MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COMPLAINT
1. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME ARAUJO VS ROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
STORES, INC. JUDGMENT ON COMPLAINT Tentative Ruling: Defendant Ross Dress for Less’ Motion for Summary judgment is granted.
From commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 855.) A defendant can meet the initial burden by showing that one or more elements of the causes of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To demonstrate that a cause of action cannot be established, the defendant must either negate an essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action or show that the plaintiff lacks evidence. (Chavez v.
Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1301.) To negate an element, the defendant must establish that plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law. (Erikkson v. Nunnick (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 826, 849.) To demonstrate that the plaintiff lacks evidence, the defendant must show that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 855.) A defendant may not simply point to an absence of evidence but must show that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain such evidence. (Gaggero v.
Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if no triable issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1002-1003.) “The moving party bears the burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.) Once this burden has been met, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Ibid.) “Any doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion are resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion.” (American Airline v.
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Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1048.) It is improper for the court to weigh the evidence or determine the credibility on a motion for summary judgment or adjudication. (Binder v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains two causes of action that are premised upon the same factual allegations: negligence and premises liability.
The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) defendant’s legal duty of care toward plaintiff, (2) defendant’s breach of duty (the negligent act or omission), (3) injury to plaintiff as a result of the breach (proximate or legal cause), and (4) damage to plaintiff. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)
Premises liability is a form of negligence wherein the owner of the premises is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in the management of such premises to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Civ. Code § 1714, subd. (a); Brooks
v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619.) To establish premises liability, a plaintiff must prove (a) the defendant was the owner, occupier, or lessor of the premises, (b) the defendant was negligent in the use, maintenance, or management of the premises, and (c) that the negligence was the cause of injury, damage, loss, or harm to the plaintiff. (Brooks, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at 1619.) “[A]lthough a store owner is not an insurer of the safety of its patrons, the owner does owe them a duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.) This includes a duty to make “reasonable inspections of the portions of the premises open to customers” and to “keep the floors safe for patrons’ use.” (Id.)
To prove an unsafe condition of property, plaintiff must prove: (1) a condition on the premises created an unreasonable risk of harm; (2) defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known about it; and (3) defendant failed to repair the condition, protect against harm from the condition, or give adequate warning of the condition. (See Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 1206, emphasis added.)
Dangerous Condition
Plaintiff asserts in opposition that the issue of the existence of a dangerous condition is not before the Court because Defendants make no argument that the carpet-tile transition was not dangerous. However, this misses Defendant’s position. Defendant’s motion is premised on the fact there was nothing on the floor that caused Plaintiff to fall, and it was Plaintiff’s knee giving away that caused the fall. (Defendant Ultimate Facts [“UF”] #28, 29, 38, 40.) The flooring on the sales floor is entirely tile, with the exception of walk-off mats located at the entryway. (Munoz Decl., ¶6, Exh.
A.) Indeed, the photograph Defendant presented shows a walk off carpet mat at the immediate front entryway only and no clothes are nearby where merchandise is hung. (Ibid.) Defendant also presented evidence that the SPS Daily Behaviors (“SPS”) log is kept in the ordinary course of business and outlines inspections. (UF #42.) The SPS shows no cleaning or floor issues where Plaintiff fell. (#43.) Plaintiff’s daughter, Michelle, specifically saw her mom on the floor close to the front in one of the aisles. (UF #38.)
Michelle did not see anything on the floor. UF #39.) The manager of the day, Gustavo Soriano (“Soriano”), testified he personally inspected the area where Plaintiff fell and there was nothing on the floor, that it was clean, dry, and free of debris. (UF #50.) Plaintiff does not dispute the foregoing UF.
Thus, Defendant met its initial burden under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(3). The burden shifts to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff relies on her own discovery responses to argue her foot got caught on carpet near the entrance to the store, the surface of which was drastically different than the smooth tile floor. (Plaintiff Ultimate Facts [“PUF”) #D.) Plaintiff argues the difference in the two textures caused her foot to catch and resulted in her fall. (Id.)
However, in summary judgment proceedings, a party may rely on admissions of fact contained in the opposing party’s pleadings as evidence, not his own. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1); 24 Hour Fitness Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1199,
1211; Hodjat v. State Farm (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.) Thus, Plaintiff’s reliance on her own discovery is unavailing.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s amended discovery response lacks personal knowledge and is based on hearsay: “Plaintiff is informed and believes that her foot got caught on carpet near the entrance to the store, which surface was drastically different than the smooth tile floor.” (PUF #A.) However, this is a violation of the D’Amico rule. In Plaintiff’s response to special interrogatory (“SROG”) No. 1, Plaintiff states she was in the shopping aisles close to the registers. (Green Decl., Exh. A.) Plaintiff has offered no “reasonable explanation” for the discrepancy in the location of the fall and why the location changed in the Amended response. (See Mackey v.
