MOLLINS vs RELIANCE, INC., et al.

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24CV014460: MOLLINS vs RELIANCE, INC., et al. 08/04/2025 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 53

or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants’ Notice of Motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Defendants’ counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel forthwith to advise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure. If Defendants’ counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, Defendants’ counsel shall be available at the hearing, in person or remotely (telephonically or by video conference via Zoom as stated in the introductory notice to today’s tentative rulings), in the event opposing counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

Defendants Reliance, Inc., American Metals Corporation, and Karla Lewis’ (“Defendants”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings of Plaintiffs Ryan Mollins and Talia Mollins’ (“Plaintiffs”) Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) is ruled upon as follows.

This matter was previously continued to permit the parties to engage in further meet and confer efforts, and to file a joint statement regarding remaining issues which require judicial intervention. The parties filed a joint statement on June 27, 2025 (the “Joint Statement”).

Factual Background

This case arises out of Plaintiff Ryan Mollins’ employment with Defendants Reliance, Inc. and American Metals Corporation. Plaintiffs allege causes of action for: (1) defamation; (2) violation of Labor Code section 1050, et seq.; (3) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5; (4) violation of Labor Code sections 6310 and 6311; (5) wrongful termination; and (6) loss of consortium. On June 6, 2025, the Loss of Consortium Cause of Action as to Defendant Karla Lewis was dismissed.

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to the first cause of action on the grounds that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently stated a claim against Defendants. Plaintiffs oppose.[1]

Legal Standard

A defense motion for judgment on the pleadings “is akin to a demurrer and is properly

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granted only if complaint does not state facts sufficient to state a cause of action against that defendant.” (Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254; see Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1) (motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to state a cause of action).) In adjudicating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court treats the pleadings as admitted all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Schonfeldt v.

State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1465.) If the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted, leave to amend must be granted unless the defect cannot be cured by amendment. (Baughman v. State of California (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 182, 187.) If, as a matter of law, there is no possible liability, denial of leave to amend is proper. (Schonfeldt, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at 1465.)

In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court will take judicial notice of records and may extend consideration to all matters that are subject of judicial notice. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604-605.) In doing so, the Court performs essentially the same task as ruling on a general demurrer. (Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146.)

Discussion

Joint Statement: Issues Remaining

The Parties’ Joint Statement set forth the remaining issues in dispute as follows:

• Issue 1: Whether the Termination Letter statements (SAC ¶¶ 73–74 / TAC ¶¶ 81- 83) and the alleged post-termination statements to a prospective employer (SAC ¶ 76 / TAC ¶ 88- 89) are facially privileged pursuant to California’s common- interest privilege under Civil Code § 47(c).

• Issue 2: If the Court finds that these statements are facially privileged under Section 47(c), whether the SAC adequately pleads malice.

• Issue 3: Alternatively, to the extent the SAC is found not to adequately plead malice, whether Plaintiffs’ proposed TAC cures that deficiency.

• Issue 4: Whether the Challenged Statements support a claim for defamation against any Defendant. Defendants’ positions with respect to the Challenged Statements are set forth in the Motion at 14-20 and in the Reply at 6-13. Plaintiffs’ positions are set forth in Plaintiffs’ Opposition, dated June 5, 2025 (“Opposition”) at 9-18.

• Issue 5: Whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a theory of defamation by

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“republication” based on the statements reflected in the prospective employer’s email. See Opposition at 17-18. Defendants’ position with respect to Plaintiffs’ “republication” theory is set forth in the Reply at 11-12. Plaintiffs’ positions regarding the post-termination defamation are set forth in their Opposition at 11, 17-18.

• Issue 6: Whether, even if Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a defamation cause of action as against Reliance, Plaintiffs have stated a viable defamation claim against Lewis or AMC. See Motion at 14, 17-18; Opposition at 12-18; Reply at 12-13.

The Joint Statement also clarified that Plaintiffs are not pursuing a defamation claim based on the alleged after-work gathering statements and thus, arguments relating to these statements are moot. (Joint Statement ¶ 3.)

In the Joint Statement Issues 3 and 5, the Parties appear to invite the Court to adjudicate challenges to the proposed Third Amended Complaint attached to the Joint Statement. The Court declines to do so. As an initial matter, the Court’s June 18, 2025 Order directed the Parties to submit a Joint Statement that “shall identify which issues, if any, were resolved by the meet and confer process.” The Court did not allow the Parties to present new issues through the Joint Statement. Further, to the extent issues relating to leave to amend were raised in Opposition, the Court notes that it may deny leave to amend where the facts are undisputed and it is clear that no action can be stated as a matter of law. (See Komorsky v.

