Phan vs. Bleu Restaurant and Dancing

Per the Proof of Service filed on January 8, 2026, Defendant Kenney Nguyen was personally served the summons and complaint on December 21, 2025, at 7112 Bluesails Drive in Huntington Beach, California. (ROA No. 62.) Notably, the Proof of Service was executed by a registered process server. (See ¶7(e)(3) of ROA No. 62.)

“The return of a process server registered pursuant to Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 22350) of Division 8 of the Business and Professions Code upon process or notice establishes a presumption, affecting the burden of producing evidence, of the facts stated in the return.” (Evid. Code, § 647.)

“Evidence Code section 647 provides that a registered process server’s declaration of service establishes a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence of the facts stated in the declaration.” (American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390.) “Because of the statutory presumption, defendant was thus required to produce evidence that he was not served.” (Ibid.)

Here, after reciting the details of the Proof of Service listed above, Defendant Nguyen declares: “I was not at the property on that date and, further that I and my ex-wife had sold the property more than two (2) years prior to the alleged date of service at that location.” (¶8(a) of Kenney Nguyen Declaration.) “Said conveyance of the property on or about September 28, 2023 is evidenced by a certified copy of the Grant Deed associated with that conveyance attached hereto as EXHIBIT B...” (¶8(a) of Kenney Nguyen Declaration.)

Attached as Exhibit B to the Declaration is a Grant Deed, which indicates the property 7112 Bluesails Drive, Huntington Beach, California was transferred from Kenney K. Nguyen and Trang T. Nguyen, as Husband and Wife, to ThoaiVy LLC, on September 26, 2023. (¶8(a) of Kenney Nguyen Declaration and Exhibit B thereto.)

Defendant additionally declares: “On the date of the purported personal service, I was not even located in the United States, as I had traveled to my home country of Vietnam and, arrived on December 12, 2025 and remained there until the date of January 5, 2025, when I departed the country of Vietnam, as evidenced by the markings in my United States Passport, a copy of which is attached hereto as EXHIBTI C...” (¶8(c) of Kenney Nguyen Declaration and Exhibit C thereto.) Included within Exhibit C is a photocopy of Defendant’s passport which, indeed, bears stamps referencing the dates December 12, 2025, and January 5, 2026. (Ibid.)

The above is sufficient to dispute service.

In response, Plaintiff raises two limited arguments.

Initially, Plaintiff asserts the motion should be denied as untimely, as it was filed more than 30 days after the service purportedly completed on December 21, 2025; however, this argument is unpersuasive, given service was insufficient.

As noted by Defendant, Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 permits a motion to quash “on or before the last day of his or her time to plead” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)), and the “time to plead” is within 30 days “after summons is served on the defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 412.20, subd. (a)(3).) Defendant persuasively argues that this time limitation is not triggered where, as here, it is demonstrated that service was not completed.

Moreover, regardless, Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 permits a motion “within any further time that the court may for good cause allows...” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a).) Here, given Defendant has established he was not personally served, contrary to the Proof of Service filed on January 8, 2026, “good cause” exists to permit this motion to proceed.

Thereafter, Plaintiff asserts the motion should be denied, as Defendant and his insurer had notice of the action, as early as January 12, 2026. Per Plaintiff’s Counsel, Plaintiff spoke with Debora Paez on January 12, 2026, wherein she confirmed that her insured was served and had tendered the matter to Triton Claims Management for further handling. (¶3 of Dennis Declaration.)

Plaintiff, essentially, relies on the existence of actual notice to defeat this motion; however, “[n]otice of the litigation does not confer personal jurisdiction absent substantial compliance with the statutory requirements for service of summons.” (Mannesmann DeMag Ltd. v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1118, 1124.)

As the undisputed evidence demonstrates Defendant was not personally served, there has been no substantial compliance with the service requirements, and the motion must be granted.

Clerk to give notice.

54 Watts vs. Doyle

25-01520747 Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default

The Motion to Set Aside brought by Defendant Reena Doyle is conditionally GRANTED, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). Defendant Reena Doyle is ordered to file and serve an Answer to the Complaint within 7 days-notice of this order and, additionally, to confirm her address and agreed upon method of service. Upon completion of the above, default will be set aside. Alternatively, in the event an Answer is not filed within the above stated time-period, the motion is denied.

“The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against the party through the party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, sub. (b).)

“Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding was taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, sub. (b).)

Initially, the instant motion was timely filed, less than two-months after entry of default. (See ROA Nos. 13 and 14.)

The entirety of this motion is one paragraph offered by Defendant, under penalty of perjury, wherein Defendant requests relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), on the basis “Defendant has been ill and unable to respond.” (See ROA No. 14 [capitalization altered from original.])

Although sparse, the above is sufficient to demonstrate excusable neglect, for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).

“Excusable neglect exists when ‘a reasonably prudent person in similar circumstances might have made the same error.” (County of San Bernardino v. Mancini (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103.)

As illness could prevent a reasonably prudent person from responding to litigation, relief is appropriate; however, Plaintiff correctly notes that Defendant failed to attach a proposed Answer to her motion, as required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) To correct this deficiency, Plaintiff proposes conditioning relief on an Answer being filed within 7 days of the hearing.

This proposal is reasonable and would result in statutory compliance, prior to default being set aside. While Plaintiff proposes only permitting 7 days for filing, this period is reasonable, given the record indicates Defendant has already prepared her Answer. (¶8-¶10 of Schueller Declaration.)