CROSS-DEFENDANT RICHARD STAITON’S AND PACIFIC LENDING TRUST #2 MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
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1. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME PABLO BRAVO VS MOTION TO SET ASIDE ON 2ND CVPS2305159 BRAVO AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT Tentative Ruling: The motion to set aside default is granted. Moving Party is given 15 days to file a responsive pleading, including any cross complaint.
2. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME CROSS-DEFENDANT RICHARD STAITON'S AND PACIFIC LENDING CVRI2301594 BENT VS GOGER TRUST #2 MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Tentative Ruling:
Goger provides sufficient evidence to support a triable issue of material fact as to the first and third causes of action. However, she did not meet her burden as to the second cause of action. In her opposition, she asked for a continuance. This motion was continued to allow compliance with a prior discovery ruling and for supplemental briefs to be filed based on the new evidence provided. Supplemental briefing was filed on 5/18/26 and 5/28/26.
In Goger’s supplemental opposition, she appears unhappy with Staiton’s response to the court ordered production. However, she does not seek another continuance. For purposes of opposition, she concedes that a loan was made by Staiton as trustee for Pacific Lending Trust #2. She argues that the loan is void under California’s Financing Law because Staiton or Pacific Lending Trust #2 were required to have broker or lending licenses. She asserts that if the California Financing Law is willfully violated, the loan is void. She contends that it is possible that the loan falls under this law and that Staiton’s conduct was willful. She also argues that it is likely at trial that she will be able to provide evidence to establish that Bent likely returned the $40,000 to Staiton. She argues there is little documentation to support the loan and it’s likely that Staiton had been working for Bent.
In supplemental reply, Staiton reasserts the validity of his arguments regarding his first and third causes of action. He argues that Goger has failed to provide any authority to support her arguments regarding the second cause of action.
The motion for summary adjudication is granted as to the second cause of action. As addressed below, Staiton met his initial burden. Goger argues that this motion should be denied to the second cause of action because under Financial Code § 22750(b), “[i]f any provision of this division is willfully violated in the making or collection of a loan, whether by a licensee or by an unlicensed person subject to this division, the contract of loan is void, and no person has any right to collect or receive any principal, charges, or recompense in connection with the transaction.” Goger has failed to cite to any authority that she has the ability to void the loan or that the fact that you could void
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the loan makes Staiton’s documents regarding the loan constitutes a slander of title when the loan has not been voided.
She fails to establish that the Financial Code is applicable to the loan. The portion of the Financial Code that Goger attempts to apply to Staiton only applies to those making more than five loans in a 12-month period. (Financial Code § 22050(e).) The only evidence to support that the Financial Code applies to Staiton is that on a website an individual with the same name as Richard Staiton, identified himself as an investor interested in property acquisitions in the Palm Desert area. It is unclear when this post was made and whether it was made by Staiton.
Additionally, it is unclear how this shows that Staiton’s conduct is covered by the Financial Code. This printout appears to indicate that an individual is looking to connect with buyers to invest or buy property. It indicates that this person is in “Property Acquisitions.” There is no language indicating that this individual is a lender. This evidence does nothing to establish that Staiton made more than 5 loans in a 12-year time period. Additionally, Goger provides no evidence that any of Staiton’s conduct was willful.
As such, she has failed to meet her burden to establish that there is a triable issue of material fact as to the second cause of action.
While Goger contends that she is likely to prove at trial that the loan was fake, she again provides no evidence in the supplemental opposition to support this assertion. She argues that it is possible that Staiton may have worked for Bent. Again, she does not provide any evidence that there was any working relationship between Staiton and Goger. Even if she did establish this, this does not establish that the loan was fake. As such, the motion is granted as to the second cause of action. It is denied as to the first and third causes of action because there are triable issues of material fact as to these causes of action.
3. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION TO CHALLENGE THE DINH VS COUNTY OF PRIVILEGE LOG AND ORDER FULL CVRI2400295 RIVERSIDE COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT ORDER Tentative Ruling:
Plaintiff moves to challenge the adequacy of the privilege log served by the County in response to Plaintiff’s document demands described in her deposition notices of two County employees, Olivia Serna and Matthew Thompson, and to compel the County’s compliance with the Court’s previous November 12, 2025, order compelling production of such documents. Plaintiff noticed the depositions of the County’s employees, Olivia Serna (Asst. Director) and Matt Thompson (Senior Investigator), who Plaintiff alleges were tasked with pretextually investigating Plaintiff during her employment with the County.
Plaintiff contends that these deponents failed to produce certain emails and records which were demanded in Plaintiff’s deposition notices. Plaintiff contends that despite the Court’s order compelling production of records, the County has intentionally withheld discoverable emails and communications while