Board of Trustees of California State University (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 640, 658.) Plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to establish a dangerous condition. Plaintiff accordingly does not meet her burden in presenting a triable issue of material fact.
Actual or Constructive Knowledge
The parties dispute whether Defendant had notice of any condition on the floor. To prevail on a claim for negligence or premises liability, the “injured plaintiff has the burden of showing that the owner had notice of the defect in sufficient time to correct it but failed to take reasonable steps to do so.” (Howard v. Omni Hotels Management Corp. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 403, 431.) “Because the owner is not the insurer of the visitor’s personal safety [citation], the owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is a key to establishing its liability.” (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 1206; see Getchell v. Rogers Jewelry (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 381, 385 [“property owner must have actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition before liability will be imposed”].)
Constructive knowledge exists when the dangerous condition was present long enough for a reasonably prudent person to have discovered it. (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 1206-1207.) Whether the presence of the condition was long enough “is a question of fact for the jury, and the cases do not impose exact time limitations. Each accident must be viewed in light of its own unique circumstances. [Citation.] The owner must inspect the premises or take other proper action to ascertain their condition, and if, by the exercise of reasonable care, the owner would have discovered the condition, he is liable for failing to correct it.” (Id. at 1207.)
The following are undisputed: Before the Incident, Plaintiff had a bad knee and used a cane regularly before the incident to help with stability. (Defendant Undisputed Fact [“UF”] #7-8, 11.) Plaintiff used her cane on the day of the fall. (UF #9-10.) The store was not crowded. (UF #13.) While the shopping cart was on her left, Plaintiff picked up a dress and walked towards a mirror that was on Plaintiff’s right. (UF #17-21.) Plaintiff took a step with her left foot and felt like it “just went into a brake, a half, like [she] stepped in glue or something,” and then fell on the concrete on her right knee, ending on her left hip. (UF #22-24.)
At the time of the fall, she was wearing new sketcher tennis shoes. (UF #25.) Plaintiff did not look around to see if there was anything on the floor and did not see what her foot “got stuck on.” (UF #28-29.) Plaintiff’s daughter, Michelle Araujo (“Michelle”), testified at deposition that she did not see anything on the floor. (UF
#9, 33, 39.) Michelle further testified that Plaintiff said her knee popped and gave way and then fell. (UF #40.) The SPS Daily Behaviors (“SPS”) is a business document that outlines manager duties and inspections. (UF #42.) The SPS shows no cleaning or floor issues. (#43, emphasis added.) Plaintiff told the store manager, Gustavo Soriano (“Soriano”), that she tripped over her own leg and was in pain and crying. (UF #46.) Michelle told Soriano that there was something on the floor that caused Plaintiff to fall, even though Michelle did not see the fall and was not present at the time of Plaintiff’s fall. (UF #49.) Soriano personally inspected the area and there was nothing on the floor, it was clean, dry, and free of debris. (UF #50, emphasis added.)
Based on the foregoing, there is no evidence that Defendant knew or should have known about the existence of any substance on the floor. Thus, Defendant met its initial burden under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(3). The burden shifts to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s opposition relies on the argument that Plaintiff fell on the carpet-tile transition. However, as previously discussed, the evidence does not support that Plaintiff was in the area where the carpet floor mat was. Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant created an alleged dangerous condition fails. Plaintiff thus fails to meet her burden of presenting a triable issue of material fact. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3).)
2. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA MOTION TO SET ASIDE ON CVRI2503978 VS HOUSE OF HOOKAH, COMPLAINT LLC Tentative Ruling: Hearing is continued to 6/23/26. The Court continued the hearing and ordered Defendants to file supplemental declaration addressing communications between Ruiz and his former attorney, Thomas Sardoni, within 14 days (by 06/05/2026). To date, Defendants fail to file any declarations.
Defendants are ordered to file, within 5 days, a supplemental declaration regarding the communications between Ruiz and Attorney Sardoni referenced in paragraphs 3 through 6 of Ruiz’ declaration in support of his motion to set aside the preliminary injunction.
Order to show cause is set for 6/23/26 re: sanctions as to Defendants’ failure to comply with the Court’s May 22, 2026 Order, which required Defendants to file their supplemental declaration by June 5, 2026.