Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Case No.: VCU324539 Date: June 15, 2026 Time: 8:30 A.M. Dept. 9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide Motion: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Tentative Ruling: To grant the District's motion.
This is a California Public Records Act (CPRA) action. Sterling Wolf initiated the action with a petition seeking to compel College of the Sequoias Community College District (District) to produce further records in response to prior record requests. Wolf's original petition was filed August 12, 2025.
Three days later, on August 15, 2025, Wolf received a further response from the District regarding his requests. In a "Notice of Supplemental Facts and Amendments" filed on September 2, 2025, Wolf advised of his receipt of the District's August 12th response. Wolf described the response as having provided "certain documents" but also as having "postpone[d] production" of others. Wolf did not indicate that the District's response was otherwise incomplete.
Wolf later filed, on November 6, 2025, an amended petition for writ of mandate, which is the current version of his operative opening pleading. Wolf no longer, according to his prayers for relief in the first amended petition, seeks to compel disclosure of records. Wolf's amended petition, instead, seeks a writ "declaring that [the District] violated their statutory duties under Gov. Code Sec.Sec. 7922.535 (timely response) and 7922,600 (duty to assist)"; and an injunctive order directing "[the District] to adopt or implement reasonable measures to ensure future compliance with deadlines and duties under the [CPRA]."
The District moves for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that Wolf's action, as framed by the amended petition, is moot. The District contends Wolf's action is moot because he effectively concedes having received all records in response to his requests. Wolf's amended petition indicates some records remained outstanding, though again of note, Wolf did not pray for a writ directing any further production.
IN any event, in Wolf's opposition to the motion, he appears to concede the District has, as of now, fully produced all documents he requested. Wolf criticizes that the District's "August 15 letter did not complete production of [a category of records he requested on June 11, 2025]" and that the District "instead made a belated determination and staged production ... later completed on September 10, 2025," but he does not assert that the District's production, inclusive of the September 10th production, was incomplete.
Wolf, nevertheless, contends: "The First Amended Petition alleges continuing and justiciable CPRA controversies, including multiple accrued violations of Gov. Code sections Sec. 7922.535 and Sec. 7922.600, prolonged nonresponse, and delayed staged disclosures continuing after litigation commenced. The Petition further alleges an unresolved catalyst dispute concerning whether this litigation substantially prompted Respondent's eventual disclosures, as well as continuing disputes concerning Respondent's CPRA obligations into the future. Eventual production alone does not necessarily establish full statutory compliance under the CPRA. Effective relief can remain available concerning the aforementioned unresolved controversies."
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Wolf's arguments are difficult to follow, but his chief contention appears to be that there is a continuing controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of Wolf and the District, as pertaining to Wolf's "ongoing need to submit materially similar CPRA requests to [the District]." As to Wolf's "ongoing need to submit materially similar CPRA requests," Wolf explains that "[t]he First Amended Petition states that [Wolf's] records requests are connected to an ongoing software and analytical project involving the collection and evaluation of public-agency information, including patterns of institutional transparency and administrative responsiveness. (1st Am.
Pet., 10; Exh. A.) Exhibit A further explains that the requested records are sought for broader research purposes and are to be incorporated into ... [an] information system for public viewing [as part of some project or entity Wolf references as 'Existential'].
In that context, declaratory relief could still have practical effect by clarifying the parties' rights and obligations in future CPRA interactions involving similar requests. This is relevant here because [the District's] asserted positions, at times appearing contradictory, create ongoing disputes regarding its CPRA obligations, and those disputes have 'some likelihood of affecting future requests for public records or future conduct relating to such requests.' (City of Gilroy v. Superior Court (2026) 19 Cal.5th 38,__ [slip opn., p. 2].)"
In City of Gilroy v. Superior Court (2026) 19 Cal.5th 38 [340 Cal.Rptr.3d 711, 581 P.3d 1138] (Gilroy), cited by Wolf, the Supreme Court held "that the CPRA authorizes declaratory relief that a public agency has violated its provisions even in some circumstances when it is uncontested that there are no existing nonexempt records to disclose." (Id., at p. 63.) The Supreme explained: "Without attempting to delineate all circumstances in which declaratory relief may be available under the CPRA, we conclude that, at a minimum, declaratory relief is appropriate in situations in which an agency is reasonably likely to repeat past conduct that allegedly violates the CPRA in response to future records requests." (Id., at p. 54.)
In Gilroy, a plaintiff nonprofit had served a series of public records requests on the City of Gilroy referencing enforcement actions by the Gilroy Police Department. (Id., at p. 46.) The City took the position, in response to each of the requests, that certain categories of records sought by the nonprofit were exempt from disclosure. (Id., at p. 47.) Eventually, though, the City produced some of the previously withheld records, while also representing "it had no other responsive, nonexempt records to disclose" and that certain responsive material (bodycam footage taken before a certain date) "had been destroyed pursuant to the City's records retention policy." (Id., at p. 48.)
