CMC; Motion Leave
CMC; Motion for Leave Tentative Ruling Plaintiff LeeAnn Morgan filed her original complaint against defendants HipCamp, Inc. (HipCamp), Freedog Farms @ Cactus Flower Ranch, LLC (Freedog), Sierra Fiechter, and Darin Fietcher on January 22, 2024, asserting causes of action arising out of premises liability.
On March 7, 2024, without any response having been filed, Morgan filed her first amended complaint (FAC), which corrected the name of defendant Sierra Fiechter to Sierra Falso.
On April 23, 2024, HipCamp filed its answer to the FAC, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 37 affirmative defenses.
On August 9, 2024, the court sustained demurrers of Freedog, Falso, and Fiechter with leave to amend.
On August 23, 2024, Morgan filed her second amended complaint (SAC) omitting Darin Fietcher as a defendant.
On December 20, 2024, the court sustained demurrers of Hipcamp, Falso, and Freedog, without leave to amend, leaving only the first (negligence) and second (premises liability) causes of action.
On January 15, 2025, HipCamp, Falso, and Freedog filed their respective answers to the SAC.
On February 24, 2025, Morgan requested, and the court entered, dismissal with prejudice as to Falso and Freedog.
On February 23, 2026, Morgan filed this motion for leave to file a third amended complaint (TAC). The motion is opposed by HipCamp. No trial date has yet been set.
" 'The court may, in furtherance of justice and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading....' [Citation.] However, the court's discretion will usually be exercised liberally to permit amendment of the pleadings. [Citations.] The policy favoring amendment is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified." (Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.)
Morgan makes this motion in order to "refine the facts" and to assert new acts of negligence learned in discovery after the filing of the SAC. (Morgan decl., P.P. 2-3.)
HipCamp argues that the motion fails to identify specific changes in the TAC from the SAC in violation of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324
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Under the circumstances here, particularly where there is no trial date, the court does not find that HipCamp has shown prejudice sufficient to deny the motion. Morgan's motion is sufficiently detailed to identify the proposed pleading changes. By its opposition, HipCamp clearly understands the nature and basis for the proposed amended pleading and has filed substantive opposition.
To the extent that HipCamp asserts that the claims lack merit, that assertion is more properly made in the motion for summary judgment HipCamp intends to file (see Opposition, at p. 6, fn. 1) or some other procedural vehicle to challenge the merits of the claim.
The motion for leave to file an amended complaint is granted. Morgan shall file and serve the TAC, in substantially the same form as attached to the motion, on or before June 22, 2026.
Tentative Ruling: Jennifer Renga vs John Lawrence Freeman Tentative Ruling: Jennifer Renga vs John Lawrence Freeman Case Number
Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Fri, 06/05/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings CMC; Motion Leave Tentative Ruling For the reasons discussed below, plaintiff's motion for leave to file her second amended complaint is granted.
Plaintiff shall separately file and serve the second amended complaint no later than June 12, 2026.
Defendant shall file and serve a responsive pleading per code. Defendant is granted leave to conduct a second deposition of plaintiff, if he deems it necessary, relating to the claims asserted by plaintiff of defamation and slander per se.
Background: The first amended complaint (FAC) filed by plaintiff Jennifer Renga on August 8, 2024, is the operative pleading.
In the FAC, plaintiff alleges twelve causes of action against defendant John Lawrence Freeman: (1) retaliation in violation of Government Code section 12900 (the California Fair Employment and Housing Act or FEHA) (2) retaliation in violation of California state law (Civil Code section 1942.5); (3) breach of contract; (4) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (6) failure to use reasonable care to protect tenants in violation of California state law (Civil Code section 1714); (7) trespassing in violation of Civil Code section 1954; (8) nuisance; (9) negligence; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (11) constructive eviction; and (12) violation of Civil Code section 52.1 (the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act).
As alleged in the FAC: On August 18, 2022, pursuant to a rental agreement between the parties, plaintiff entered into possession of premises located at 1711 Grand Avenue in Santa Barbara, California (the premises) which is owned, maintained, operated, and managed by defendant. (FAC, P.P. 10-11, 14 & 16.)
On March 25, 2023, plaintiff fell down a stairway within the premises, causing plaintiff to sustain severe injuries and to be hospitalized for over a month. (FAC, P. 19.)
Plaintiff initiated a claim against defendant's homeowner's insurance policy for damages related to the injuries plaintiff sustained from the fall (the Claim). (Id. at P.P. 19 & 31.)
On March 19, 2024, plaintiff signed a release prepared by defendant's insurance carrier regarding the Claim. (Id. at P.P. 46-48.)
Beginning in November 2023, after receiving notice of the Claim, defendant and his girlfriend, Tina, began sending messages to plaintiff urging plaintiff not to pursue her legal rights with respect to the Claim, and threatening to evict plaintiff, to take away plaintiff's "section 8", to tell the housing authority that plaintiff has a problem with substance abuse, and to turn off plaintiff's hot water and electricity, among other things. (FAC, P.P. 20, 22-26, 30-33, 36, 39.)
Defendant also demanded that plaintiff vacate the premises, and presented plaintiff with termination notices and notices to quit the premises. (Id. at P.P. 30, 32, & 36.)
In addition, Tina admitted to slashing a tire on plaintiff's car. (FAC, P. 27.)
On two occasions, defendant entered the premises without prior warning or permission, yelling at plaintiff and calling her a "cunt", among other things. (Id. at P.P. 35-36.)
Defendant also blocked plaintiff's access to her parking space, preventing her from leaving the premises. (Id. at P. 37.)
Though plaintiff complained about and asked defendant to cease, defendant's conduct, defendant ignored plaintiff's requests. (FAC, P. 41 & 43.)
As a result of defendant's conduct, plaintiff experienced symptoms of "PTSD", had difficulty eating and sleeping, and lived in constant fear. (Id. at P.P. 28, 38, 42.)
Plaintiff was forced to move out of the premises on February 29, 2024. (Id. at P. 45.)
On September 9, 2024, defendant filed an answer to the FAC, generally denying its allegations and asserting forty-four affirmative defenses.
On March 23, 2026, plaintiff filed the present motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (SAC) adding some additional allegations and a thirteenth cause of action for defamation and slander per se. Defendant opposes the motion.
Analysis: Pursuant to Code of Civil procedure section 473(a)(1), the court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.
The court's discretion will usually be exercised liberally to permit amendment of the pleadings. (Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.)
"Generally, leave to amend must be liberally granted [citation], provided there is no statute of limitations concern, nor any prejudice to the opposing party, such as delay in trial, loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation. [Citation.]" (Solit v. Tokai Bank (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1448.)
"(a) Contents of motion