MOLLINS vs RELIANCE, INC., et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with

24CV014460: MOLLINS vs RELIANCE, INC., et al. 03/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Third Amended Complaint in Department 25

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Reliance, Inc., American Metals Corporation, and Karla Lewis’s (“Defendants”) Motion to Strike portions of Plaintiffs Ryan Mollins and Talia Mollins’ (“Plaintiffs”) Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) is ruled upon as follows.

Factual Background

This case arises out of Plaintiff Ryan Mollins’ employment with Defendants Reliance, Inc. and American Metals Corporation. Plaintiffs allege causes of action for: (1) defamation; (2) violation of Labor Code section 1050, et seq.; (3) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5; (4) violation of Labor Code sections 6310 and 6311; (5) wrongful termination; and (6) loss of consortium. On June 6, 2025, the Loss of Consortium Cause of Action as to Defendant Karla Lewis was dismissed.

The TAC alleges that despite Plaintiff’s complaints about his subordinate’s conduct, Defendants refused to investigate, permitted the subordinate to engage in defamatory claims against Plaintiff, and retaliated against Plaintiff by terminating his employment.

Defendants now move to strike the following allegations from Plaintiff’s complaint:

1. Last two sentences of paragraph 39 (“Warren was AMC’s primary point of contact for sales of Nucor products, so Mr. Mollins and Heater had a longstanding business relationship with Warren. Once the dinner concluded, Mr. Mollins, as well as most other attendees, departed thereafter.”)

2. Last two sentences of paragraph 40 (“On this occasion, Mr. Mollins observed that Heater was visibly hungover. Mr. Mollins was somewhat surprised because he had also attended the dinner but did not find or witness anything that would cause such a long night or a hangover.”)

3. First four sentences of paragraph 41 (“While in his office, within a few minutes, Heater began telling Mr. Mollins about her long night. Heater recounted that she, Lewis, and Warren had stayed up through the night and into the morning. Heater revealed that at one point, her, Lewis, and Warren ended up drinking together in Lewis’s hotel suite. As soon as Mr. Mollins heard the lead up to Heater’s story,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV014460: MOLLINS vs RELIANCE, INC., et al. 03/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike Third Amended Complaint in Department 25

he began to brace for another notification of his name being brought up by Lewis in a negative and threatening way.”) 4. Last sentence of paragraph 42 (“Heater never mentioned that conversation or late-night get-together again.”)

5. Paragraph 76 (“In or around mid-July 2023, Mr. Mollins and some Reliance and AMC personnel attended a weekend-long Lake Tahoe golf tournament. Among the AMC personnel in attendance was Mr. Mollins, Heater, and the GM of AMC’s West Sacramento location, Dan Nethaway (“Nethaway”). Nethaway reported directly to Mr. Mollins and had an office right next to him. Nethaway and Mr. Mollins previously had a good working relationship. Nethaway and Heater accompanied each other in driving to Lake Tahoe for the event. Throughout the event, culminating in a company-dinner, Mr. Mollins could tell Nethaway was acting much different compared to their usual interactions.”)

6. Paragraph 84 (“On or about July 21, 2023, Nethaway left Mr. Mollins a conspicuously emotional voicemail. In his message, Nethaway, seemingly trembling with emotion, stated, “Hi Ryan, it’s Dan, (sigh), I don’t know what to say man. I just want to tell you about how much I love you and care about you, and I’m upset about everything that’s going on here, but I just need you to know that I love you and care about you and you mean a lot to me man. I just feel like I need to tell you that man. I’m here for you if you ever want to call. Love you.” Mr. Mollins was surprised by the level of emotion in Nethaway’s voice, especially given the out of character behavior he displayed the week prior.”)

Plaintiff opposes.

Legal Standard

A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint's allegations, which are assumed to be true and which are given a liberal construction. (Blakemore v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 36, 53; Velez v Smith (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163; Code Civ. Proc. § 437(a).) Allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike are considered as a whole, with all parts in their appropriate context. (Courtesy Ambulance Serv. v. Superior Court (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1519; see also Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 [“[J]udges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.”].) Code of Civil Procedure section 436 empowers a court to strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in a pleading.

“Motions to strike can be used to reach defects in or objections to pleadings that are not

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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challengeable by demurrer.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023 update) ¶ 7:156.) For example, motions to strike can be used to attack any part of a pleading, even single words or phrases. (Id. [citing Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 393 [stating a conventional motion to strike “may be used to attack parts of a count as pleaded”].) “The bench and bar are used to thinking of motions to strike as a way of challenging particular allegations within a pleading.” (Baral, supra, at pp. 393-394.)

Discussion

At the outset, the Court notes that the First District Court of Appeal’s en banc decision in PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (Ibershof) (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680 explains that motions to strike are not to be used as a “line item veto” to excise certain allegations from a pleading:

We emphasize that [the] use of the motion to strike should be cautious and sparing. We have no intention of creating a procedural “line item veto” for the civil defendant. However, properly used and in the appropriate case, a motion to strike may lie for purposes discussed in this opinion. (PH II, Inc., at 1683.)

The Court of Appeal found that a motion to strike is certainly a proper means by which to challenge punitive damages allegations and that such a motion has also been approved when the face of the complaint fails to plead facts showing a primary right of the plaintiff and a primary duty of, or wrong committed by, the defendant. (Id. (citing Lodi v. Lodi (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 628, 631.) But the appellate panel suggested that there certain other limited circumstances when a motion to strike is permissibly made:

We recognize that in some cases a portion of a cause of action will be substantively defective on the face of the complaint. Although a defendant may not demur to that portion, in such cases, the defendant should not have to suffer discovery and navigate the often dense thicket of proceedings in summary adjudication. We conclude that when a substantive defect is clear from the face of a complaint, such as a violation of the applicable statute of limitations or a purported claim of right which is legally invalid, a defendant may attack that portion of the cause of action by filing a motion to strike. (2 Civil Procedure Before Trial (Cont.Ed.Bar 1994) §31.2, pp.31-3 to 31-4.)

(PH II, Inc., at 1682-1683.)

Defendants argue that the portions of the TAC they seek to strike “serve no legal or factual purpose and instead function only to add immaterial, superfluous, or prejudicial

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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narrative into the pleadings.” (Mtn., p. 5:3-5.) Defendants further argue that the at issue paragraphs contain only abusive allegations only intended to prejudice Defendants.

The Court finds that striking the referenced allegations is not warranted. As noted above, “use of the motion to strike should be cautious and sparing.” (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1683.) “In [deciding] a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) Motions to strike should not be used as a “procedural 'line item veto' for the civil defendant.” (PH II, Inc., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p.1683.)

Rather, they have been used approvingly “to challenge portions of causes of action seeking punitive damages,” and “where a substantive defect is clear from the face of a complaint, such as a violation of the applicable statute of limitations or a purported claim of right which is legally invalid.” (Id. at pp. 1682-1683.)

Here, the Court finds Defendants are attempting to use the motion as an improper line item veto. The Court also finds that the allegations at issue provide context to the factual allegations supporting the causes of action. Therefore, Defendants' motion to strike is DENIED.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.