The nonprofit subsequently commenced suit in which it sought both to compel the City to produce the withheld records and "a declaration of 'the rights of the parties, including [nonprofit's] right to proper responses to its CPRA requests that compl[ied] with the time limits and rules for extensions set forth in the CPRA and that at the time of [the nonprofit's] request, [that] [the City of] Gilroy [had] failed to produce responsive records that existed at the time and were subsequently destroyed.' " (Id., at pp. 48-49.)
The Supreme Court reversed a Court of Appeal's determination that the trial court had erred in granting declaratory relief because it had not also ordered production of records, and no additional responsive, nonexempt records could be produced. (Id., at p. 71; see id., at p. 49.) The Supreme Court concluded that some of the underlying trial court's judicial declarations "addressed contested issues regarding the City's handling of records requests that were sufficiently likely to recur," and that "declaratory relief [was] appropriate in these circumstances to help guide the parties' future conduct and inform their rights and responsibilities under the CPRA." (Id., at p. 54.)
Contrary to Wolf's apparent assertions, the court does not find that Wolf's "ongoing software and analytical project involving the collection and evaluation of public-agency information," notwithstanding the complained of trouble Wolf encountered in securing responsive records from the District, presents an analogous situation in which declaratory relief is warranted because "an agency is reasonably likely to repeat past conduct that allegedly violates the CPRA in response to future records requests." Wolf encountered no assertions of disclosure exemptions in his records request endeavor with the District akin to the positions the City asserted in Gilroy. Instead, Wolf encountered, at best, undue delay followed by eventual complete response and production.
There are no continuing controversies presented by this factual background, as presented, that would call for anything beyond a proclamation of what the CPRA already and clearly provides with respect to an agency's obligations to respond to records requests under the CPRA. Wolf's "software and analytical project" presents no unique considerations and is merely a description of his particular claimed need for records. "[E]very person," however, "has a right to inspect any public record, except as otherwise provided [under the CPRA]" (Gov. Code, Sec. 7922.525, subd. (a)), irrespective of the purposes for which they desire to inspect such records.
Accordingly, the court agrees with the District that Wolf's petition is moot, or, more accurately, that declaratory relief is not warranted under the circumstances as presented in the amended petition. And, while it is usually not appropriate to test the merits of a declaratory relief action at the pleading stage "because the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of rights even if it is adverse to the plaintiff's interest' [citation]" (Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 734, 751 [115 Cal.Rptr.3d 89]), where a complaint for declaratory relief concerns a disputed question of law, a decision properly may be made on a motion for judgment on the pleadings (see Wilson v. Board of Retirement of Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Asso. (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 195, 201 [319 P.2d 426]; see also Wilson v. Civil Service Com. (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 340, 344).
Here, no disputed question of fact is presented concerning Wolf's request for declaratory relief. Wolf's petition presents solely a legal question of whether the circumstances of his engagement in "an ongoing software and analytical project" occasion the need for a judicial declaration of rights under the CPRA given the past difficulty Wolf encountered in obtaining records from the District. The court can, and does, answer that question here: It does not. Accordingly, the District's motion is granted and judgment shall be entered for the District.
The court's determination here does not purport to, in any way, determine the prevailing party for the purposes of Government Code section 7923.115, or Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b). The court notes that, "In [CPRA] litigation, the plaintiff may be a prevailing party even though the court did not enter judgment in his or her favor." (Sukumar v. City of San Diego (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 451, 463 [221 Cal.Rptr.3d 418].) The determination of the prevailing party in CPRA litigation turns on the question of whether the plaintiff's lawsuit "spurred defendant to act or was a catalyst speeding defendant's response." (Ibid., citing Belth v. Garamendi (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 896, 901 [283 Cal.Rptr. 829], internal quotation marks omitted.)
The court notes Wolf, as a self-represented party, may not be awarded attorney's fees (see Musaelian v. Adams (2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, 517-520 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 475, 198 P.3d 560]; Argaman v. Ratan (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1176-1181 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 917]); Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 285-292 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 902 P.2d 259]; Jacobson v. Simmons Real Estate (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1290-1294 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 699]), and though he might still otherwise be entitled to costs if he were determined the prevailing party, it happens that in this case Wolf was granted fee waivers for his costs. But, on the other side of this, if the District were determined to be the prevailing party, and if it were determined that Wolf's case was "clearly frivolous," the court would be required to "award court costs and reasonable attorney's fees" to the District (Sec. 7923.115, subd. (b)).
Additionally, per Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b), "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding," and under that section, the District would be entitled to its costs if it were determined to be the prevailing party. Again, however, the court does not reach a prevailing party determination here.
If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.
Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings. Re: Valley First Credit Union vs. Saesee, Ekeo