Farmers Ins. Exch. (2019) 33 Cal. App. 5th 960, 971.) However, when the adequacy of the pleadings is unclear, “the proper course of action [is] to permit amendment, after which the defendants [may test] the complaint’s sufficiency via demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Armenta ex rel. City of Burbank v. Mueller Co. (2006) 142 Cal. App. 4th 636, 643.) The Court finds that this case does not present a circumstance where the facts are undisputed and it is clear that no cause of action can be stated as a matter of law, and the Court does not opine on what appears to be a challenge to the allegations of a prospective complaint.

Defendants argue that the SAC fails to sufficiently state a claim against Defendants for defamation because: (1) alleged defamatory statements were made in 2019, and are thus time barred; (2) alleged defamatory statements in Plaintiff Ryan Mollins’ termination letter are not actionable and subject to the common interest privilege; (3) alleged post-termination statements are conclusory and fail to allege the statements with sufficient detail; and (4) general conclusory allegations of defamation are devoid of supporting factual allegations. Plaintiffs oppose, arguing that they sufficiently state a claim for defamation.

“Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation. The tort involves the intentional

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publication of a statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes special damage.” (Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.) The elements of a claim for defamation include: (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage. (J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Phillips & Cohen LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 87, 97.)

The Court notes that like a demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings must be made to the “entire complaint or cross-complaint or as to any of the causes of action stated therein.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(2).) Therefore, should Defendant’s challenges to Plaintiff’s complaint fail to dispose of the entire cause of action for defamation, the motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied.

Termination Letter: Actionable Statements (Issue 4)

Defendants argue that allegations of defamation in relation to Plaintiff Ryan Mollins’ termination letter cannot support his claim for defamation, as the SAC does not allege that Defendants made any of the allegedly defamatory statements described in the letter, and further the alleged defamatory statements in the termination letter are not actionable. Plaintiffs oppose, arguing that the contents of the termination letter “represent false assertions of fact by alleging disrespect and unprofessionalism, damaging [Plaintiff’s] professional reputation.” (Opp., p. 13:11-12.)

“Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing . . . which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.” (Civ.Code, § 45.) A publication “must contain a false statement of fact” to give rise to liability for defamation. (Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (“Gregory”) (1976) 17 Cal.3d 596, 600.) A statement of opinion “cannot be false and is outside the meaning of libel.” (Tschirky v.

Superior Court (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 534, 539.) “[T]he dispositive question ... is ‘whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the published statements imply a probably false factual assertion.’ ” (Kahn v. Bower (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1607, fn. omitted.) “The court examines the communication in light of the context in which it was published.” (Jensen v. Hewlett–Packard Co. (“Jensen”) (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 958, 969) “The communication's meaning must be considered in reference to relevant factors, such as the occasion of the utterance, the persons addressed, the purpose to be served, and ‘all of the circumstances attending the publication.’” (Id. (citing Polygram Records, Inc. v.

Superior Court, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d 543, 555); see Gregory, supra, 17 Cal.3d at 601 [“The distinction frequently is a difficult one, and what constitutes a statement of fact in one context may be treated as a statement of opinion in another, in light of the nature and content of the communication taken as a whole.”].)

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In Jensen, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th 958, the appellate court addressed the question whether a poor performance evaluation by an employer would support a cause of action for defamation by the employee. The Jensen Court held “unless an employer's performance evaluation accuses an employee of criminal conduct, lack of integrity, dishonesty, incompetence or reprehensible personal characteristics or behavior . . . it cannot support a cause of action for libel. This is true even when the employer's perceptions about an employee's efforts, attitude, performance, potential or worth to the enterprise are objectively wrong and cannot be supported by reference to concrete, provable facts.” (Id. at 965.)

Jensen's supervisor evaluated his work as “adequate in certain respects” but noted Jensen had been “the subject of some third party complaints,” “was not carrying his weight,” exhibited a “negative attitude in dealing with others,” lacked “direction in his project activities” and was “unwilling to take responsibility for the projects he oversaw.” (Id. at p. 966.) The court held this evaluation would not support a cause of action for defamation because it constituted opinion, not fact, and did not suggest Jensen lacked honesty, integrity, competence, or that he had reprehensible personal characteristics; in doing so, the Court noted the context of the statements in a performance evaluation and that “the word ‘evaluation’ denotes opinion, not fact.” (Id. at pp. 970–971.)

In Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1154, the appellate court analyzed Jensen in a defamation case by an employer against his employer, concluding that a supervisor accusing Gould of “poor performance” was “clearly a statement of opinion” that was not actionable, as it did “not suggest any lack of honesty, integrity, or competency” nor did “it impute any reprehensible personal characteristic.” However, the Gould Court also concluded that an accusation that the employee made a mistake in a bid was actionable, as it would impute incompetence in his trade and is susceptible to proof.

