibit A, signed by plaintiff on or about July 18, 2016 Exhibit B, signed by plaintiff on or about April 1, 2024 Exhibit C, signed by plaintiff on August 4, 2025, a day before he was terminated.

All three employment agreements contain arbitration clauses. The arbitration clauses in exhibits B and C look to be the same and state that they contain provisions that they are controlled by the Federal Arbitration Act.

Plaintiff argues that the July 2025 agreement was fraudulently induced, and that all three agreements are procedurally and substantively unconscionable.