MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES
1. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME FIGUEROA ROJAS VS CVPS2400373 AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES CO., INC. Tentative Ruling:
This is a lemon law matter. On 1/22/2024, Alida Figueroa Rojas (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Honda”) asserting a single cause of action for breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Act. The case concerns a 2019 Honda Civic purchased by Plaintiff on 9/8/2019.
Now, Plaintiff moves for $20,628 in attorneys’ fees, a 1.5x multiplier for an additional $10,314 in fees, and $3,256.37 in costs. Plaintiff state they are the prevailing party under the Song-Beverly Act and pursuant to the settlement agreement entered by the parties. Plaintiff argues she is thus entitled to attorneys’ fees and provides support for the requested hourly rates and billing entries, as well a memorandum of costs.
In opposition, Honda argues the request is unreasonable for an unremarkable lemon law case. Honda also argues that Plaintiff’s counsel did not justify the high hourly rates requested and that several specific entries are excessive. Finally, Honda states this case does not warrant a 1.5x enhancement. Honda does not challenge the requested costs.
In reply, Plaintiff restates the arguments from the moving papers.
ANALYSIS
The Song-Beverly Act contains a cost-shifting provision that expressly allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover their costs and expenses, including attorney fees. Civil Code §1794(d) provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under [the Song-Beverly Act], the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” There is no dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in the action and are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Thus, the only question to be determined by this motion is the amount of the award.
The matter of reasonableness of a party’s attorney fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Co. (1989) 190 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1062
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time records and billing statements. (See Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587; see also Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1394.)
In determining the reasonable amount of attorney fees, the court first determines a lodestar figure (time reasonably spent by each biller multiplied by an hourly rate that is reasonable for each biller). (Serrant v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48.) In exercising its discretion, the Court may consider all of the facts and the entire procedural history of the case in setting the amount of a reasonable attorney fee award. (Bernardi, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1394; see also PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096 (factors considered in determining the reasonableness of a party’s attorney fees include the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given and the success or failure).)
First, the hourly rates are not reasonable for Riverside County. Plaintiff’s counsel is from Los Angeles. Plaintiff makes no showing they could not obtain local counsel, and therefore, are entitled to out-of-town rates. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 615-619 (plaintiffs were entitled to Santa Monica rates for counsel when they proved they could not obtain local counsel).) A “reasonable” hourly rate is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant community. (PLCM Group, Inc. v.
Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) Plaintiff’s counsel rates range from $350/hour to $600/hour for attorneys and $145/hour to $200/hour for paralegals and clerks. The court should reduce the hourly rates based on the court’s experience regarding similar rates in the community, which is $400/hour for a partner, $300/hour for an associate, and $150/hour for clerks. The requested $145/hour rate for paralegals is reasonable.
Also, in evaluating the reasonableness of an attorney fee request, the trial court may consider whether the case was overstaffed. (Reck v. FCA US, LLC (2021) 4 Cal.App.5th 682, 699.) This case was clearly overstaffed with 8 attorneys, three paralegals, and one law clerk. The court should strike the de minimis time entries of attorneys Amy Morse, Elvira Kamosko, Roger Kirnos, and Timothy Lupinek – each of whom billed under 3 hours on this case.
As far as the entries themselves, Plaintiff’s counsel contends they spent an aggregate of 60.4 hours litigating the case over 2 years. Despite Honda’s arguments to the contrary, the billing entries appear commensurate with the tasks performed. Honda argues the court should strike billing entries after 10/22/2025 because that is when Honda served the 998 Offer. But Plaintiff did not accept the 998 Offer until 12/8/2025 – the last date there are any entries relating to litigation tasks not tied to this settlement. (See Declaration of Roger Kirnos, Exhibit C.)
Finally, Plaintiff’s request for a 1.5x Lodestar enhancement is meritless. The purpose of the lodestar enhancement is “to bring financial incentives for attorneys enforcing important constitutional rights...into line with incentives they have to undertake claims for which they are paid on a fee-for-services basis.” (Ketchem v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) The party seeking the enhancement has the burden of proof. (Id. at 1138.) “[A] trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional
representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation. Otherwise, the fee award will result in unfair double counting and be unreasonable.” (Id. at 1138.) In the present case, there is no reason for an enhancement; this is merely double billing. This was not a complicated case; there was no exceptional quality of work.
Regarding costs, Plaintiff requests $3,256.37 per the memorandum of costs. Honda does not challenge this request. The court should award the full amount requested.
For these reasons, the court should reduce the award as follows:
Biller Total Reduced Rate in $ Total Reduced Time ($400/hour for partners and Amount in $ senior attorneys; $300/hour for associates; $150/ hour for clerks and paralegals) Brian Plummer 11.7 400 4,680 Harita Nandivada 3.5 300 1,050 Keishunn Johnson 8.2 300 2,460 Nitin Sapra 5.6 400 2,600 Jonathan Rivera Cruz 9.5 145 1,377.50 Kasey Xicara 6.6 145 957 Lee Salazar 4.3 145 623.50 Daniel Limes1 3.5 150 525
Total Fees 14,273 Total Costs 3,256.37
Total Award 17,528.37
1 Mr. Limes is an attorney admitted to the Puerto Rico bar with whom Plaintiff’s counsel contracts with for
“attorney and law clerk services.” (Declaration of Roger Kirnos, ¶ 28(c).) Because Mr. Limes is not licensed to practice in California, his services should be billed at the law clerk rate.