Petitioner’s Motion for Sanctions
LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 15, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.
No. 26CV00034
GIBB v. TOYOTA MOTOR CREDIT CORP.
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
The motion is denied.
Petitioner Ian Gibb (“Gibb”) filed an amended petition for alternative writ of mandate on January 16, 2026. Respondent is Toyota Motor Credit Corporation (“respondent”). Gibb asserts his vehicle was towed from a parking lot in Napa County where respondent operates. Gibb asserts he made multiple written requests seeking documents, information, and clarification regarding the grounds for removal of his vehicle. Gibb claims violations of Vehicle Code section 22658, subdivision (f). Gibb seeks a writ of mandate, ordering respondent to perform their duties pursuant to this section. Gibb argues a writ is required because respondent has withheld the grounds for the tow which stifles his ability to pursue a post-storage hearing.
On January 8, 13, and 20, 2026, Gibb applied for ex parte orders shortening time or in the alternative, issuance of an alternative writ of mandate. Each request was denied.
Respondent filed a demurrer to the second amended petition. On May 11, 2026, this Court sustained, with leave to amend, the demurrer. Gibb filed a third amended petition on May 15, 2026.
On May 4, 2026, before the demurrer hearing, Gibb filed this motion for sanctions against respondent’s counsel pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. Gibb argues that respondent delayed the proceeding with a “frivolous demurrer.” In opposition, respondent argues that Gibbs failed to provide notice of the motion for sanctions with the 21-day safe harbor, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, subdivision (f)(1)(B). Next, respondent argues that the record strongly supports a contention that Gibb’s filings, not respondent’s, are frivolous, pointing to the three ex parte applications which were denied. Finally, respondent maintains that this motion is moot because the Court already sustained its demurrer.
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, subdivision (a) provides that “[a] trial court may order a party, the party’s attorney, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” Actions or tactics includes “the making or opposing of motions or the filing and service of a complaint, cross-complaint, answer, or other responsive pleading.” Frivolous is defined as “totally and completely without merit or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 128.5, subd. (b)(1)-(2).)
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LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 15, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.
The Court does not find evidence of actions or tactics made in bad faith on the part of respondent or its counsel. The Court does not find that respondent’s demurrer was frivolous, particularly since this Court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend, finding merit to respondent’s position. Therefore, there is no basis to levy sanctions against respondent or its counsel. Procedurally, the request for sanctions is also deficient because respondent asserts Gibbs failed to abide by the 21-day safe harbor requirement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, subdivision (f)(1)(B): “[i]f the alleged action or tactic is the making or opposing of a written motion or the filing and service of a complaint, cross-complaint, answer, or other responsive pleading that can be withdrawn or appropriately corrected, a notice of motion shall be served as provided in Section 1010, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court, unless 21 days after service of the motion or any other period as the court may prescribe, the challenged action or tactic is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.”
Therefore, the motion for sanctions is denied.
No. 24CV03566
CROWN ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC v. CHAVEZ
(UNOPPOSED) DEFENDANT CHAVEZ CALDERON’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT
The motion is denied. Defendant’s motion fails to establish mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect and he failed to serve it on plaintiff.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Crown Asset Management, LLC obtained a default judgment against debtor Samuel Chavez, who now moves to set aside the judgment based on Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).
Timeline:
12/18/24 Plaintiff filed a limited jurisdiction collections complaint for unpaid credit card charges of $1,541.22
1/30/25 Defendant substitute served by registered process server
11/7/25 Default judgment entered by the clerk