In this case, based solely on the allegations before it – as the Court notes that the Termination Letter is not attached to the SAC – it would appear that Plaintiff’s allegations that the Termination letter stated that he engaged in disrespectful treatment of subordinates and co-workers and that there were a number of reports from multiple employees about his behavior would be actionable under the reasoning of Jensen and Gould. As an initial matter, these allegations, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, impute incompetency to Plaintiff in his role as a manager and executive officer. Further, whether multiple employees had made reports about Plaintiff is a fact that is susceptible to proof.

Accordingly, the Court finds that alleged statements in the termination letter are actionable and sufficient to give rise to a claim for defamation.

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Termination Letter and Post-Termination Statements: Common Interest Privilege (Issues 1 & 2)

Defendant argues that any statements made to potential future employers of Mr. Mollins are protected by California common-interest privilege. Plaintiffs argue briefly in opposition that common-interest privilege does not apply because Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged malice throughout their complaint. Plaintiffs do not appear to contest that statements made about Mr. Mullins’ employment may fall within qualified privilege pursuant to Civil Code section 47(c), but assert that the privilege does not apply because Plaintiffs have alleged malice.

Civil Code Section 47(c) provides:

In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information. This subdivision applies to and includes a communication concerning the job performance or qualifications of an applicant for employment, based upon credible evidence, made without malice, by a current or former employer of the applicant to, and upon request of, one whom the employer reasonably believes is a prospective employer of the applicant.

This subdivision applies to and includes a complaint of sexual harassment by an employee, without malice, to an employer based upon credible evidence and communications between the employer and interested persons, without malice, regarding a complaint of sexual harassment. This subdivision authorizes a current or former employer, or the employer’s agent, to answer, without malice, whether or not the employer would rehire a current or former employee and whether the decision to not rehire is based upon the employer’s determination that the former employee engaged in sexual harassment.

This subdivision does not apply to a communication concerning the speech or activities of an applicant for employment if the speech or activities are constitutionally protected, or otherwise protected by Section 527.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure or any other provision of law. (Emphasis added.)

“The general rule is that a privilege must be pleaded as an affirmative defense. But where the existence of a privilege is revealed on the face of the complaint, it may be asserted in a demurrer.” (Tschirsky v. Superior Court (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 534, 538.) Indeed, “where the complaint shows that the communication or publication is one within

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the classes of qualifiedly privileged, it is necessary for the plaintiff to go further and plead and prove that the privilege is not available in the particular case, e.g., because of malice.” (Smith v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 625, 630- 631.)

In order to plead malice, a plaintiff must plead “more than general allegations of malice are required. Actual facts of malice must be alleged or be apparent from the communications themselves.” (Martin v. Kearney (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 309, 312.) Plaintiffs contend that allegations of negative and disparaging statements made by Defendants are sufficient to constitute malice. Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations of malice and single allegation that Defendant Lewis allegedly states that Mr. Mollins “better watch every move he makes” are insufficient to allege that all the defamatory statements were made with malice.[2]

Therefore, while Plaintiff has alleged claims in relation to the termination letter which give rise to a claim for defamation, Plaintiff has not sufficiently overcome the common interest privilege in relation to these alleged defamatory statements.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS, with leave to amend, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on this basis.

Allegations Against Lewis or AMC (Issue 6)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs offer no credible basis for asserting defamation against either Lewis or AMC because there are no allegations that AMC or Lewis authored the Termination Letter. In the Joint Statement, Plaintiffs point broadly to their opposition at 12-18 in support of their assertion that they have stated a claim.

In this case, while Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Reliance and AMC were his joint employers, he does not allege facts to support why Defendant AMC would be held liable for the statements of Koch, who is alleged to be an employee of Reliance. Likewise, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support how Lewis is connected to the statements of Koch. The Court does not find that the conclusory allegations regarding Defendants collectively are sufficient.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS, with leave to amend, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on this basis.

Disposition

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.

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As this is the first challenge to the complaint, leave to amend is granted. Plaintiffs may file and serve an amended complaint no later than August 25, 2025. Although not required by statute or court rule, Plaintiffs are directed to present the clerk a copy of this ruling at the time of filing the Third Amended Complaint. Defendants may file and serve a response within 30 days of service of the Third Amended Complaint, 35 days if served by mail.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

[1] Defendants initially moved for judgment on the pleadings on the loss of consortium

cause of action as well. However, in the Joint Statement, the Parties represent their understanding that the Request for Dismissal renders that issue moot. [2] Further, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts which would support their argument that

“republicized rumors can destroy conditional privilege if there are no reasonable grounds for believing the statement to be true.” (Opp., p. 13:22-23.)